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Abstract 
This dissertation investigates the structural dynamics of the inter-organizational 
(litigation, alliance) relations in the environmental movement sector (EMS) in the United 
States, 1970-2001. Particularly, it focuses on the litigative and alliance ties between the 
environmental organizations (EORGs) including both environmental movement 
organizations (EMOs) and environmental government agencies (EGAs), and explaining 
the processes by which the contemporary inter-EORG structure has emerged over time. 
The methods used in analysis include (balance, structural) partitioning, p-star logit, and 
categorical data analysis in statistical network analysis. The data analyzed were collected 
from various sources including LexisNexis and Guide Star and include both 
organizational attributes and relations. To explicate the dynamic processes by which the 
contemporary inter-EORG structure has emerged, this dissertation investigates the 
formation of dyadic, triadic, and network structure with regard to litigative and alliance 
ties, respectively. Selected fundamental models of network dynamics (transitive 
dominance, strategic actor, and social balance) help explain the empirical inter-
organizational (litigation, alliance) relations in later chapters. The theoretical and 
empirical findings help better understand the structural and dynamic issues in the study of 
the environment, social movement, complex organizations, and network evolution. 
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Part I 
 
Introduction 
 Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
The introduction of the “environment” as an object of sociological inquiry was not until 
recently in the United States (see Fisher, 1967; Catton and Dunlap, 1979; Sallee, 1979; 
Buttel, 1987; Lamm, 1992). The sociological inquiry of the environment has varied in 
relation to, but is not limited, the following central topics in the discipline: state, policy, 
development, media, industry, management, globalization, science, culture, and religion. 
The inquiry has addressed varied problems that plagued the society such as substandard 
housing, energy consumption, work conditions, gender inequality, poverty, crime, health 
inequity, and injustice. 
While noticing the arguable differences in movement characteristics between the 
social movement with regard to the environment and the conventional (labor, human 
rights) movements, scholars studying the environment and social movements have 
labeled the collective behavior with regard to the environment “new social movement” 
(NSM) (Gamson, 1989).1 Although this dissertation research does not intend to assess the 
characteristics of the “newness” of the collective activities regarding the environment, it 
                                                          
1 Other NSMs include peace/anti-war, feminist movements, etc. The debate has been fierce with regard to, 
among other topics, the questions of “newness” of the new social movements and whether the new social 
movements are a product of the shift to a postindustrial economy (for an overview, see Pichardo, 1997). 
While being productive, the debate will not come to an end until we have more evidence to support varying 
theorization of the contemporary social movements. In addition, as scholars have pointed out, comparative 
study of varying social movements in different movement sectors will be a necessity before we can fully 
evaluate the nature of contemporary social movements (see Canel, 1992; Klandermans, 1986; Klandermans 
and Tarrow, 1986). 
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considers as noticeable the emergence of the contemporary movement as characterized 
by the active contentious relations and alliances between the organizations over the past 
decades. While assuming that the movement structure composed of both contentious and 
alliance relations will characterize the structural organization of the environmental 
movement sector (EMS), which constrains (or facilitates) movement activities, this 
dissertation addresses how the contemporary movement structure has emerged in the 
United States since 1970. 
This dissertation research answers the grand question of “what has generated the 
contemporary movement structure in the environmental movement sector (EMS) in the 
United States since 1970?” While aiming to answer the grand research question above, 
this dissertation research pursues two goals: (a) explicating the structural dynamics of the 
EMS in the United States over the period, 1970-2001 that have brought about the 
contemporary movement structure and (b) developing a theoretical and methodological 
framework for analyzing complex network structure and its dynamics. Recent advances 
in social network analysis and organization theory will help, to a great extent, achieve 
those goals thereby help better understand the contemporary movement structure in the 
EMS from a multidisciplinary perspective. This first chapter introduces what (empirical) 
problems are to be solved, what theoretical questions motivated the study, and what 
structural processural foundations are needed for the discussions in the chapters that will 
follow.  
 
1.1   The Problem 
The literature of social movements has discussed how social movements emerge, develop, 
and dissolve in varied contexts. It included discussions of what preconditions social 
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movements (cycles), how social movements present movement agenda, how social 
movements organize movement activities, how social movements mobilize resources 
(labor, finance, time, etc.), how social movements (do not) achieve movement outcomes, 
how social movements dissolve, and finally how social movement outcomes result. In 
fact, the studies of social movements since the 1960s have considerably extended our 
knowledge so that we have a comprehensive understanding of the topics involving social 
movements. 
While the studies of social movements have covered a wide range of topics of 
social movements, not many have attempted an explanation of the processes by which the 
contemporary movement structure has evolved. It appears that many studies have been 
satisfied with the narratives of the movement dynamics by simply describing the 
processes (including incidental episodes) by which the contemporary movement structure 
came into existence. This holds true in most social movement sectors. We need a 
systemic understanding of the structural dynamics with regard to how the contemporary 
complex movement structure has emerged from its simplest form by utilizing systemic 
methods. Without it, our understanding of varied movement activities that are constrained 
(or facilitated) by the movement dynamics would be limited. 
In fact, there have been attempts to explain the structural dynamics of the 
movement sectors. However, they did not give deserved attention to the structural-
relational dimension of the movement sectors (for an exception, see Diani and McAdam, 
2003). Even if they did, the consideration of the structural-relational dimension was 
“metaphoric”, not “substantive” (Berkowitz and Wellman, 1983). Accordingly, analysis 
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did not aim to investigate which movement element is linked to which movement 
element through which relation (Meyer, 2004). 
This dissertation focuses on the structural dynamics of the environmental 
movement sector since the 1970 in particular thereby the contemporary movement 
structure has emerged. Unlike other social movements, the environmental movement in 
the United States has developed relatively recently in its modern form through dynamic 
trajectories that are not yet fully understood. Investigation of the movement structure and 
its trajectories would help us to better characterize the contemporary environmental 
movement in the United States, which may signify the future movement that will have to 
solve unprecedented environmental problems. 
 
1.2   Theoretical Motivation 
This dissertation research–particularly, an empirical investigation of the EMS in chapters 
6, 7, and 8–was motivated by intellectual efforts to answer a set of theoretical questions 
that were relevant in the multidisciplinary area involving social movement/collective 
action, complex organizations, and network-structural dynamics.2 The specific theoretical 
inquiries, which will be presented in this section with corresponding hypotheses, are 
concerned with the generative-structural processes thereby development of dyadic and 
triadic (litigative, alliance) ties leads to the emergence of the contemporary 
                                                          
2 This dissertation research assumes that the outcomes in environmentalism are, to some extent, contingent 
on the inter-EMO relations, which makes indispensable study of the “networks” of EMOs. A succinct but 
useful definition of network can be “a set of actors and the relations defined over them” (Doreian and 
Stokman, 1997). Thus, studying inter-EMO relations from a network perspective requires, first, 
identification of a set of EMOs and the explicit ties between them and, second, investigation of the 
structural properties (e.g., hierarchy) of the EMO networks–processes of tie formation that “generate” the 
structural properties of the networks that, in turn, facilitates (or constrains) organizational behavior (Fararo 
and Butts, 1999). 
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environmental movement structure. Of varied structural-theoretical approaches, this 
dissertation research benefits from recent advances in social balance models, E-state 
structuralism, and strategic actor models in appropriate chapters. 
This dissertation research was, first, motivated by the premise that organizations 
do not form and maintain ties with other organizations randomly. Rather, they are 
conscious or purposive in determining who their partners or enemies and the formation of 
basic dyadic (litigative, alliance) ties, along with the formation of triadic ties, can be 
thought to have generated the contemporary movement structure in the EMS in the 
United States. Under this assumption that the formations of litigation and alliances are 
not random, the first line of inquiry asks, first, if the environmental organizations 
(EORGs) that are specialized in modern strategies of litigation and lobbying have tended 
to use litigation as a movement strategy [Q1a] and, second, if the EORGs with similar 
organizational characteristics–in particular, action areas and strategies–have tended to 
cooperate with each other [Q1b]. Thus, it is hypothesized that the EORGs that have been 
active in the formation of litigation and in the formation of alliances have had different 
organizational characteristics, respectively [H1a] [H1b]. 
 
Question 1a. “In what ways have the organizational characteristics been 
associated with lawsuit formation in the environmental movement sector (EMS) in the 
United States since 1970?” [Q1a] 
 
Hypothesis 1a. “The environmental movement organizations (EMOs) that are 
specialized in modern strategies of litigation and lobbying have used litigation as a 
movement strategy against movement opponents in the environmental movement sector 
(EMS) in the United States since 1970.” [H1a] 
 
Question 1b. “In what ways have the organizational characteristics been 
associated with alliance formation in the environmental movement sector (EMS) in the 
United States since 1970?” [Q1b] 
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Hypothesis 1b. “The environmental movement organizations (EMOs) with 
similar organizational characteristics–in particular, action areas and strategies–have 
cooperated with each other for litigation in the environmental movement sector (EMS) in 
the United States since 1970.” [H1b] 
 
This dissertation research was also motivated by a structural-theoretical inquiry 
concerned with the processes thereby dyadic ties develop onto triadic (litigative, alliance) 
structures over time. That is, triadic dominance structures and alliance structures emerge 
by three dyadic ties are closed in certain principles or mechanism(s) of structural 
dynamics. The second line of inquiry asks under what conditions triadic dominance and 
collaborative movement structures emerged in the EMS in the United States. A few basic 
models of network dynamics that include triadic completion processes such as E-state 
structuralism (Berger, Wagner, and Zelditch, 1985; Fararo and Skvoretz, 1986) and 
strategic actor models (Burt, 1992; Doreian, 2006) help the investigation. It is 
hypothesized that the transitive dominance mechanism as in Hypothesis 2a [H2a] will 
appear and the strategic actor mechanism as in Hypothesis 2b [H2b] will appear in the 
generative-structural processes in the EMS. 
 
Question 2a. “Under what conditions have triadic dominant movement structures 
been formed in the environmental movement sector (EMS) in the United States since 
1970?” [Q2a] 
 
Hypothesis 2a. “The litigation structure has been transitive (x→y→z then, x→z) 
in the environmental movement sector (EMS) in the United States since 1970, i.e., an 
environmental organization (EORG) (x) that filed a lawsuit against EORG (y) that filed a 
lawsuit against EORG (z) has been more likely than others to file a lawsuit against EORG 
(z).” [H2a] 
 
Question 2b. “Under what conditions have triadic collaborative movement 
structure haves been formed in the environmental movement sector (EMS) in the United 
States since 1970?” [Q2b] 
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Hypothesis 2b. “The environmental movement organizations (EMOs) located in 
the positions that are strategically disadvantageous have been more likely than others to 
cooperate with other EMOs in the environmental movement sector (EMS) in the United 
States since 1970.” [H2b] 
 
Comparable with the second inquiry, the third inquiry deals with the structural 
dynamics when the two distinct types of (litigative, alliance) ties are combined. In 
contrast to the mechanisms above, the dynamic here is due to structural tensions rather 
than benefits or control. The second line of inquiry asks under what conditions triadic 
signed structures have been balanced in the environmental movement sector (EMS) in the 
United States. Although social balance models as a triadic completion model help the 
investigation, this dissertation research also considers the characteristics of the EORGs 
involved in structural dynamics. Thus, it is hypothesized that the EGAs in imbalanced 
structures have been more likely than the EMOs to make the structures balanced in the 
EMS in the United States [H3a]. Partitioning a signed network into a set of equivalent 
positions also help investigate the structural dynamics. The EORGs located in equivalent 
positions within and between plus-sets are expected to play similar roles in the alliance 
structure in the EMS in the United States [H3b]. 
 
Question 3a. “Under what conditions have triadic signed structures been 
balanced in the environmental movement sector (EMS) in the United States since 1970?” 
[Q3a] 
 
Hypothesis 3a. “The environmental government agencies (EGAs) in imbalanced 
structures have been more likely than the environmental movement organizations 
(EMOs) to make the structures balanced in the environmental movement sector (EMS) in 
the United States since 1970.” [H3a] 
 
Question 3b. “Have the environmental organizations (EORGs) located in 
equivalent positions in signed structures behaved in a similar fashion in the 
environmental movement sector (EMS) in the United States since 1970?” [Q3b] 
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Hypothesis 3b. “The EORGs located in equivalent positions within and between 
plus-sets have been more likely than others to form (litigative, alliance) ties in a similar 
fashion in the environmental movement sector (EMS) in the United States since 1970.” 
[H3b] 
 
Finally, this dissertation research was motivated by the inquiry of what structural 
characteristics have emerged in the EMS in the United States given the principles of the 
formation of the dyadic and triadic structures investigated thus far. The structural 
characteristics that interest this dissertation research include several network-structural 
properties such as “connectedness,” “balance,” and “hierarchy.” Naturally, the current 
inquiry directs attention to the trajectory of the dynamic movement structure through time 
and thus the generative-structural mechanism(s) that has generated the contemporary 
environmental movement structure (Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1998; Fararo and Butts, 
1999). Basic models of network dynamics focusing on triadic completion processes 
discussed above help study the generative-structural processes. Investigating the 
structural properties of the contemporary environmental movement structure that has 
emerged will suggest how the organizational behavior of the EORGs embedded in the 
movement structure will be constrained or facilitated depending on the positions that they 
are occupying. 
 
Question 4. “What are the structural characteristics (e.g., connectedness, balance, 
and hierarchy) of the contemporary movement structure that has emerged in the 
environmental movement sector (EMS) in the United States since 1970?” [Q4] 
 
Hypothesis 4. “The contemporary movement structure in the environmental 
movement sector (EMS) in the United States can be characterized as disconnected, 
decentralized, and yet balanced.” [H4] 
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1.3   Processural Foundations 
This section introduces briefly the fundamental conceptions of statistical network 
analysis for investigating the structural dynamics of the environmental movement 
structure in the following chapters: network structure, network evolution, and estimation 
of tie probability. First introduced is the conception of “network structure” and, 
particularly, partition structures–both cohesive and equivalent subsets. Second, the 
section introduces the conception of “network evolution”. To discuss fundamental 
models of network evolution in the following chapter, it focuses on the triadic 
(completion) models in which dyadic ties are assumed to be dependent on each other 
while generating the complex movement structure through the generative-structural 
processes. Finally, this section introduces an exponential random graph model (ERGM) 
to estimate the probability of whether or not there is a relational tie between two distinct 
actors. 
 
1.3.1   Structure and Dynamics 
Network Structure. As Doreian and Stokman (1997) succinctly define, network 
structure is “a set of nodes and relations defined over them.” Formally, a network 
structure is summarized G(V, A, E) where G represents a graph, V a vertex set, A a set of 
arcs, and E a set of edges given A ∩ E = Ø.3  Although there are multiple ways to 
investigate the network structure, the researcher may focus on one or more of differing 
layers of network structure. That is, the researcher may examine the characteristics of the 
                                                          
3 In this dissertation, vertices and nodes to indicate the points in graphs are used interchangeably as in other 
network studies. The same is true for edges and arcs to indicate the relations although edges are used in 
non-directed graphs while arcs in directed graphs or simply digraphs. 
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network structure by focusing on the individual or local level characteristics such as 
measures of degree centrality (Freeman, 1979) or the whole or global level characteristics 
such as centralization and density. Alternatively, the researcher may want to consider 
sub-structures such as cliques, k-cores, or positions depending on the theoretical and 
empirical interests. The network structure may also be of different modes: one-mode, 
two-mode, or multiple-mode. While conventional research has analyzed one-mode or 
two-mode networks only, a scheme to represent (particularly visually) multiple-mode 
network has been developed (Carley, 2001).4 
Network Partitions. A network structure may be partitioned into several sub-
structures. The methods to partition the network are varied and represent different 
approaches: relational or position approach. A relational approach is concerned with 
viewing the network structure as a collection of nodes joining adjacent neighbors. By 
examining the ways in which nodes are tied to adjacent neighbors, the researcher 
attempts to detect cohesive subgroups or regions (e.g., cliques, core/periphery, k-core) 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994). For example, a network routine, “cliques” is used to detect 
a maximally complete subgraph in which every node is linked directly to every other 
node. Similarly, “core/periphery” identifies which nodes belong in the core and which 
belong in the periphery. From a slightly different perspective, “k-core” finds all k-cores 
for every possible value of k. A k-core in an undirected graph is a connected maximal 
induced subgraph which has minimum degree greater than or equal to k. These 
                                                          
4 While network theory and methods have been confined to one-mode or two-mode relations, Kathleen M. 
Carley and associates have developed the meta-network framework (and subsequently computer packages) 
to represent and analyze the interdependence of substructures in the macrostructure in which multiple types 
of entities are linked through multiplex relations (Krackhardt and Carley, 1998; Carley and Hill, 2001). 
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procedures from a relational approach partition the network structure into subgroups or 
regions in which nodes have similar attributes (e.g., attitudes, motivation). 
In contrast, a positional approach is concerned with viewing the network structure 
as a collection of nodes occupying potentially equivalent positions. Thus, the researcher 
attempts to partition the network structure into equivalent positions that may signify 
similar roles (Lorrain and White, 1971; White, Boorman, and Breiger, 1976). In search of 
equivalent nodes in a network structure, there are two approaches: structural equivalence 
and regular equivalence. Two nodes are structurally equivalent if they are equally related 
to and from all other nodes (Lorrain and White, 1971) while they are regularly equivalent 
if they are equally related to equivalent others (Borgatti and Everett, 1989, 1993). Despite 
a slight difference in algorithm, these procedures partition the network structure into 
positions in which nodes play similar roles. Recently, network theorists introduced 
blockmodeling technique to partition a network into pre-defined block types and 
permutate the network to calculate the fit (White, Boorman, and Breiger, 1976; Doreian 
et al., 2005a, 2005b). 
While the network partitions have been searched mainly in one-mode networks, 
advances in the methods have involved partitioning two-mode networks as well. Batagelj 
(2003) developed an algorithm to blockmodel two-mode network data by local 
optimization. Further, Doreian et al (2005a, 2005b) presented a generalized 
blockmodeling of two-mode network data. In principle, they treated rows and columns of 
a two-mode network separate entities and thus partition them separately. The two-mode 
network data are permutated and compared with pre-defined block types to calculate the 
fit. The advances in the methods to deal with two-mode network data have been useful in 
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social network analysis in that social sciences often deal with affiliative relations such as 
membership or participation. This dissertation research will also investigate some two-
mode networks and thus benefit from these techniques. 
Finally, given the signed network data, network partitions are searched in a 
completely different manner. In a signed network, the relations are positive (+), negative 
(–), or null. The partitioning method (i.e., “balance partition”) in a signed network 
partitions the nodes into plus-sets so that the nodes within the plus-sets are joined by 
positive ties while the nodes between the plus-sets negative. The methods to measure the 
(im)balance of a signed network have included consideration of cycle (or semi-cycle) 
(Cartwright and Harary, 1956), weighting (Hummon and Fararo, 1995), and line index 
(Harary, 1959; Harary et al., 1965; Doreian and Mrvar, 1996). A revival of interest in 
social balance theory has allowed advances in studies of mechanisms to explain network 
dynamics theoretically (Doreian and Krackhardt, 2001; Hummon and Doreian, 2003) and 
conflictual relations in social worlds empirically (Moore, 1979). 
Network Evolution. Network evolution is an ordered process of a network 
structure with a trajectory through time. Study of network evolution has been done in 
varied approaches since social balance theory (Heider, 1946; 1958) and social exchange 
theory (Homans, 1950; Blau, 1964; Kapferer, 1972). In an effort to discover processual 
mechanisms in network evolution, several models have been presented. This dissertation 
research notices models with the two different properties as follows because they are 
thought to generate network structures that cannot be reduced to lower level properties: 
(a) dependence of dyadic ties and (b) generative-structuralism. Following the two 
properties, this dissertation focuses on the following three models of network evolution: 
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(a) social balance models (Heider, 1946, 1958), (b) E-state structuralism models 
(Skvoretz et al., 1996), and (c) rational choice models (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996; 
Hummon, 2000; Doreian, 2006). 
Formally, network evolution can be expressed as follows: when a network 
structure is summarized G (V, E) where G represents graph, V vertex, and E edge, we let 
X(t) denote the network state at time t. Here, X(t) can be a g x g adjacency matrix with 
entries xij(t). A sequence of matrices, X(t1), …, X(tn) is called a trajectory of the network. 
  
Xij(t) =  1 an edge runs from node i to node j at time t 
    0 otherwise 
 
Dyadic Dependence. Network structure evolves by two distinct nodes creating 
dyadic ties given a fixed set of nodes. Network evolution can be modeled in a different 
fashion depending on the assumption of the (in)dependence of dyadic ties: creation of 
dyadic ties can be either dependent or independent. For example, while assuming dyadic 
independence, the principle of “homophily” proposes that nodes with similar attributes 
tend to create a tie with each other, which can add up to a network structure (McPherson 
and Smith-Lovin, 1987). Holland and Leinhardt (1979), on the other hand, argue that any 
network in which higher level properties can be modeled adequately using only 
properties of nodes and dyads has no social structure. While the conditions that they 
assumed generate ‘random’ networks without significant structural properties, this 
dissertation is concerned with the conditions that generate “biased” networks. Thus, it 
focuses on the models that assume dyadic dependence and particularly basic triadic 
completion models including the three examples mentioned above. 
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Generative Processes. Fararo and Butts (1999) define generative or generative-
structural processes as the processes by which complex system level properties emerge 
from simple local level changes. Recent decades have seen advances in theoretical 
development and (simulation) modeling in social sciences (Chomsky, 1957; Bourdieu, 
1990; Fararo and Butts, 1999; Epstein and Axtell, 1997). In parallel, network theorists 
have modeled the same processes to discover (generative) mechanisms to explain 
network evolution in which complex network properties emerge from changes in dyadic 
ties. Here, I introduce some examples of generative mechanisms discovered by network 
theorists. In commonality, they attempt to explicate the trajectories in which triadic 
relations are closed while assuming that a series of dyad creation is dependent on each 
other. They include balance mechanism, bystander mechanism, and, so to speak, utility 
mechanism. Each mechanism explains generative process by which particular social 
structure (e.g., hierarchy) emerges. 
 
1.3.2   Tie Probability 
Choice of Model. Over the past decades, there have been remarkable advances in 
statistical network analysis in developing models to estimate the probability of existence 
(or absence) of a relational tie in network structure. Initially, the p family models 
assumed the independence of dyads (Holland and Leinhardt, 1977; Fienberg and 
Wasserman, 1981; Holland and Leinhardt, 1981) and yet later (p-star) did not (Frank and 
Strauss, 1986; Strauss and Ikeda, 1990; Wasserman and Pattison, 1996; Pattison and 
Wasserman, 1998; see also Rennolls, 1995). The biggest advance in these models, 
compared to conventional statistical models to deal with categorical outcomes, is that 
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these models include relational properties (e.g., transitivity) of the network as well as 
attributes of the actors. Given the empirical network data, the relational effects are 
estimated and compared with structural properties of the baseline random graph. 
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 Chapter 2 
Literature: Movement Dynamics 
 
The rise of modern social movements/collective action in the United States dates back to 
the 1950s. Since then, contemporary social movements have developed while covering 
various areas such as civil rights, labor, women, peace, the environment, and so forth. As 
Zald and McCarthy (1987) pointed out, however, the literature on social 
movements/collective action has surprisingly been lacking systematic analysis of the 
interaction of social movement organizations (SMOs) (for exceptions see Zald and Ash, 
1966; Gusfield, 1966; Wilson, 1973; Nelson, 1974). The same holds true for the 
environmental movement in the United States on which this dissertation research will 
focus. The existing literature on American environmental movement has tended to focus 
on the deployment of the environmental movement without due attention to the structural 
and dynamic characteristics of the inter-organizational relations in the movement that 
may constrain or facilitate its deployment and thus are equally important as the specific 
topics are. 
While there were general narratives of the structure and changes in the 
contemporary environmental movement sector (EMS) in the United States (Liroff, 1976; 
Trubek, 1978; Fox, 1981; Andrews, 1999, Brulle, 2000; see also a journalistic account by 
Shabecoff, 2000; 2003 and others), in common, scholars have noticed structural changes 
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in the contemporary EMS as follows: (a) growth and professionalization of EMOs 
operating at the national level (Mitchell, Mertig, and Dunlap, 1991), 5  6  (b) heavy 
dependence on large private foundations for funding opportunities (Jenkins and Halcli, 
1999; Brulle and Caniglia, 1999), (c) expansion of alliances for both mobilization and 
protest, (d) prevalent use of lobbying and litigation that are non-traditional strategies 
(Handler, 1978; Pellow, 1999), (e) growing conflicts between ideological camps forming 
conflictual relations within the sector (Edwards, 1995), and (f) increase in right-wing 
conservative movement and countermovement and consequent ideological diversification 
(Gale, 1986; Pichardo, 1997; Shabecoff, 2000). 
Given the structural changes in the contemporary EMS in the United States, this 
chapter will review the literature on how the relations between the environmental 
organizations (EORGs), which are thought to represent the structure of the EMS, have 
evolved along the changes in the social movement sector (SMS) in the United States 
since the late 1960s.7 8 Particularly, the focus will be placed on both the inter-EORG 
                                                          
5 In this chapter, “national EMOs” or “EMOs operating at the national level” are defined as the EMOs with 
membership in more than two states. 
6  For a discussion of professionalization in other social movements, see Jenkins and Eckert (1986), 
Staggenborg (1988), and others. 
7 Network conceptions have been useful in representing and studying the intra- and inter-organizational 
structures. Brass (1984) and Krackhardt (1990) focused on the intra-organizational structure as a network. 
Krackhardt (1994) employs graph theory to measure the structure of informal organizations. Krackhardt 
and Brass (1994) studied organizational behavior (i.e., motivation, leadership, job design, 
turnover/absenteeism, work attitudes, and power) based on network theory. Powell (1990) studied network 
forms of organizations in craft and high-technology industries. Importantly, he contrasts networks with 
market and hierarchical governance structures. He stated, “[S]uch an arrangement is neither a market 
transaction nor a hierarchical governance structure, but a separate, different mode of exchange, one with its 
own logic, a network … Basic assumption of network relationships is that one party is dependent on 
resources controlled by another, and that there are gains to be had by the pooling of resources.” 
8 Following Zald and McCarthy (2002), all the EMOs in the environmental social movement can be 
thought of as an environmental movement industry (EMI). The EMOs within an EMI cooperate, compete, 
and sometimes engage in conflict with each other (Edwards, 1995). They come together for some shared 
purposes either of protest or of collective representation. They compete for resources from sympathizers 
and adherents, and they conflict over leadership of the movement as a whole. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) 
introduced “organizational field” (EOF). 
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conflicts and alliances. 9  The first section will review the literature on the dynamic 
movement conflicts while the second section, dynamic movement alliances. Those 
sections will focus on, first, how the two major types of relationships that have 
constituted the EMS have been studied and, second, what has been known regarding the 
dynamics of the movement sector due to the relationships. The final section will review 
the literature on the approaches to structural dynamics in social movements/collective 
action. The literature on complex organizations and social networks will also be reviewed 
with a discussion of the principles and fundamental models of network dynamics. 
 
2.1   Movement Dynamics: Conflicts 
Just as conflicts and tension have been unavoidable elements in social world, so have 
they been in contemporary social movements. They have been one of the central topics in 
sociological inquiry in general and in the Marxist/critical inquiry in particular. In the 
study of social movements, scholars have focused on the contention between the 
movement and the movement opponents while leaving behind the contention within the 
movement itself. This intellectual negligence of the within-movement conflicts or 
tensions has left the study of contemporary social movements both incomplete and 
inaccurate. In fact, the growth of modern American environmentalism has been in 
                                                          
9 Early organizational theorists including March and Simon (1958), Blau and Scott (1962) among others 
perceived organizations as “rational systems” that “oriented to the pursuit of relatively specific goals and 
exhibiting relatively highly formalized social structures.” It is noticeable that this definition focused not 
only on the distinctive characteristics of organizations but also on their normative structure. Later 
organizational theorists (Gouldner 1959; Gould 1979) understood organizations as “natural systems” whose 
participants share a common interest in the survival of the system and engage in collective activities, 
informally structured, to secure this end. Still other theorists viewed organizations as “open systems” in 
which “interdependent activities linking shifting coalitions of participants”. The systems are thought to be 
embedded in–dependent on continuing exchanges with and constituted by–the environments in which they 
operate (Hirsch, 1972, 1985; Hannan and Freeman, 1977, 1989; Aldrich, 1979; Galaskiewitz, 1979; 
McKelvey, 1982; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Scott, 1983). 
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parallel with the growth of conflicts within the EMS. The literature on social movements 
has noted an increase of tensions and conflicts between the SMOs (Zald and McCarthy, 
1987), and between the movement and countermovement (Zald and Useem, 1987) within 
the SMS–thus, transition from “consensus movement” to “conflict movement.”10 
The literature on the movement dynamics, therefore, caution that it is naïve to 
assume that SMOs all share a common goal and have little interest in competition and 
conflict. As Zald and McCarthy (1987) pointed out, the naïve assumption of the inter-
SMO relations has kept scholars from investigating such central processes. The literature 
on competition and conflicts within the movement sector further presents the conditions 
under which inter-SMO competition turns into conflicts. First, conflicts occur when there 
are limited numbers of institutional funders. Second, conflicts occur when organizational 
survival is at stake. The conflicts emerge to achieve the outcomes as follows: First, 
conflicts emerge for obtaining the legitimacy of representation of constituency or over 
exclusive membership. Second, conflicts emerge for obtaining the symbolic dominance, 
i.e., defining the terms of social movement action (Zald and McCarthy, 1987). 
Zald and Useem (1987) presents interesting triadic models of the conflictual 
relations possible between the movement parties in social movements. While their 
original template includes all parties–social movement (SM), countermovement (CM), 
and authority, Figure 2.1 selects a few models of triadic relations between the social 
movement and the authority, which will be relevant for this dissertation research. 
. 
                                                          
10 Earlier work on right-wing movements and more recent work on conservative countermovements shed 
light on the latent conflicts between the movement/countermovement conflicts (see Bell, 1964; Lipset and 
Raab, 1970 for earlier work) (see Conover and Gray, 1983, Useem, 1984; Luker, 1984 and Useem and Zald, 
1987 for case studies; and see Mottl, 1980; Gale, 1982 and Lo, 1982 for more general treatments). 
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Minimal Direct Conflict
Conflict Model 
State Involvement
 
 
Figure 2.1: Models of SM-CM-Authority Relations 
 
Note: Borrowed and modified from Zald and Useem (1987) 
 
Model A represents the conflictual structure of movement organizations with 
authorities minimally involved. That is, SMOs battle for resources such as members with 
little attempt to change laws or gain state support. Model B represents the conflictual 
structure in which movement organizations directly attack authorities. As movement 
organizations are not sufficiently stable to implement major changes in society, they 
attempt to shift the cost of achieving change from themselves to the government and 
polity at large. Model C places the authorities at the center of the conflictual relations 
between movement organizations. Since distinct movement organizations attempt to 
convince authorities of their position and demonstrate their strength, the triadic structure 
is left “open.” Finally, the “closed” triplet of Model D suggests that movement 
 21
organizations seek to both make demands on the government and damage the other 
movement. 
The literature also notices that a wide range of forms of conflicts have existed in 
environmental movements: verbal claims, direct confrontation, lobbying authorities, 
speaking disparate audiences, litigation, and so on. Of those conflictual relations, most 
highly structured type of antagonistic encounter may be the litigation (Handler, 1978; 
Barkin, 1979; Epp, 1990; Morag-Levine, 2003). While litigation may be a form of the 
most antagonistic relationships between SMOs, it has gained more and more popularity 
as an effective movement strategy since the 1970s (Zald and Berger, 1978; Barkan, 1979; 
Mueller and Judd, 1981; Balser, 1997; McCright and Dunlap, 2000). The next section 
will discuss in detail how scholars have studied litigation as a movement strategy in 
environmental movement in the United States. 
 
2.1.1   Litigation, A Movement Strategy 
Handler (1978) notes that it was from the late 1950s on that litigation has been widely 
used as an instrument of social reform so that it can be called a movement. Most notable 
has been the work of civil rights groups, particularly the litigation activities of the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the NAACP 
Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. (LDF).11 The apparent successes in civil rights 
litigation and the receptivity of the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts 
encouraged other movement groups and organizations to adopt the same strategy. Since 
                                                          
11 This dissertation research focuses on “environmental” litigation only. See Vose (1972), McCloskey 
(1972), Horowitz (1977), and others for further information on court activity in relation to other subject 
areas. 
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then, the movement witnessed three interrelated phenomena: (a) a period of judicial 
activism that stimulated and encouraged the use of litigation as a tool of social reform, (b) 
a growth in the number of client groups turning to lawyers and the courts including 
racial/ethnic minorities, the poor, environmentalists, consumers, women, etc.,12 13 and (c) 
a rise in lawyer organizations interested in law reform, that is, test-case litigation. 
Most legal activities by the SMOs were directed at the government. The SMOs 
have sought to have existing laws enforced or new laws enacted and enforced.14 Besides 
these purposes, nonetheless, litigation has been used for achieving various purposes.15 As 
a nontraditional movement strategy, litigation has been used for various purposes 
including political leverage, publicity, fund raising, consciousness-raising, and 
legitimacy. The section below discusses the use of litigation in environmental movement 
in particular. 
 
                                                          
12 The decades since 1970 have seen the foundation-supported legal defense firms or public interest law 
firms. They were known primarily for representing environmentalists and consumers, but they also 
represent many other interests–the physically and mentally ill, children, women, juveniles, and TV viewers. 
13 Discussion of other types of organizations involved in the legal system is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation research. However, critics argue that interest groups have been taken into alliance with 
government and have become “institutionalized.” Instead of competition among groups vying for 
government benefits, there is consensus politics. Government deals with the most powerful, best-organized 
interests in society and tends to sanction and support bargains already struck, which further strengthens the 
entrenched groups. Thus, the alliance system fails to take into account unarticulated interests or weak and 
poorly organized groups (Lowi, 1971; Connolly, 1969). 
14 Legal defense firms (or public interest law firms) favor litigation and, in some situations, this can be very 
useful for SMOs. Litigation and administrative proceedings for technical and complex matters can be 
lengthy and expensive, and even the largest SMOs have to be very selective in picking causes. But when 
problems are long-term, or complex, or require extensive changes in field-level discretion, more effective 
change may be brought about through lobbying. 
15 Defining organizational success is a difficult problem. Scholars have pointed out that there is a difference 
between the stated or official goals of an organization and its operative goals, the goals that are actually 
pursued. Moreover, as noted, organizations often have multiple goals that can be inconsistent and which, in 
fact, require multiple indicators of success. Legitimacy was one of the criteria that Gamson (1975) uses to 
measure success; he defines legitimacy as whether a challenging group is accepted by antagonists as 
speaking for its constituency. By acceptance, Gamson means consultation, negotiation, formal recognition, 
or inclusion in the antagonists’ organizational structure. 
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2.1.2   Environmental Litigation 
It was in the early 1960s when the EMOs began attacking government agencies for 
failure to take account of environmental considerations in approving projects (Handler, 
1978).16 One of the most significant early battles centered on the efforts of Consolidated 
Edison of New York to build the Storm King pumped storage facility on the Hudson 
River. The utility applied to the Federal Power Commission for the necessary permits and 
licenses, which were granted routinely. However, an EMO contested that decision, and in 
one of the first important environmental cases, Scenic Hudson Preservation Commission 
v. Federal Power Commission (1965), the court held that the agency must take into 
account environmental and aesthetic considerations in decisions on power plant sites. To 
implement this principle, the agency had to grant those who had a special interest in these 
matters (i.e., the EMOs) an opportunity to be heard.17 
The modern environmental movement in the United States started in the years 
immediately following the Scenic Hudson decision.18 The Environmental Defense Fund 
was organized in 1967 and began attacking the use of the pesticide DDT. That litigation 
was used to launch a nationwide campaign that was able to attract large sums of money 
through contributions, membership drives, and form foundations. At the same time, law-
                                                          
16 In the late 1960s, there was also ferment in the Congress. Several congressional hearings and reports 
expressed concern about the way that federal agencies handled natural resources and the environment. The 
impact of the federal government on the environment was significant, but individual agencies were either 
unconcerned about the environment or were relatively insensitive to broader environmental concerns. What 
emerged from Congress’s concern was the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). 
17 Another example might be the proposed construction of the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline (TAP), which was 
halted for failure to file a proper impact statement. Theses decisions came as shocks to government and 
business. Environmental groups and their lawyers were using litigation apparently to great advantage. 
18 Shabecoff (2000) calls the movement since the first Earth Day (April 22, 1970) the “second wave” while 
the movement launched by John Muir, Gifford Pinchot, and Theodore Roosevelt may be described as the 
“first wave” of the modern American environmentalism. In this period, unlike the older conservation 
groups, their focus was not on land and wildlife preservation but on pollution and toxic substances in the 
environment and their effects on human health. 
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reform organizations (e.g., defense firms) devoted to environmental causes grew. For 
example, the Sierra Club organized the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund with a central 
staff office coordinating and lending technical assistance to the legal activities of the 
various Sierra Club chapters throughout the country. In 1970, a group of lawyers and 
environmentalists who had been engaged in the Scenic Hudson litigation formed the 
Natural Resources Defense Counsel (NRDC). Many other law-reform organizations 
pursued several different causes, but included environmental issues as major areas of 
concern. 
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) announced the policy of the 
federal government to create and maintain conditions of “productive harmony” between 
man and nature by assuring “safe, healthful, productive, and aesthetically and culturally 
pleasing surroundings.”19 To back up this pledge, the act required that all major federal 
projects significantly affecting the environment be accompanied by a statement detailing 
the environmental impact of the proposed action. Earth Day was celebrated four months 
after the passage of NEPA, and that event signaled the emergence of the environmental 
movement as a mass political force. 
As with the use of litigation in other social movements, litigation has been used 
successfully for extrajudicial purposes such as gaining time, publicity, harassment, 
embarrassment, increasing costs, and mobilizing political opposition, which has allowed 
the EMOs to employ means other than litigation to pursue their goals. Handler (1978) 
noted that arguably extrajudicial uses of the litigation might have been the most 
important accomplishment of the environmentalists to date. 
 
                                                          
19 42 U.S.C. §4331(a), (6), (2), (3), (1970), Pub. L. No. 91-190, Tit. I, §101 (January 1, 1970) 83 Stat. 852. 
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2.2   Movement Dynamics: Alliances 
In social sciences, scholars have studied alliances in relation to varied topics including 
general theory, innovation, culture, collective action, management, uncertainty, and so on. 
As far as organizations are concerned, they have been studied in both the intra-
organizational and the inter-organizational context. 
Scholars who focused on the inter-organizational alliances were those who 
emphasized the organization-environment interface in network terms (Rogers 1974; Stern 
1979; Boje and Whetten 1981). Studies of the inter-organizational alliances include the 
following examples: While focusing on the exchange relations and exchange networks, 
Cook (1977) developed an extension of the exchange model for the analysis of inter-
organizational relations. As an alternative to the dominant adaptation perspective, 
Hannan and Freeman (1977, 1989) proposed a population ecology perspective on 
organization-environment relations. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), in an effort to 
understand the behavior of an organization in relation to the ecology of organizations, 
argue that organizations survive to the extent that they are effective. Mizruchi and 
Galaskiewicz (1993) reviewed the literature on inter-organizational relations over the past 
years and organize it into three theoretical traditions: resource dependence model, social 
class framework, and institutional model. 
 
2.2.1   Environmental Alliances 
By definition, organizational environment refers to the interface or interconnections 
between organizations and their environments–resources, organizational population, 
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institutions, technological uncertainty, and so on.20 Organizations have been involved in 
alliances with other organizations in the environment to overcome unfavorable conditions 
and effectively mobilize resources. That is, in achieving the judicial and extrajudicial 
purposes, alliances have been widespread between the EMOs that were relatively 
disadvantaged. As discussed above, Handler (1978) notes that there have been a number 
of factors that serve to facilitate alliances among EMOs: task specialization (i.e., similar 
conceptions of goals and tactics), external social control (e.g., norms, resources), 
overlapping constituents (i.e., interlocking boards, memberships), and elite/third-party 
constraints. 
 
2.3   Movement Dynamics: Approaches 
This final section reviews dominant approaches that have existed to studying the 
structural dynamics in social movements. In particular, this section comprises two parts: a 
review of approaches to structural dynamics in the social movement literature and a 
review of approaches to structural dynamics in the social network literature. The 
approaches in social movement center on the “resource mobilization” (RM) approach and 
the “political process” (or “political opportunity”) (PP) approach. A review of other still 
                                                          
20 In fact, there are various ways to identify organizational environments. Scott (1992) identifies the social 
psychological, the structural, and the ecological levels. At the ecological level, organizational environments 
include four sublevels: organizational sets, organizational populations, areal organizational fields, and 
functional organizational fields. He also identifies two types of organizational environments: technical and 
institutional. “Technical environments” are those in which organizations produce a product or service that 
is exchanged in a market such that they are rewarded for effective and efficient performance. For example, 
Stinchcombe (1990) demonstrated the interconnectedness of organizational structures with uncertainties of 
environments. By contrast, “institutional environments” are characterized by the elaboration of rules and 
requirements to which individual organizations must conform in order to receive legitimacy and support. 
Thus, institutional environments refer to the symbolic aspects of environments and the symbolic elements 
of interest include both normative and cognitive systems. Of organizations, the state, professional 
occupations, unions, and trade associations are among the most important sources of institutional structures 
in the modern world. DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) work was the first with respect to the institutional 
environment to focus explicitly on interorganizational fields as networks. 
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important approaches that emphasize culture, identity, and agency will be left untouched 
for the current dissertation research (e.g., Snow and Benford, 1988, 1992; Offe, 1985; 
Goodwin, 1997). For the network approaches, this section will include a few fundamental 
models of network evolution based on the principles of dyadic dependence and 
generativity. 
 
2.3.1   Mobilization or Opportunity? 
First, the existing approaches to social movements/collective action have tended not to 
clearly specify movement boundaries including movement elements and the ties between 
them. For example, the RM approach has not considered the movement elements in the 
wider context in which social movements rise, deploy, and decay, which resulted in 
insufficient explanatory conditions that may become part of the movement at any time. 
Similarly, the PP approach has not been explicit about which dimensions of political 
opportunity explain which dependent variables (McAdam, 1996). That is, the approach 
has not evolved far enough to explain in what ways the contextual conditions are 
structurally organized beyond identifying contextual variables. Accordingly, it was 
sometimes unclear which movement element relates to which movement element through 
what relation (Meyer, 2004). 
Second, as a result, the previous studies of social movements/collective action 
have been weak in explain the structural properties of the movement that facilitates or 
constraint movement activities. In fact, the literature has emphasized the structure that 
facilitates social movements to occur. For example, scholars who have focused on how 
social movements emerge within the political contexts have emphasized “opportunity 
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structure,” i.e., the ways in which particular political opportunities are structurally 
organized at a particular time and space (McAdam, 1982; Meyer and Whittier, 1994; also 
see others).21 On the other hand, those who have focused on how resources are mobilized 
in social movements emphasize “mobilization structure” (McCarthy and Zald, 1973; 
1977; Zald and McCarthy, 1987). As Meyer (2004) put it, they turned the questions of 
why to those of how and explain the processes by which cooperating or competing SMOs 
mobilize collective action. Nonetheless, the ambiguous consideration of the explicit 
movement elements and the relations between them has made the dominant approaches 
weak in explicating the movement structure that facilitates or constraint movement 
activities. 
Moreover, the existing studies of the social movements/collective action have 
tended to be weak in explaining movement dynamics, i.e., how the complicated 
movement structure emerge from simple movement activities. For example, the RM 
approach has been primarily concerned with the structure in which resources are 
mobilized. The PP approach has been better in explaining the structural processes by 
which movement activities are generated through time in relation to the large movement 
contexts. 
 
2.3.2   Network Approach 
In comparison, the network approach complements the existing approaches by allowing 
the researcher to identify movement elements from movement contexts, activities, and 
outcomes, and further investigate explicit relations between those movement elements 
                                                          
21 Movement activities (e.g., advancing claims) are “context-dependent” (Meyer, 2004) and the political 
contexts can be broadly defined including political cleavages and institutional openness. 
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(see Diani and McAdam, 2003). In studying movement dynamics in particular, a network 
approach complements the two approaches by developing theoretical and methodological 
frameworks to explicate the structural mechanisms thereby the movement structure 
evolves over time. 
While the conception of network was widely considered as a metaphor, more and 
more scholars are using it as substance to represent structure of the relational patterns of 
varying societal units (Scott, 1992).22 For example, an intra-organizational structure can 
be represented as a network of nodes and ties between them and, in the same way, an 
inter-organizational structure, too. As Fararo (2000) put it, the metaphor of “structure as 
network” was, though widely employed informally in sociology, transformed into a mode 
of model building and analysis through a convergence of ideas and techniques from 
several traditions including sociometry (Moreno 1934), balance theory, and the analysis 
of structures of kinship (White 1963). He noted, social network analysis has become a 
mode of structural analysis with an extensive battery of formal techniques at its disposal 
(see also Scott, 1992; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). 
Moreover, the network approach is not limited to the traditional distinctions 
conventionally made in the study of social movements; for example, it can be applied to 
both traditional and contemporary (or “new”) social movements, all forms of social 
movements (labor, environmental, peace, or women), all camps of ideological orientation 
(radical, mainstream, or conservative), and all levels of units (individuals, organizations, 
or nations). In addition, it can be used in comparison across the conventional distinctions 
to discuss whether the distinctions are meaningful; for example, it can compare the 
                                                          
22 Following Goffman, Breiger (1974) presented that there were two types of social ties: membership and 
social relations. He referred to them as “membership network analysis” and “social relations network 
analysis,” respectively. 
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findings from different movement sectors, from different time points, or from different 
geographic locations. The network approach in the study of social movements/collective 
action has already started achieving some goals, though the full-fledged paradigm has yet 
to come. 
 
2.4   Network Evolution: Principles and Models 
Lenski et al (1991) defines network evolution as “series of events with a definable 
outcome.” Similarly, Doreian and Stokman (1997) defines network evolution as “series 
of events that create, sustain, and dissolve social structures.” That is, network evolution is 
an ordered process of a network structure with a trajectory through time. In fact, there 
have been considerable efforts to develop models to explain network evolution in social 
network studies. Of varied theoretical efforts for network dynamics or evolution, this 
dissertation research is particularly interested in a few dynamic models that attempt to 
explain how complex structural properties emerge from simple dyadic processes while 
assuming the dependence of dyadic ties and the generative-structural processes (for 
agent-based models developing in social sciences, see Macy and Willer, 2002). These 
model properties are thought to generate structural properties that cannot be reduced to 
lower level properties. 23  The following two paragraphs will discuss the two distinct 
assumptions that the models reviewed are based on. 
                                                          
23 It is not to say that the models with a dyadic independence assumption are not important in studying 
network evolution. They have helped discover important principles of dyadic attachment in social world. 
Those that network theorists have found thus far include, but are not limted to, ‘homophily’ (McPherson 
and Smith-Lovin, 1987; McPherson et al., 2001), “accumulative advantage” or “power law” (Merton, 1973; 
Watts, 1999; Watts and Strogatz, 1998), “legitimacy” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), “multi-connectivity”, 
and so on (see Powell et al., 2005 for applications of more dyadic conditions). However, it does not seem 
attractive to model network evolution as an aggregate of independent dyads because of the reasons as 
follows: (a) the models based on dyadic independence are, in essence, not structural in a Simmelian sense 
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Dyadic Dependence. First, the assumption of the dependence of dyadic ties refers 
to the basic property that the tie creation between two distinct nodes is not independent of 
tie creation in other parts in the network. Network structure evolves by two distinct nodes 
creating dyadic ties given a fixed set of nodes. Naturally, this assumption makes the 
researcher turn to triad completion models in which dyadic ties are dependent on each 
other. That is, explaining triad completion is an essential process in studying network 
evolution while the dyad is still a fundamental unit of analysis in social network analysis. 
Second, series of tie creation at the dyadic level “generate” structural properties at the 
network level. 24  Nevertheless, the structural properties cannot be understood as an 
aggregate of the dyadic ties. Each subsection discusses what these assumptions would 
imply for the trajectory of network evolution for each model. 
Generativity: Fararo and Butts (1999) define generative or generative-structural 
processes as the processes by which complex system level properties emerge from simple 
local level changes. Recent decades have seen advances in theoretical development and 
(simulation) modeling in social sciences (Chomsky, 1957; Bourdieu, 1990; Fararo and 
Butts, 1999; Epstein and Axtell, 1997). In parallel, network theorists have modeled the 
same processes to discover (generative) mechanisms to explain network evolution in 
which complex network properties emerge from changes in dyadic ties. An effort to 
explain generativity focuses on the final network structure (e.g., hierarchy) emerged from 
the generative processes. However, investigation of generativity requires, first, an 
identification of mechanism(s) (e.g., social balance) by which a network structure at time 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(1950), (b) they do not provide such generative mechanisms as the next section illustrates, and thus (c) they 
do not suggest an emergent social structure in a Holland and Leinhardt’s sense (1979). 
24 Holland and Leinhardt (1979), on the other hand, argue that any network in which higher level properties 
can be modeled adequately using only properties of nodes and dyads has no social structure. The conditions 
that they assumed generate “random” networks without significant structural properties. 
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t evolves into a network structure at time t+1, and, second, an explication of the processes 
by which the mechanism(s) discovered generates a complex network structure that cannot 
be reduced to lower level properties. 
In what follows, three fundamental models of network dynamics are reviewed: 
social balance models (Heider, 1946; 1958), E-state structuralism models (Skvoretz et al., 
1996), and strategic actor models (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996; Hummon, 2000; Doreian, 
2006). Each approach presents different mechanisms: balance mechanism, bystander 
mechanism, and rational mechanism.25 The first two models focus on triadic completion 
processes based on the assumption that dyad formation is dependent on each other while 
the third model focuses on general network processes. In commonality, they all assume 
that an aggregate of a series of dyadic ties interdependent on each other generates 
emergent structural properties. And yet, each model is unique in that it is based on 
differing assumptions of motivation, behavior, and equilibrium state. For example, social 
balance models that propose balance mechanism explain purposive behavior of tie 
formation by cognitive (and social) actors and series of the dyad creation arrives at 
balanced equilibrium. Table 2.1 summarizes the characteristics of the models reviewed in 
what follows. 
                                                          
25 Beyond the three models introduced, there can be more dynamic models that assume dyadic dependence. 
For example, exchange (network) theory (Emerson, 1962, 1964, 1967a,b; Blau, 1964; Cook and Emerson, 
1978) that developed some of the current network models is not included in the current discussion. 
However, the theory presents that the “power-balancing” mechanisms in power-imbalanced exchange 
networks can bring about network extension. That is, actors may engage in tie forming activities to alter the 
balance of power in the exchange network. In general, they were interested in how relatively stable 
exchange network structures emerge from unstable and less structured networks of exchange relations. 
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Table 2.1: Comparison of Model Properties 
Mechanism Motivation Behavior Equilibrium 
Balance Mechanism Cognitive, Social Purposive Balance 
Bystander Mechanism Social Non-Purposive Hierarchy 
Rational Mechanism Economic Purposive (Maximum) Utility 
 
2.4.1   Social Balance Model 
Since the first systematic formulation by Heider (1946, 1958), social balance theory has 
continued to develop despite the contradictory assessment of the theory (Davis, 1979; 
Opp, 1984; Manhardt, 1995). Further, social balance theory has provided social network 
theory with useful insights for the dynamics of network structure. To discuss social 
network models for network dynamics, this section focuses on the main tenets of social 
balance theory. In its original formulation of balance theory, Heider (1946, 1958) focused 
on the cognitive inconsistencies that exist in the minds of persons on dyads and triples. 
For example, in his pox triple p is a focal person, o another person and x an object (which 
may be a third person). The tie o → q is p’s perception of the signed tie from o to q. If 
there is a negative tie in the triple, the triple is imbalanced because there is a cognitive 
inconsistency, while if there is no negative tie or if there are two negative ties in the 
triple, it is balanced and there is no cognitive inconsistency. Figure 2.2 illustrates 
examples of imbalance triples. 
Imbalanced triples are thought to be inherently unstable while balanced triples 
stable. Thus, cognitive inconsistencies or imbalance (tension, strain) that exist as a 
driving force in the minds of persons were thought to motivate rational persons to 
consider changes in signed relations in which they are involved to reduce the imbalance 
that they experience. Since the change was the sign relations in the minds of persons, 
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rather than in the social relations, the Heider’s theory explains mental affect processes but 
does not explain the processes in signed social relations and the aggregate outcomes in 
the macrostructure. That is, Heider’s formulation was concerned with cognitive 
inconsistencies in ‘unit-formation relations (U)’ whereas Cartwright and Harary’s (1956) 
and others, ‘affect relations’ (R) affective inconsistencies in a more generalized context. 
 
    ⓧ      ⓠ 
 
 
 
 
                       ⓟ ⓞ                     ⓟ ⓞ 
 
              (a) Imbalance   (b) Cartwright and Hararian 
 
Figure 2.2: Examples of Imbalanced Triples 
 
Since the generalization of Cartwright and Harary (1956), however, balance has 
been studied in a more generalized context. The sign of a triple was defined as the 
product of the signs of the links in the triple. If the resulting sign is positive then the triple 
is balanced and if this sign is negative then the triple is imbalanced. The idea of the sign 
of a triple extends naturally to the sign of a semi-cycle of any length. Thus, a graph 
(network) is balanced if all of its semi-cycles are balanced. A balanced graph was viewed 
partitioned into two subsets (later, plus-sets) so that every positive arc joins vertices of 
the same subset and every negative arc joins vertices of different subsets (Structure 
Theorem I: Cartwright and Harary, 1956). In the Davis’s (1967) Structure Theorem II, the 
subsets in a balanced graph were thought to be more than two (thus, κ-balanced for κ ≥ 2). 
Still, imbalance was the driving force but balance processes were thought to operate in 
social relations at the group level. The Moore’s (1979) application of balance theory to 
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analyzing international relations is a good example.26 The processes involve changes in 
signed relations and the (number and size of) partition structures to arrive at equilibrium. 
A recent revival of interest in social balance theory has provided social balance 
models that emphasize balance mechanisms and measures of (im)balance at equilibrium. 
From a re-analysis of the Newcomb (1961) data, Doreian et al (1997) observes different 
time scales in reciprocity, transitivity, and balance theoretic mechanisms. Using the same 
dataset (Newcomb, 1961), Doreian and Krackhardt (2001) examines pre-transitive 
balance conditions (i→j, j→k) to find that their Fundamental Structural Balance 
Hypothesis (FSBH)–“signed human relations tend to be balanced over time”–was 
supported in general except for the triples with (i→j) was negative and, importantly, 
signed relations were also concerned with actor attributes. This observation that the 
driving force of balance processes was found in actor attributes alerts that non-structural 
processes can be mistakenly interpreted as structural balance processes. They also 
suggest that there may be multiple balance mechanisms that may be switched on or off in 
given empirical contexts. Later, Doreian (2002) emphasizes “event sequences” as 
generators of network evolution and suggests that movement towards balance, if it exists, 
is neither simple nor direct. 
In their simulation research, Hummon and Doreian (2003) proposed a theoretical 
model for social balance in the form of an agent based simulation (ABS) model that 
simulates distinct but interdependent social actors making positive and negative 
                                                          
26 To introduce a few more empirical applications, Mower-White (1977, 1979) conducted experiments to 
test triadic balance hypotheses and found that balance is only one of the biases that affect subjects’ 
responses. She also argued that social context influences balance outcomes. Epstein (1979), in an analysis 
of longitudinal survey data of friendship choices among secondary school students, found that friendship 
selections are not explained by “a single theory of balance”. At a larger scale, Moore (1979) applied 
balance theory to international relations to examine whether balance could be attained with more than two 
subgroups. He concluded that the structural balance theory was valid for international relations. 
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selections of each other in efforts to reach balanced cognitive states.27 From the reflection 
on the practices that one line of balance theory has based only on the ideas of Heider 
(1946, 1958) and the other based only on Cartwright and Harary (1956), they modeled a 
balance theoretic process with two levels. One is located in the minds of actors and is 
fully consistent with the initial (micro-level) formulation of Heider (1946, 1958) while 
the second (macro-level) is attentive to group level dynamics. At this group level, the 
simulations are consistent with the line of work by Cartwright and Harary (1956) where 
attention has been focused on the structure of small groups. They have coupled the two 
levels, by having a ‘pure Heider’ (micro) process and a ‘pure Cartwright and Harary’ 
(macro) process, which inform and constrain each other as they operate. 
The design variables for the simulations are ‘group size’, ‘degree of 
contentiousness of a group’ and the ‘mode of communicating choices’ regarding the 
existence and sign of social ties. The outcome variables were the ‘number of acts’ that 
groups need to reach balance (or equilibrium), the ‘number of actors’ whose cognitive 
images of the network are balanced, the ‘number of clusters’ (plus-sets) at equilibrium, 
and the ‘level of imbalance’ at the group level. They found that the design variables have 
complicated impacts on the number of actor choices made to reach balance, the level of 
group imbalance, the number of actors with balanced images and the number of plus-sets 
formed. The simulation results suggested that, first, the initial contentiousness are 
relevant, second, the modes of communication is important for balance theoretic 
                                                          
27 Recent decades have seen the emergence of social simulations as a tool to develop and test theory in 
social sciences (see the emergence of virtual experiments as a tool to develop social theory in Hummon and 
Fararo, 1994; Carley and Prietula, 1994). Virtual experiments allow researchers to test relationships of 
interest under specified parameterized conditions with or without empirical data. Recently, computational 
sociology and agent-based modeling (ABM) have been recognized useful in studying generative-structural 
processes in dynamic social systems (Macy, 1991; Macy and Skvoretz, 1998; Macy and Willer, 2002). 
Considering the difficulty of collecting reliable longitudinal signed data, studies of balance processes can 
also benefit from virtual experiments (Doreian, 2003). 
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dynamics, third, these dynamics are different in ‘large’ small groups compared to ‘small’ 
small groups, and, finally, there is a subtle relation between the number of plus-sets 
formed and the two types of balance realized by the model. 
Overall, balance theory, as a fundamental model for network processes, focuses 
on imbalance as the driving force of network processes and yet balance processes are 
thought to operate at both mental and group levels. Further, balance processes result in 
the macrostructure of partition structures at equilibrium, of which imbalance can be 
measured by the line-index (Doreian and Mrvar, 1996). Figure 2.3 illustrates balance 
mechanism. The triple (b) is a triple that the triple (a) can evolve into.  
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              (a) Imbalance              (b) Balance 
 
Figure 2.3: Balance Mechanism 
 
2.4.2   E-State Structural Model 
E-state structuralism (Skvoretz et al, 1996) proposes dynamic models by which 
dyadically based social psychological processes aggregate to produce stable power and 
prestige orders in groups of arbitrary size via the development of networks of ties among 
actors. It synthesizes concepts and ideas drawn from expectation states theory and from 
social network analysis. Expectation states theory developed from a concern with the 
emergence of power and prestige orders in task-oriented groups of arbitrary size. Much of 
the advance in expectation states theory came from studying subjects in a dyadic context 
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in which the expectations vis-à-vis an alter have been manipulated via the introduction of 
diffuse status differences or differences in specific performance characteristics (Balkwell, 
1991). However, this exclusive focus on behavior in dyads set aside the problem of how 
dyadic effects may or may not aggregate to yield coherent status effects in larger groups. 
Compared to expectation states theory, E-state structuralism takes a more global 
view of the aggregation problem. The basic theoretical construct of E-state structuralism 
is the concept of an “E-state”. This idea is abstracted from the core assumptions of the 
expectation states research program (Berger, Wagner, and Zelditch, 1985). The initial use 
of the term “E-state” in Fararo and Skvoretz (1986) occurs in an effort to model the 
formation of dominance structures in animal groups and adapts this type of construct to 
animal interactions. Fararo and Skvoretz (1986) also take the novel step of deploying the 
E-state construct in a social network context. By postulation, each actor has a relational 
E-state toward others in the network. The social network is a set of actors together with 
the configuration or pattern of relational E-states. This conception of social networks 
described in terms of relational E-states defines the general idea of “E-state 
structuralism”. 
The basic E-state model, constructed by Fararo and Skvoretz (1986) deals with 
the classical problem of dominance structure formation in the barnyard and the fact that 
the structures tend to be highly transitive (Mazur, 1973; Freeman, Freeman, and Romney, 
1992). Conceptually, dominance ties refer to pairs of complementary E-states in which 
one organism expects to dominate another and the second expects to defer to the first. 
Such a tie may develop between two organisms, firstly if one attacks the other. This is a 
“victim” effect. The victim effect by itself, however, does not ensure high degrees of 
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transitivity. A second mechanism, the “bystander” effect, is required. By virtue of this 
mechanism, ties may form between bystanders to an agonistic encounter and its 
participants. Bystanders form such E-states by mirroring what they observe: the model 
postulates that in observing an attack a bystander may form a deference orientation to the 
attacker (and the attacker, a dominance orientation to the bystander) and may form a 
dominance orientation to the victim (and the victim, a deference orientation to the 
bystander).28 
According to Holland and Leinhardt (1979), any network in which higher level 
properties can be modeled adequately using only properties of nodes (actors) and dyads 
(pairs of actors) has no social structure. A biased network algorithm was presented in 
Skvoretz (1990); relative to a population of random graphs with the same indegree and 
outdegree distribution, the biased graph exhibits social structure. The question is: is the 
observed value of the property significantly greater or less than expected relative to an 
appropriately constructed population of random graphs? The specific conditional 
distribution provides a baseline against which properties of the observed graph are to be 
compared; “Do groups typically evolve into networks, represented by the absorbing 
states, that exhibit “interesting” structure in the precise sense defined in social network 
analysis?” 
The network has evolved to an absorbing, equilibrium state in which further 
attacks may occur, but according to the axioms of the model, these attacks cannot alter 
the configuration of ties. They examined whether the probability of a complete hierarchy 
and the distribution of triad types in the evolved networks depart significantly from 
                                                          
28 Formally, let xNy indicate that no tie exists between x and y and let xDy indicate that a dominance tie 
from x to y exists. The bystander effect in a transitive dominance structure explains that if x domantes y 
(xDy) and then a bystander (z) tends to dominate y (zDy) while the bystander defers x (xDz). 
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expectations derived from the baseline random graph distribution. They arrived at some 
conclusions: a) a completely transitive hierarchy of dominance relations only if the 
bystander effect is non-zero, b) the network evolves comparatively rapidly, c) most ties 
occur via bystander effects and few via the victim, i.e., without bystander effects, 
transitivity only occurs at chance levels, and d) events occurring in different dyads–
attacks and the formation of ties–are not necessarily independent: attacks in one dyad can 
affect the outcome of tie formation in other dyads. 
Advances in E-state structuralism include ‘contingent complementarity E-state 
model’, ‘contingent complementarity model with parallelism’, and ‘E-state precedence 
model’. More content work on dominance structure formation has dropped some of the 
simplifying assumptions of the basic model (Fararo, Skvoretz, and Kosaka, 1994) and has 
extended the domain of the first model to task oriented discussion groups of humans 
(Skvoretz and Fararo, forthcoming). Figure 2.4 displays bystander mechanism. 
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            (a) Victim Effect        (b) Bystander Effect 
 
Figure 2.4: Bystander Mechanism 
 41
2.4.3   Strategic Actor Model 
In fact, rational choice theory and social network theory have had conflicting 
assumptions of social action and social structure. While rational choice theorists have 
assumed that a social structure is an aggregate outcome of individual social action (a 
bottom-up approach), network theorists have assumed that a social structure facilitates or 
constrains individual social action (a top-down approach). Despite this fundamental 
difference in assumptions, they have been recently working together to develop an 
integrative approach to understanding network processes (e.g., the semi-conference of 
mathematical sociologists and network theorists, August, 2004. San Francisco, CA). 
Nonetheless, modeling rational or strategic actors is not new to social network theory. 
For example, Burt (1992) proposed the conception of ‘structural holes’ in which strategic 
actors benefit by virtue of being located in strategic positions in a network. Numerous 
others have studied resources (or ‘social capital’) embedded in networks to which social 
actors have access through network ties (Lin et al., 2001). 
And yet, not much effort has been made to model strategic actors in explaining 
network evolution. In what follows, I introduce a few examples as such. Specifically, 
strategic actor models assume that actors (and networks, too) have calculus for the 
benefits from being located in a network position and the costs of maintaining the ties. 
Self-interest (i.e., calculation of costs and benefits) drives actors (not) to form a tie with 
other actors and the network structure is thought to evolve depending upon the choices 
that the strategic actors make. For example, Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), based on 
strategic actor models, specified the conditions under which certain equilibrium 
structures (null, star, and complete graphs) emerge. By parameterizing the costs and 
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benefits, they derived the equilibrium structures under specified combinations of 
parameters where ties are formed by rational actors. Hummon (2000) was also concerned 
with the generation of ties and the nature of network processes over time when actors 
behave according to the calculus of the benefits and the costs. In his simulation model 
based on the Jackson and Wolinsky’s work, however, Hummon identified other 
equilibrium structures not anticipated by Jackson and Wolinsky.  
To resolve the discrepancy between the Jackson and Wolinsky’s work and the 
Hummon’s work, Doreian (2004) explored transitions between pairs of structures to see 
if it was possible to establish the conditions under which equilibrium structures were 
generated. Using networks with a fixed set of vertices and the Jackson and Wolinsky 
framework, he explored the transitions between networks on the lattice of all graphs 
through the addition and deletion of ties. That is, he attempted to establish the conditions 
under which structures not identified by Jackson and Wolinsky occurred and were still 
stable. An examination of these transitions revealed the equilibrium structures anticipated 
by Jackson and Wolinsky, the equilibrium structures located by the Hummon simulations, 
plus some other equilibria. He assumed that rational actors employed a bounded 
rationality (Simon, 1976) and sequenced the decisions by those boundedly rational actors. 
To introduce the formulas employed, the set of all edge graphs for n vertices formed a 
lattice which identified the transitions between graphs when lines were added (or deleted) 
one at a time. The utility of a network, , for i can be written as: G
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where ijδ  and ijγ  denote, respectively, the benefit for an actor, i, of the tie (i ↔ j), and the 
cost of maintaining that tie for i while ijω  represents the value of actor j for actor i and  
the geodesic distance of j from i. Further, the total utility from the network as a whole is 
given by: 
ijt
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In sum, strategic mechanism explains network processes by which network structure 
evolves into a structure in which the utilities for the actors and the network as a whole are 
maximized (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996; Hummon, 2000; Doreian, 2006). Figure 2.5 
displays strategic mechanism.  
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           (a) Lower Utility          (b) Higher Utility 
 
Figure 2.5: Utility Mechanism 
 
2.4.4   Comparisons of Models 
Thus far, I have discussed two fundamental properties of network dynamic models 
(dyadic dependence, generative processes). As fundamental models of network evolution, 
three triad completion models (social balance, E-state structuralism, strategic 
actor/network) were considered with four more dyad-focused models. In reality, however, 
these organizing rules of network ties co-exist and thus it may not be possible to 
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distinguish one from another. Furthermore, it cannot be assumed that one principle 
dominates at all time periods. That is, different organizing principles may be dominant at 
each stage in the formation of the network. Now, I compare the three models of network 
evolution and the mechanisms that they present to discuss the applicability for structural 
dynamics in organizational fields in general and the environmental organizational field in 
particular. Focus will be on model suitability, usefulness, expandability, and so on. Table 
2.2 summarizes the comparison of the model properties. 
First, social balance models are most versatile in terms of suitability (or 
expandability) of the models (and the mechanisms) to dealing with multiple types of 
nodes (i.e., multi-mode networks) and multiple types of (including signed) relations. In 
its initial formulation, Heider’s (1946) pox triple was multi-modal because it included 
two people (p, o) and an object (x) although later models have dealt with networks of 
one-mode. Social balance models have not been multiplex although they deal with signed 
relations, i.e., two different types of relations. In contrast, E-state structuralism models 
have been limited to a single type of nodes, but it dealt with two distinct types of ties 
(dominance, deference) at the same time. Like social balance models, E-state 
structuralism models examined negative (dominance) ties in exchange of deference 
(positive) ties. Strategic actor models have been limited to one-mode networks of the 
same type of positive ties only. Thus, at the current stage of the model, strategic actor 
models are least versatile. 
Second, in terms of network processes–how triads are created from a set of dyads 
and how generativity works, social balance models explain that social actors in socio-
cognitive interests purposively form signed ties to achieve a balanced state. Accordingly, 
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series of dependent dyadic ties generate multiple partition (plus-set) structures which may 
be oppositional. On the other hand, E-state structuralism models explain that social actors 
in social interests (non-)purposively create ties to achieve a hierarchical state: victim 
effect-purposive and bystander effect-nonpurposive. That is, series of dependent dyadic 
ties generate a dominance structure. According to the strategic actor models, social actors 
in economic interests purposively form ties to achieve a state of maximum utility. Series 
of dependent dyadic ties generate a maximum utility structure for both actors and the 
network at the same time. Table 2.1 above summarizes these model properties. 
Overall, those three fundamental models of network dynamics are applicable in 
varying degrees to organizational fields in general and the environmental organizational 
fields in particular. Social balance models are useful in explaining relations between 
organizations that are collaborating and conflictual at the same time such as 
contemporary socio-political organizations. 29  These models are also applicable to 
analyzing two-mode relations in organizational fields such as organizations around events 
that they (do not) support. Further, these models are perfect in explaining the oppositional 
structure in which groups of (social, political) organizations contend with each other. 
These models are applicable to both alliance and conflictual ties. E-state structuralism 
models, on the other hand, are useful in explaining a stable dominance (also deference) 
structure emerges between organizations that are competing over limited resources such 
as contemporary socio-political organizations. These models are also useful in explaining 
how a hierarchical structure of organizations emerges naturally even though not all 
organizations intend to do so. These models are applicable to both alliance and 
                                                          
29 While almost all network studies have focused on positive ties (e.g., friendship, alliance, trade), few 
studies negative ties (e.g., Sampson, 1968). Doreian (2003, classnotes) finds the reasons behind the scarcity 
of the studies of negative ties from the lack of reliable signed data and cognitive discomfort involved. 
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conflictual ties. Finally, strategic actor models are useful in explaining how a stable 
structure is generated between organizations that are competing over limited resources 
such as information. These models are applicable to alliance relations.  
 
Table 2.2: Comparison of Suitability of Models 
Models Multi-Mode Multiplex Negative 
Social Balance Yes No Yes 
E-state Structuralism No Yes Yes 
Strategic Actor No No No 
  
Note: ‘(Yes)’ indicates that future models might handle negative ties. 
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Part II 
 
Measures, Estimation, and Data 
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 Chapter 3 
Methods: Tools and Measures 
 
Since this dissertation research aims to explicate how the current environmental 
movement structure has emerged, statistical network methods are essential in this 
investigation. The methods used in the chapters 5, 6, and 7 are three fold: (a) describing 
tie distribution, (b) partitioning network structure, and (c) estimating tie probability. First, 
description of tie distribution focuses on revealing characteristics of the network 
structures and changes based on some relevant measures. Second, partitioning network 
structure classifies a network structure into several substructures for equivalence and 
balance. Finally, estimation of tie probability includes categorical data analysis and 
exponential random graph models (ERGM). The computer packages used include SAS, 
Pajek, Ucinet, and Multinet. 
 
3.1   Describing Tie Distribution 
First, description of tie distribution includes describing network structure and dynamics 
based on some relevant network measures. The description in this dissertation will focus 
on presenting how the individual, subset, and network properties change over time based 
on some network measures as follows: network size, density, centralization, clustering 
coefficient, imbalance, contentiousness, transitivity, and centrality. 
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 3.1.1   Measures 
Network size, density, and centralization: The size of a network is determined by the 
number of nodes and the number of ties between the nodes. When a network structure is 
summarized as G(V, E), | V | representing the vertices refers to the number of nodes and | 
E | representing edge refers to the number of ties. The density of a binary network is the 
total number of ties divided by the total number of possible ties. For a valued network, it 
is the total of all values divided by the number of possible ties. In this case, the density 
gives the average value. For a given binary network with vertices v1....vn and maximum 
degree centrality cmax, the network degree centralization measure is S(cmax - c(vi)) 
divided by the maximum value possible, where c(vi) is the degree centrality of vertex vi. 
Clustering Coefficient: Clustering coefficient calculates the clustering coefficient 
of every node and the clustering and weighted clustering coefficient of the whole network 
(Watts, 1999). The clustering coefficient of a node is the density of its open 
neighborhood. The overall clustering coefficient is the mean of the clustering coefficient 
of all the nodes. The weighted overall clustering coefficient is the weighted mean of the 
clustering coefficient of all the nodes each one weighted by its degree. This last figure is 
exactly the same as the transitivity index of each transitive triple expressed as a 
percentage of the triples in which there is a path from i to j.  
Imbalance: The measures of imbalance, literally, measure the level of imbalance 
in signed networks (Harary, 1959; Doreian and Mrvar, 1996). Doreian and Mrvar (1996) 
developed an algorithm based on the (negation or deletion) line-index based on Harary 
(1959). The line-index measure considers inconsistencies in balance partitions that take 
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one of two forms: negative ties within plus-sets (“negative inconsistencies”) or positive 
ties between pairs of plus-sets (“positive inconsistencies”). Formally, letting N be the 
total number of negative ties within plus-sets and P be the total number of positive ties 
between plus-sets, the criterion function is defined as in Equation (1). In this formulation, 
the two types of inconsistencies are treated as being equally important: the criterion 
function is simply the count of all inconsistencies regardless of their types. In an 
alternative formula, the positive and negative inconsistencies can be weighted as follows: 
P(C) = αN + (1-α)P, where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. 
 
P(C) = N + P    Equation (1) 
 
Contentiousness: As in the measures of imbalance, the measure of 
contentiousness measures the level of contentiousness in signed networks. It calculates 
the number of negative ties relative to the total number of ties in signed networks–the 
ratio of the number of negative ties to the number of total ties (Hummon and Doreian, 
2003). Formally, the measure of contentiousness can be expressed as in Equation (2). The 
level of contentiousness does not reflect the level of imbalance in signed networks 
because multiple plus-sets can be linked via a number of negative ties in perfect balance 
in which case the level of contentiousness is high but the level of imbalance is zero. 
 
         Number of Negative Ties (N) 
C = ------------------------------------------- Equation (2) 
Number of All Ties (A) 
 
Transitivity: While the measure of transitivity is essential in triadic analysis, it 
calculates the density of transitive triples in a network. The density of transitive triples is 
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the number of triples which are transitive divided by the number of paths of length 2, i.e. 
the number of triples which have the potential to be transitive. In graph-theoretic terms, 
three vertices u, v, w taken from a directed graph are transitive if whenever vertex u is 
connected to vertex v and vertex v is connected to vertex w then vertex u is connected to 
vertex w. This definition can be extended to valued data. Strong transitivity occurs only if 
the final edge is stronger than the two in the original path. This can be relaxed so that the 
user can define the minimum value of the final edge (weak transitivity). For distances, 
transitivity can be defined in terms of the number of triples satisfying the triangle 
inequality, and for probabilities in terms of the product of probabilities of the edges. 
Centrality: The measures of centrality calculate the centrality scores of vertices in a 
network depending on the defined criteria. The centrality measures are varied and thus have 
to be selected before use according to the phenomena of interest. The examples include 
degree, closeness, reach, betweenness, flow betweenness, eigenvector, power, information, 
and influence. This dissertation considers “degree” centrality to measure the centrality scores 
(Freeman, 1979) of the EORGs based on their activities (e.g., lawsuit, alliance) and identify 
central EORGs. The degree centrality is calculated as follows: the number of vertices 
adjacent to a given vertex in a symmetric graph is the degree of that vertex. For non-
symmetric data, the in-degree of a vertex u is the number of ties received by u and the out-
degree is the number of ties initiated by u. In addition, if the data are valued, then the (in- and 
out-) degrees will consist of the sums of the values of the ties. The normalized degree 
centrality is the degree divided by the maximum possible degree expressed as a percentage. 
The normalized values should only be used for binary data. For valued data, the non-
normalized values should be used and the degree centralization should be ignored. 
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 3.2   Partitioning Techniques 
Partitioning network structure classifies a network structure into several substructures 
depending on the defined criteria. This dissertation attempts at a synthesized method to 
partition the movement network structures into a set of plus-sets and a set of equivalent 
positions in a sequential manner in signed networks. That is, a synthesized method 
partitions a signed structure into plus-sets and equivalent positions in sequence so that 
equivalent positions can be detected within and between plus-sets. A temporal 
observation of the equivalent positions within and between plus-sets through time may 
suggest structural mechanisms thereby balance-structurally equivalent actors, while 
developing similar attributes, play similar roles in the structural dynamics. 
 
3.2.1   Balance Partition 
In a signed network, the relations are positive (+), negative (–), or null. The balance 
partitioning of the signed network partitions the nodes into plus-sets so that every 
positive arc joins vertices of the same subset and every negative arc joins vertices of 
different subsets (Cartwright and Harary, 1956; Davis, 1967). In balance partitioning, the 
inconsistencies are the negative ties within plus-sets (i.e., “negative inconsistencies”) and 
positive ties between plus-sets (i.e., “positive inconsistencies”). The two structural 
theorems in balance theory introduced below state that, first, a signed network is 
balanced if and only if the set of vertices can be partitioned into two or more plus-sets 
and, second, the signed network is κ-balanced for κ ≥ 2 if and only if the set of V can be 
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partitioned into κ subsets, called plus-sets. The first theorem is concerned with balance 
partition itself and resulting plus-sets while the second the number of plus-sets: 
 
Structure Theorem I: A signed graph (G, σ) is balanced if and only if the set of vertices V can be 
partitioned into two subsets so that every positive arc joins vertices of the same subset and every 
negative arc joins vertices of different subsets (Cartwright and Harary, 1956). 
 
Structure Theorem II: A signed graph (G, σ) is κ-balanced for κ ≥ 2 if and only if the set of V can be 
partitioned into κ subsets, called plus-sets, so that every positive arcs joins vertices of the same 
subset and every negative arc joins vertices of different subsets (Davis, 1967). 
 
The methods to measure the (im)balance of a signed network have included 
consideration of the signs of a cycle (or semi-cycle) (Cartwright and Harary, 1956), 
weighting (Hummon and Fararo, 1995), and line index (Harary, 1959; Harary et al., 
1965; Doreian and Mrvar, 1996). A recent advance in the line index by Doreian and 
Mrvar (1996) proposes the use of an algorithm (based on the two structure theorems 
above) that provides a description of the partition structure(s) of the graph and a measure 
of imbalance, which was the line index (negation or deletion) proposed by Harary (1959). 
Formally, as in Equation (3), they sought to determine the clustering(s) C* for which: 
 
P(C*) = P(C)   Equation (3) φ∈Cmin
 
where C is the clustering of a given set of vertices V, and Φ is the set of all possible 
clustering and P: Φ → ℜ  is a criterion function. The criterion function is constructed 
from (negative and positive) inconsistencies with a balanced structure and then 
minimized by using a relocation algorithm. Letting N be the total number of negative ties 
within plus-sets and P be the total number of positive ties between plus-sets, the criterion 
function is defined as in Equation (1): 
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 P(C) = N + P    Equation (1) 
 
3.2.2   Structural Partition 
In search of equivalent nodes in a network structure, there are two approaches: structural 
equivalence and regular equivalence. Two nodes are structurally equivalent if they are 
equally related to and from all other nodes (Lorrain and White, 1971) while they are 
regularly equivalent if they are equally related to equivalent others (Borgatti and Everett, 
1989, 1993). Despite a slight difference in algorithm, these procedures partition the 
network structure into positions in which nodes located in equivalent positions play 
similar roles.30 Given a signed network partitioned into plus-sets, the signed network can 
further be partitioned into equivalent positions from a positional approach (Lorrain and 
White, 1971; White, Boorman, and Breiger, 1976). That is, the synthetic approach allows 
us to find the nodes occupying equivalent positions within and between the plus-sets. 
Table 3.1 summarizes structurally unique positions that can be detected from 
these partitioning methods employed in sequence. The equivalent nodes within the same 
plus-sets can be considered “competitors” because they belong to the same group but 
play similar roles. The nodes that are not equivalent within the same plus-sets can be 
considered “allies” because they belong to the same group but play different roles. On the 
                                                          
30  Recently, network analysts have seen a series of advances in network partitioning: First, network 
theorists introduced generalized blockmodeling technique to partition a network into pre-defined block 
types and permutate the network to calculate the fit (Doreian et al., 2005a, 2005b). Second, network 
theorists have developed methods to partition two-mode networks. Batagelj (2003) developed an algorithm 
to blockmodel two-mode network data by local optimization. Further, Doreian et al (2005a, 2005b) 
presented a generalized blockmodeling of two-mode network data. In principle, they treated rows and 
columns of a two-mode network separate entities and thus partition them separately. The two-mode 
network data are permutated and compared with pre-defined block types to calculate the fit. The advances 
in the methods to deal with two-mode network data have been useful in social network analysis in that 
social sciences often deal with affiliative relations such as membership or participation. 
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other hand, the equivalent nodes across distinct plus-sets can be considered “contenders” 
because they belong to different groups but play similar roles. The vertices that are not 
equivalent across distinct plus-sets can be considered “others” because they belong to 
different groups and play different roles. The idea can be applied to all network elements 
that are competing or contending in the same network structure: individuals, groups, or 
organizations. 
 
Table 3.1: Partitioning: Balance and Equivalence 
 
Equivalence 
Same Position Different Position 
Balance 
Within Plus-set Competitors Allies 
Between Plus-set Contenders Others 
 
 
3.3   Estimating Tie Probability 
One of the fundamental questions in statistical network analysis is that under what 
conditions two distinct nodes will create a tie with each other. The assumption of dyadic 
dependence in the construction of network structure discussed in the previous chapter 
makes this inquiry much more interesting than that of dyadic independence does because 
it can explain the creation of dyadic ties conditional on the rest of the network structure. 
To explain the existence (or absence) of a relational tie, there are several models that can 
be used: categorical data analysis models, conditional logit models (McFadden, 1973, 
1981), and exponential random graph models (ERGM). While conventional categorical 
data analysis models can explain whether or not there is a (incoming, outgoing) tie 
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between two distinct actors, they consider only actors’ attributes as explanatory variables. 
As an extended form, conditional logit models are useful in that they consider both 
attributes and relational characteristics such as measures of centrality. Recent advances in 
exponential random graph models (ERGM) or p-star family models, which do not assume 
dyadic independence, allow the researcher to estimate the tie probability (Holland and 
Leinhardt, 1977, 1981; Wasserman, 1987; Wasserman and Iacobucci, 1988; Wasserman 
and Pattison, 1996; Pattison and Wasserman, 1998). 
 
3.3.1   Exponential Random Graph Models (ERGM) 
Until 1980s, p family of models had been used to estimate tie probability in statistical 
network analysis (Holland and Leinhardt, 1977, 1981; see also others), which were quite 
limiting because they had independence assumptions on interacting actors in a network. 
In contrast, the models for random graphs developed by Frank and Strauss (1986) and 
Strauss and Ikeda (1990) made the limiting assumptions no longer necessary and allowed 
the development of logit p* models that do not make severe independence assumptions 
on dyads (Wasserman and Pattison, 1996; Pattison and Wasserman, 1998; see also 
Rennolls, 1995). In the formulation presented by Wasserman and Pattison (1996), the 
response variable is a logit, or log odds of the probability that a relational tie is present 
and the explanatory variables can be quite general. The primary effects that were found 
so far useful are those corresponding to various dyadic configurations (e.g., choice, 
mutuality, expansiveness, attractiveness), triadic configurations (e.g., transitivity, 
cyclicity), subgroup effects (e.g., age groups), and network centralization. The family of 
models p* contains the Markov random graphs of Frank and Strauss (1986) as a special 
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case, as well as the dyadic interaction model p1 of Holland and Leinhardt (1977) (Holland 
and Leinhardt, 1981; Fienberg and Wasserman, 1981). Thus, the basic log linear model 
(i.e., p*) is:  
 
   exp {θ’z(x)} exp {θ1z1(x) + … + θ1z1(x)} 
Pr (Χ = x) = -------------- = --------------------------- (Model 1: p*) 
       κ (θ)            κ (θ) 
 
where θ is a vector of the model parameters, z(x) is the vector of the explanatory 
variables, and κ is the normalizing constant that ensures that the probabilities sum to 
unity. 
The alternative version of model 1 that does not depend on κ is a logit model. In a 
logit or logistic regression model, the response variable is dichotomous and is coded as a 
binary variable (for example, Y* = 1 or 0), which is often assumed to have a binomial 
distribution. Given the nature of this response variable, it is natural to model probabilities, 
Pr (Y* = 1). Probabilities are modeled as a function of a linear combination or a linear 
predictor of the explanatory variables (for example, β0 + β1y1 + … + βryr, where the Y’s 
are explanatory variables and the β’s are regression coefficients). Since probabilities must 
be between 0 and 1 and the linear predictor can (theoretically) equal any value between –
∞ and +∞, probabilities are transformed into logits before equating them to the linear 
predictor. A logit is the logarithm of the odds that an ‘event’ occurs (for example, Y* = 1). 
Setting the transformed probabilities or logits equal to the linear predictor gives us: 
 
            Pr(Y* = 1) 
logit (Y*) = log ---------------- = β0 + β1y1 + … + βryr (Model 2: logit p*) 
          Pr(Y* = 0) 
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The approach to simplify the p* family of models so that model parameters can be 
estimated was first described by Strauss and Ikeda (1990). The basic random variable, Xij, 
reflecting the presence or absence of a relational tie from i to j, is dichotomous. Hence, 
we can consider the odds that this tie is present – the ratio of Pr(Xij = 1) or Pr(Xij = 0). 
Thus, we define the conditional odds as:  
 
        Pr(Xij = 1|Xijc) 
exp {ωij} = ---------------------- (conditional odds) 
        Pr(Xij = 0|Xijc) 
 
where we statistically condition our probabilities on the complement relation which 
contains all the other ties in the network. This approach has the advantage of yielding a 
model not dependent on the normalizing constant. The odds defined above simplifies p* 
substantially. Using the two other relations, Xij+, formed from Χ where the tie from i to j 
is forced to be present, and Xij-, where the tie from i to j is forced to be absent, we have:  
 
Pr(Xij = 1|Xijc) exp{θ’z(Xij+)} 
----------------------   =  --------------------- = exp{θ’[z(Xij+) - z(Xij-)]} (simplified odds) 
Pr(Xij = 0|Xijc) exp{θ’z(Xij-)} 
 
From this result, we obtain the logit version of p* by taking the logarithm of the odds: 
 
Pr(Xij = 1|Xijc) 
ωij = log ---------------------- = θ’[z(Xij+) - z(Xij-)] (Model 3: simplified logit p*) 
Pr(Xij = 0|Xijc) 
 
If we define dij(z) = [z(Xij+) - z(Xij-)], then the logit Model 3 simplifies succinctly to ωij = 
θ’dij(z). The expression dij(z) is the collection of explanatory variables used to fit the logit 
version of p*. The elements of dij(z) are changes in the measurements on the original 
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network explanatory variables that arise when xij changes from 1 to 0. One takes the set 
of explanatory variables z(x), and records the values of the statistics when xij = 1 and 
when xij = 0. The differences in the statistics are the elements of dij(z). This version of the 
model, in which a log odds is equated to a linear function of the components of dij(z), is 
referred to as the logit p* family of models. These models can include actor-attribute 
explanatory variables, such as the form of the actors. We can allow model parameters to 
depend on the attributes; for example, we can study the effect of the form of the actors on 
tendencies toward mutuality or transitivity. In general, the models have used dyadic 
configurations (e.g., choice, mutuality, expansiveness, attractiveness), triadic 
configurations (e.g., transitivity, cyclicity), subgroup effects, and network centralization 
for relational variables while the attributes of the partners and those of the partners’ 
partners for attribute variables. 
In studying signed networks, exponential random graph models (ERGM), as in 
the categorical data analysis, may be used once the networks of positive and negative 
relations are separated. That is, to investigate the presence (or absence) of a relational tie 
in a signed network, the signed network has to be separated into a network of positive ties 
and a network of negative ties as they represent different qualities of relations. Once the 
networks are separated, estimation can be done in the same way in each network structure 
as introduced above. It would be worthwhile to investigate whether or not the same 
conditions contribute to the presence (or absence) of tie probability differently in positive 
and negative networks. 
Maximum (Pseudo-)Likelihood Estimation: Fitting the logit p* family of 
models are done by adopting a pseudo-likelihood estimation strategy that assumes that 
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the logits ωij of the conditional probabilities defined in Equation (1) are statistically 
independent. Maximizing this pseudo-likelihood (MPL) function is equivalent to fitting a 
logistic regression model to the logits ωij. To assess the statistical importance of a 
particular variable, one can fit two models: one with the variable and another without it 
(while the other variables must remain the same). The difference in pseudo-likelihood 
ratio statistics (GPL2) can be evaluated approximately by referring the value to a Χ2 
distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of parameters associated with 
the variable in question (Wasserman and Pattison, 1996; Pattison and Wasserman, 1998). 
In addition to GPL2, one can also examine the ratios of parameter estimates or linear 
functions of parameter estimates, to their approximate standard errors. The square of such 
ratios are known as Wald statistic (Agresti, 1990) and labeled here as WaldPL for our 
pseudo-likelihood estimated parameters. 
 
3.4   Computer Packages 
The data analyses have been done in various computer packages including SAS (2003), 
Pajek (2006), Ucinet (2006) and Multinet (2005). SAS is one of the most popular 
statistical packages developed by the SAS Institute. While meaning “spider” in Slovene, 
Pajek is a network program for large network analysis developed by Vladimir Batagelj 
and Andrej Mrvar. Developed by Steven P. Borgatti, Martin G. Everett, and Linton C. 
Freeman, Ucinet may be the most user-friendly network package. Finally, Multinet is a 
package for statistical network analysis developed by William D. Richards and Andrew J. 
Seary. 
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 Chapter 4 
Description of Data 
 
To investigate the emerging movement structure introduced in the prior chapters, I have 
collected data to represent and analyze the environmental movement structure composed 
of the EORGs operating at the national level including both environmental movement 
organizations (EMOs) and environmental government agencies (EGAs) and the inter-
EORG relations including both lawsuit and alliance ties in the United States for the 
period, 1970-2001. This chapter introduces the sources and nature of the data to be 
analyzed in the following chapters and discusses the issues and challenges that faced the 
coding of each variable. While the data sources are indicated below, the nature of the data 
is of four different kinds: (a) organizational attributes, (b) organizational relations, (c) 
network configurations, and (d) yearly statistics. The data were longitudinal collected for 
the period from 1970 to 2001. 
 
4.1   Data: Sources 
The data were collected from various sources including LexisNexis, FindLaw, Guide Star, 
legal defense firms, annual reports, and websites. On the one hand, the primary sources of 
litigation were LexisNexis, FindLaw, and legal defense firms that had records on 
environmental litigation at all levels of the courts. Particularly, LexisNexis had detailed 
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records of legal activities at all levels of the courts by the EORGs at all local, regional, 
and national levels. For example, the data set provided the plaintiff(s), defender(s), case 
number, court name, charges, and so forth. The annual reports and the websites of the 
EORGs were used to supplement and verify the data. Table 4.1 below summarizes the 
variables used in analysis. The final column of the table indicates the main data sources 
for each variable. The two response variables (lawsuit, alliance) came from mostly 
LexisNexis and FindLaw as the main data sources. That is, dyadic information on 
environmental lawsuits was used for the first response variable, lawsuit and the dyadic 
partnership relations between the organizations that cooperated for joint lawsuits was 
used for the second response variable, alliance. Other relational variables in the table 
such as “out-lawsuit” were also created from the dyadic litigation and alliance ties. 
On the other hand, the data on organizational characteristics were collected from 
Guide Star and mission statements from the annual reports and websites of the 
organizations. First, Guide Star was an excellent source of data on non-profit 
organizations such as social movement organizations and foundations. 31  It provided 
general information (year of foundation, etc.), mission statements, board of directors, 
forms 990, financial records, and so forth. Of the variables summarized in Table 4.1, the 
information from Guide Star was used to generate the following organizational variables: 
organizational type, age, size, location, orientation, strategy, and area. 
Second, the mission statements from the annual reports and the websites of the 
organizations also provided detailed information on those organizations comparable to 
                                                          
31  Guide Star is an abundant data source of numerous non-profit organizations. It provides general 
information (e.g., “who we are”, year founded, physical address, etc.), mission & programs, board of 
directors, Form 990, financials, and so on. It also provides customized reports depending on the level of 
subscription. 
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that from Guide Star.32 Of the variables in Table 4.1, the following variables were coded 
from the mission statements: organizational type, age, orientation, strategy, orientation, 
and area. Using mission statements as a data source may raise several questions regarding 
reliability and coding. First, mission statements can vary in length and style depending on 
the organizational preferences (e.g., longer mission statements may have more strategies 
expressed), which raises an issue of how to legitimately use them to establish 
comparability between organizations. I dealt with this issue by following the principles 
such as: (a) I used broad knowledge of the organizations and their characteristics that the 
literature had provided (for example, the literature viewed the Sierra Club as being 
“mainstream” rather than “conservative/right-wing” or “radical” whereas it viewed the 
Green Peace as being “radical”). (b) I compared information in Guide Star and the 
mission statements with each other to arrive at the appropriate coding of the 
organizational attributes. The information from the mission statements, which tended to 
vary depending on the organizations, was verified by the information that was in 
relatively uniform format in Guide Star. (c) Since this dissertation was not a joint project, 
I was the only coder. Thus, I coded the organizational variables from Guide Star and the 
mission statements twice over six month of interval to ensure the reliability of the coding. 
While “4.3 Data: Nature” below will discuss in more detail how these data 
sources were specifically used to create organizational variables and the difficulties that 
had to be dealt with, here I briefly discuss the extent to which the current data sources can 
be considered complete and reliable. As indicated above, the main data sources on 
                                                          
32 Typical mission statements are 1-2 sentences in succinct format and 1-2 paragraphs in extended format in 
length. For example, the Sierra Club uses four short sentences for its mission statement. Typical mission 
statements tend to be written in standard format in plain language, though some organizations do use 
different styles. 
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environmental litigation including LexisNexis, FindLaw, and legal defense firms provided 
complete records of legal activities of the EORGs by year, level (of court), and type (of 
litigation) that even the Department of Justice did not provide. Particularly, LexisNexis 
was a single important data source that had complete information for the defined scope of 
the data. The main data sources for organizational attributes including Guide Star and 
mission statements had to be used more carefully. Although the two sources provided 
detailed information, the generation of organizational variables from these sources 
largely depended on the interpretation of the data by me alone. As indicated above, I 
attempted to minimize the possibility of the introduction of my judgment by using broad 
knowledge of the field from the literature, comparing the two main data sources with 
each other (Guide Star, mission statements), and coding more than once over an interval 
for the verification of the coding. 
Another issue of using mission statements as a data source concerned the possible 
differences between what was expressed and what was factual in the mission statements 
about the organizations. For example, many EMOs had been actively involved in 
litigation even though they never mentioned litigation as a movement strategy in their 
mission statements. That is, it is possible that expressed strategies of a movement 
organization are different from the operating strategies of the organization. I consider 
important the expressed information as well as the factual information and believes that 
the differences may be, rather than simply misleading, one of the objects that research 
outcomes have to explain. Section 4.3 Data: Nature will describe more about the data 
while focusing on how the organizational variables were generated from the data sources 
that this section revealed. 
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 4.2   Data: Collection 
Given the data sources identified, the data collection was conducted in a series of steps: 
first, the lawsuit cases with regard to the federal environmental laws and regulations were 
identified for the years from 1970 to 2001. The number of environmental lawsuit cases 
varied from dozens to thousands depending on the year. The environmental lawsuit cases 
that involved local and state environmental laws and regulations were excluded from 
consideration. As a result, the investigation in later chapters does not target the legal 
activities regarding local and state environmental laws and regulations by any levels of 
EORGs. 
Second, of numerous environmental lawsuit cases identified from 1970 to 2001, 
the lawsuit cases that involved the EORGs operating at the national level were selected. 
For the lack of absolute criteria for the national EORGs, the EORGs were considered 
environmentalist organizations operating at the national level if they were operating in 
more than two states or had membership in more than two states. Accordingly, local and 
regional EORGs were excluded in the data set even if they were involved in the lawsuits 
regarding federal laws and regulations. As a result, the investigation in later chapters does 
not target the legal activities by the local and regional EORGs regarding any levels of 
environmental litigation. Since this dissertation confined its focus on the national EORGs 
that had been involved in federal environmental litigation between 1970 and 2001, a 
number of other types of EORGs had to be excluded from the data set, though they 
played important roles in American environmentalism during the period. For example, 
industrial organizations such as labor unions, for-profit corporations, and trade 
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associations such as United Steelworkers of America (USWA), Monsanto Inc., American 
Forest & Paper Association (AF&PA) were not considered in data collection because 
they were thought to belong to for-profit sector. 
Finally, the data collected for the period, 1970-2001 on the lawsuit ties regarding 
the federal environmental laws and regulations and the national EORGs involved were 
collapsed into eight periods of four years. The historical events for the period in the 
United States were not used to divide the entire period. The national EORGs and the 
environmental lawsuit ties between them were thought to constitute the conflictual 
movement structure and the national EORGs and the partnership relations for joint 
lawsuits between them the alliance structure. Accordingly, the findings from the 
investigation in Chapters 6, 7, and 8 have implications only for the movement structure, 
as defined in this chapter, represented by the movement organizations and the 
interorganizational relations in the EMS in the United States, 1970-2001. 
 
4.3   Data: Nature 
The nature of the data is of four different kinds: (a) organizational attributes, (b) 
organizational relations, (c) network configurations, and (d) yearly statistics. 
Organizational attributes refer to the organizational characteristics including size, age, 
orientation, action area, primary strategy, and geographic location. Organizational 
relations include lawsuit relations and alliance relations between the EORGs over the 
period, 1970-2001. Third, network configurations refer to dyadic and triadic composition 
of the ties. Finally, yearly information include yearly characteristics of the EMS such as 
the number of lawsuits, the number of EORGs in lawsuits, the number of EORGs that 
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filed lawsuits, the number of EORGs that were filed lawsuits, the number of alliances, 
and the number of EMOs in alliances. 
 
4.3.1   Organizational Attributes 
The first dataset contains information on organizational characteristics that will be used 
to explain the existence of lawsuit ties and alliance ties as response variables. Table 4.1 
summarizes organizational variables, which are arranged by label, unit of observation, 
data type, description for both explanatory and response variables, and main data sources. 
As presented above in Section 4.1, organizational variables were constructed and coded 
largely based on my interpretation of the descriptions of the organizations provided in the 
data sources. Thus, the introduction of the organizational variables that follows will focus 
on what the variables were, how the categories of the variables were constructed, and 
how the data sources were coded. 
First, I had explored organizational variables that could characterize the EORGs 
and came up with the following variables as necessary: organizational type, location, age, 
size, (ideological) orientation, (action) area, and strategy. 33  The criteria to code the 
organizational descriptions for organizational variables came mainly from the reading of 
the literature on social movements/collective action and American environmentalism. For 
example, the literature (Andrews, 1999; Shabecoff, 2000, 2003) that describes the 
development of American environmentalism uses three categories of conservative, 
                                                          
33 Other organizational variables include organizational structure, culture, resources, and so on. They were 
not included in this dissertation due to either the irrelevancy to the current purpose or the unavailability of 
the data. 
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mainstream, and radical to classify the EORGs into ideological camps. In case there was 
no better classification scheme, I followed the literature. 
Second, the data sources (mainly, Guide Star and mission statements) were coded 
for organizational variables after the sources had been cross-compared. The first variable, 
organizational type was classified into only two categories since I intended to distinguish 
movement organizations from other types of organizations: thus, environmental 
movement organization (“EMO”) and environmental government agency (“EGA”).34 The 
distinction between the two types of organizations was obvious. For the distribution of 
the EORGs in each category, refer to Section 5.1 Environmental Organizations (EORGs) 
in the following chapter. 
The data sources for organizational age were both Guide Star and mission 
statements. An EORG’s age was calculated by the absolute difference between the year 
when the EORG was founded and the year of 2001. The data source for organizational 
size was Guide Star and the most up-to-date annual operating budget of the EORGs was 
used as a proxy of the EORG’s size. The variable was coded binary (small: annual budget 
≤ $25,000; large: annual budget ≥ $25,000) depending on their annual budget circa 2001. 
The EORGs with less than an annual budget of $25,000 were exempt from reporting tax 
and their annual budget was not obtainable. Of course, this dichotomy of annual budget 
should not hide the differences in organizational size among the national EORGs. 
The difficulties of coding mostly contained in coding the following three 
variables: orientation, (primary action) area, and strategy. In contrast to the variables 
described above, several challeges were facing the coding processes of these variables. 
                                                          
34 There were sixteen social movement organizations (SMOs) committed to general action areas other than 
the environment. However, they were not distinguished in the analysis from the EMOs due to the reason 
specified above. 
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Initially, it was challenging to come up with a complete list of categories that would 
contain all possible cases of the variables and that were mutually exclusive at the same 
time. From a preliminary coding of the data sources, I had a long list of the categories for 
each variable, and then made the list short yet still complete for the current data by 
combining similar categories.35 
As indicated above in Section 4.1 Data: Sources, I used prior knowledge from the 
literature, cross-comparison of the main data sources, and multiple coding to ensure the 
reliability of the coding. The data sources of organizational orientation were both Guide 
Star and mission statements. An EORG was coded as belonging to one of the three 
distinct ideological groups: conservative, mainstream, or radical.36 The criteria for the 
classification came mainly from the reading of the literature on social 
movements/collective action and American environmentalism (Andrews, 1999; 
Shabecoff, 2000, 2003). Shabecoff (2000, 2003), for example, describes that the 
conservatives include members of hunting, fishing, and land preservation groups such as 
National Wilderness Institute (NWI). They are suspicious of government but rarely 
criticize business. They try to reach their goals largely through the private sector. The 
members of the mainstream camp are pragmatists seeking incremental reforms. They 
work with government and the political parties and, while often battling with business 
and industry, do not see them as their enemies either. They include widely known EMOs 
such as Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC). Finally, the members of the radical 
                                                          
35  For example, preliminary categories of the variable, strategy including {(funding for) research, 
(developing) education(al programs), information diffusion, publication}, {consciousness raising, 
campaigning, public awareness}, {lobbying (for policy reform)}, and {legal defense, legal assistance} were 
shorted to “research/education”, “public awareness”, “policy/lobbying”, and “litigation”. 
36 For a counter-movement in American environmentalism, see an anti-environmental organization (Center 
for the Defense of Freedom or CDF) tracing the financial resources of the EMOs 
(URL: http://www.activistcash.com or http://www.undueinfluence.com). 
 70
camp such as Military Toxic Project (MTP) are anti-government as well as anti-business. 
They seek fundamental changes in the political and economic systems and give the need 
to protect nature primacy over the need to protect humans. I classified the EORGs based 
on the goals, ideologies, and strategies that the EORGs expressed in their mission 
statements and that Guide Star summaried. 
The data sources for organizational (primary action) area were Guide Star and 
mission statements. As with organizational orientation above, the data sources were 
coded initially into dozens of categories based on what the EORGs expressed in their 
mission statements and what Guide Star summarized, and then reduced to the following 
categories: air/climate, ocean/river, wildlife/land, historic preservation, recycle/energy, 
public transportation, toxic/nuclear, animal rights, and general. A challenge was that 
many EORGs were committed to more than one action area. I had to consider the primary 
action area of an EORG as its organizational area. 
Organizational strategy was also identified from both Guide Star and mission 
statements based on the expressed organizational strategies and tactics. The EORGs were 
classified into one of the following categories: research/education, public awareness, 
policy/lobbying, or legal defense. The EORGs that used research/education as a strategy 
were the EORGs that committed to research and education inside their organizations 
rather than more aggressive activities outside. The public awareness EORGs expressed as 
their strategies more active strategies including campaigning, picketing, and so forth. The 
EORGs that expressed as their strategies an intervention in the political system by 
affecting policy processes were coded policy/lobbying EORGs. Finally, the EORGs that 
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chose to affect the court decisions as a movement strategy were considered legal defense 
EORGs. 
 
Table 4.1: Description of Organizational Variables 
Label Unit of Observation Data Type Description 
Main 
Data Sources 
Response 
Variables     
Lawsuit Dyad (directed) 
Categorical 
(Binary) 
Whether an EORG files a lawsuit against 
another EORG for a given period 
LexisNexis 
FindLaw 
Alliance Dyad (undirected) 
Categorical 
(Binary) 
Whether two distinct EORGs have a alliance 
for a given period 
LexisNexis 
FindLaw 
Explanatory 
Variables     
Attributes 
  Type Organization Categorical EMO or EGA 
Guide Star 
Mission Statement 
  Location Organization Categorical 
Geographical location in which an EORG’ 
headquarter is located (Northeast, 
Midwest, South, or West) 
Guide Star 
  Age Organization Continuous Years since foundation (2001-year of foundation) Guide Star 
  Size Organization Categorical Whether an EORG is small or large in annual operating budget Guide Star 
  Orientation Organization Categorical Ideological orientation (radical, mainstream, or conservative) 
Guide Star 
Mission Statement 
  Area Organization Categorical 
Primary action area (air/climate, 
ocean/river, wildlife/land, historic 
preservation, recycle/energy, public 
transportation, toxics/nuclear, animal 
rights, public health, general) 
Guide Star 
Mission Statement 
  Strategy Organization Categorical 
Primary strategy (research/education, 
public awareness, policy/lobbying, or 
litigation) 
Guide Star 
Mission Statement 
Relations 
Number of out- 
lawsuits 
(lsoutdegree) 
EORG Continuous Number of lawsuits filed by an EORG for a given period 
LexisNexis 
FindLaw 
Number of in- 
lawsuits 
(lsindegree) 
EORG Continuous Number of lawsuits filed to an EORG for a given period 
LexisNexis 
FindLaw 
Number of 
partners 
  (ptdegree) 
 
EORG Continuous 
 
Number of partners of an EORG for a given 
period 
LexisNexis 
FindLaw 
Configurations 
  (1) Edges 
 
Dyad 
 
Discrete 
 
Edges (mutuality) (i<->j) 
LexisNexis 
FindLaw 
  (3) 2Stars  Triad Discrete 2Stars (popularity or expansiveness) (j<->i<->k) 
LexisNexis 
FindLaw 
  (6) Triads  Triad Discrete Triads (Closure) (i<->j, i<->k, j<->k) LexisNexis FindLaw 
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The data source for organizational location was Guide Star and the website of the 
EORGs. I followed the conventional classification of the U.S. region into four different 
areas: Northeast, Midwest, South, or West. An EORG was considered operating in a 
region where the EORG was headquartered. By definition, national EORGs operated in 
multiple states. However, the locations where they were headquartered were thought to 
inform who they were, i.e., organizational identity and movement/organizational strategy. 
 
4.3.2   Organizational Relations 
As shown in the third and fourth rows of Table 4.1, the first response variable (variable 
name, lawsuit) measured whether or not an EORG filed a lawsuit against its opponent for 
a given period. Since this dissertation research is concerned with under what structural 
conditions the EORGs employed litigation as a movement strategy, analytic focus is on 
“who utilized litigation under what conditions” rather than “what parties were involved in 
a lawsuit.” The second response variable (variable name, alliance) measured whether or 
not there was an alliance tie between two distinct EORGs. The other relational variables 
are summarized under “relations” in Table 4.1. The relational variables measure the 
extent to which the EORGs were engaged in litigation: number of out-lawsuits 
(lsoutdegree), number of in-lawsuits (lsindegree), and number of partners (ptdegree). The 
number of out-lawsuits (lsoutdegree) was calculated by the number of lawsuits filed by 
an EORG for a given period while the number of in-lawsuits (lsindegree) was calculated 
by the number of lawsuits filed to an EORG for a given period. Finally, the number of 
partners (ptdegree) was calculated by the number of partners of an EORG for a given 
period. 
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 4.3.3   Network Configurations 
Third, network configurations refer to the dyadic and triadic configurations in which the 
focal EORG is involved in the network. While there are dozens of network configurations 
worthy of studying, this dissertation research focuses on only three network 
configurations because the ties are undirected in alliance networks, which are (1) Edges 
(mutuality: i↔j), (3) 2Stars (popularity or expansiveness, j↔i↔k), and (6) Triad 
(closure: i↔j, i↔k, j↔k) (the numbers are the identification numbers for parameters in 
MultiNet). Edges (mutuality) measures whether or not EORGs i and j choose each other 
as partners and 2Stars measures, first, the EORG i’s expansiveness–whether or not 
EORG i chooses both EORG j and EORG k as its partners or, second, the EORG i’s 
popularity–whether or not EORG i is chosen by both EORG j and EORG k as their 
partners. Triads (closure) measures closedness as a form of a triad in which EORGs i, j, 
and k are all tied to each other. 
 
4.3.4   Yearly Statistics 
The fourth data set stores yearly characteristics of the EMS. Table 4.2 summarizes the 
yearly statistics of the EMS between 1970 and 2001, which are arranged in label, unit of 
observation, data type, and description. The variables are classified in two groups: 
statistical or graph-theoretic. The statistical variables are as follows: the number of 
lawsuits, the number of EORGs in lawsuits, the number of EORGs that filed lawsuits, the 
number of EORGs that were filed lawsuits, the number of alliances, and the number of 
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EMOs in alliances. As in the other dataset, the yearly information has been further 
collapsed into eight consecutive periods. The graph-theoretic variables include 
centralization, density, and clustering coefficient.  
 
Table 4.2: Description of Yearly Variables 
 
Label Unit of Observation Data Type Description 
Statistical 
  No. of lawsuits Tie Discrete Number of lawsuit ties 
  No. of EORGs in lawsuits Organization Discrete Number of EORGs in lawsuits 
No. of EORGs that filed 
Lawsuits Organization Discrete Number of EORGs that filed lawsuits 
No. of EORGs that were 
Filed lawsuits Organization Discrete Number of EORGs that were filed lawsuits 
Number of alliance ties Tie Discrete Number of alliance ties 
Number of EMOs in alliance ties Organization Discrete Number of EMOs in alliance ties 
Graph-theoretic 
  Centralization Network Continuous 
Network degree centralization (S(cmax - 
c(vi)) divided by the maximum value 
possible) 
Density Network Continuous Total number of ties divided by the total number of possible ties 
Clustering coefficient Network Continuous 
Overall clustering coefficient is the mean of 
the clustering coefficient of all the nodes. 
Node clustering coefficient is the density of 
its open neighborhood.  
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 Chapter 5 
EMS: Anatomy of the Structure 
 
This chapter will explore the structure of the environmental movement sector (EMS) in 
the United States while focusing on the environmental organizations (EORGs) and the 
ties between them. The EORGs are of two different kinds: environmental movement 
organizations (EMOs) and environmental government agencies (EGAs) that have used 
litigation as an organizational strategy. The inter-EORG relations are also of two 
different kinds: litigation and alliances. The following parts will explore these 
components separately before analysis can be made in the following chapters. The EMOs 
in alliances are a subset of the EMOs in litigation because the alliances considered were 
only for joint litigation. Chapter 8 will investigate inter-EORG signed ties and yet they 
are a combination of (negative) litigation and (positive) alliances. An exploration of the 
EMS will help investigate, in the following chapters, the structural dynamics of the sector 
for the given period in the United States. 
 
5.1   Environmental Organizations (EORGs) 
This section will explore the organizational characteristics of the EORGs (EMOs, EGAs) 
before more structural-relational analyses will be done in the following chapters. The 
EORGs have been selected such that they operate at the national level and they have been 
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involved in federal environmental litigation between 1970 and 2001. From these criteria, 
I have identified 176 EORGs including 143 EMOs (81%) and 33 EGAs (19%). A 
complete list of the EMOs and EGAs can be found in Appendix A and B, respectively. 
They are different in organizational characteristics including organizational age, size, 
geographical location, ideological orientation, primary action area, and strategy. The 
organizational variables were not measured every year for the given period due to the 
limited availability of the data. Thus, the organizational characteristics provided below 
describe the summary image of the EORGs for the entire period, 1970-2001. 
 
5.1.1   Environmental Movement Organizations (EMOs) 
The 143 EMOs include sixteen social movement organizations (SMOs) (11%) with 
general action areas other than environmental one, though they will not be distinguished 
from the EMOs in analysis. Despite the important roles that they have played in 
American environmentalism, a number of other types of EORGs have not been included 
in the data set because this dissertation research focuses on the national EORGs that have 
been involved in federal environmental litigation between 1970 and 2001. For example, 
all local and regional EMOs such as the Oregon Natural Resource Council (ONRC) have 
been excluded. Also excluded are all industrial organizations such as labor unions, for-
profit corporations, and trade associations such as United Steelworkers of America 
(USWA), Monsanto Inc., American Forest & Paper Association (AF&PA). In addition, 
national EORGs that were involved in lawsuit cases at the local or state levels were also 
excluded. 
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Yet, the EORGs in the current dataset are not homogeneous in terms of age, size, 
geographical location, ideological orientation, primary action area, strategy, and so on. Of 
the 143 EMOs excluding 33 EGAs, a majority of the EMOs in the data set are still young: 
41 EMOs (29%) were founded before 1970 while the other 94 EMOs (66%) after 1970 (8 
EMOs (6%) unknown). The fact that more EMOs in the dataset were founded after 1970 
reflects the heightened atmosphere in the environmental movement in the United States 
since the first Earth Day. Since 1970, each decade has seen fairly similar number of new 
EMOs (39, 28, and 27, respectively). Figure 5.1 displays the number of newly founded 
EMOs between 1970 and 2001. 
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Figure 5.1: Number of Newly Founded EMOs 
 
In terms of organizational size, the majority of the EMOs were large, though there 
were small EMOs as well. While an EMO’s annual budget is an indicator of the EMO’s 
size, I did not collect the annual budget for every year. Instead, I measured the most up-
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to-date budget of the EMOs as a proxy. 124 EMOs (87%) were considered large (budget 
≥$25,000) whereas 19 EMOs (13%) small (budget ≤$25,000). The EMOs with less than a 
budget of $25,000 are exempt from reporting tax. Of course, this dichotomy of annual 
budget should not hide the differences in organizational size among the EMOs. For 
example, large EMOs also vary from having an annual budget of $25,000 to several 
million dollars. In contrast, there are EMOs with a small budget of less than $25,000. For 
example, the Cabinet Resource Group (CRG), the Desert Protective Council (DPC), and 
The Animal Fund (TAF) are such EMOs. 
Geographically, the national EMOs operate in multiple states. However, the 
locations where they are headquartered may inform who they are, i.e., organizational 
identity and movement/organizational strategy. A majority of the EMOs are 
headquartered in South and West. Of 143 EMOs, 56 EMOs (39%) are in South, 52 EMOs 
(36%) in West, 26 EMOs (18%) in Northeast, and 9 EMOs (6%) in Midwest. 
Interestingly, of 56 EMOs in South, 36 EMOs are headquartered in Washington, DC, the 
capital city of the United States, which suggests their primary strategies–lobbying and 
litigation, though they rarely identify themselves as such in their organizational texts such 
as mission statements. 
Importantly, in ideological orientation, the EMOs are not homogeneous either 
despite the same organizational type. From what they announce in their mission 
statements regarding their goals and ideologies, they can be classified into three distinct 
camps: ‘mainstream,’ ‘radical,’ or ‘conservative.’ 106 EMOs (74%) can be classified as 
mainstream, 25 EMOs (17%) radical, and 12 EMOs (8%) conservative. The members of 
the mainstream camp are pragmatists seeking incremental reforms. They work with 
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government and the political parties and, while often battling with business and industry, 
do not see them as their enemies either. They include widely known EMOs such as 
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC). On the other hand, the members of the 
radical camp such as Military Toxic Project (MTP) are anti-government as well as anti-
business. They seek fundamental changes in the political and economic systems and give 
the need to protect nature primacy over the need to protect humans. The conservatives 
include members of hunting, fishing, and land preservation groups such as National 
Wilderness Institute (NWI). They are suspicious of government but rarely criticize 
business. They try to reach their goals largely through the private sector. 
The EMOs are diverse also in organizational/movement strategies to achieve their 
goals. That is, a majority of the EMOs (102 EMOs; 71%) identify themselves in their 
mission statements as those employing ‘public campaign’ as their primary strategy while 
the others ‘research/education’ (17 EMOs; 12%), ‘policy/lobbying’ (11 EMOs; 8%), and 
‘legal defense’ (13 EMOs; 9%). Still, more than 80% of the EMOs are employing 
traditional strategies such as public campaign and research/education whereas less than 
20% of the EMOs non-traditional strategies such as policy/lobbing and legal defense. The 
fact that the American EMS has been flooded with environmental litigation since 1970 
suggests two contradictory facts: (a) a majority of the EMOs announce that they use 
traditional strategies and yet (b) a majority of the EMOs employ non-traditional strategies 
as well. Thus, it appears that a majority of the EMOs have been involved in 
environmental lawsuits regardless of their official movement strategies. 
Finally, the EMOs can also be classified into differing groups in terms of primary 
action areas: wildlife/land (48 EMOs; 34%), general (34 EMOs; 24%), animal rights (24 
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EMOs; 17%), ocean/river (15 EMOs; 10%), toxics/nuclear (10 EMOs; 7%), air/climate 
(2 EMOs; 1%), historic preservation (2 EMOs; 1%), recycle/energy (2 EMOs; 1%), and 
public transportation (1 EMOs; 1%). A majority of the EMOs focus on a single action 
area whereas a quarter of them on multiple (general) issues. The EMOs are mostly 
concerned with land followed by water and air of the natural resources. In sum, 
wildlife/land, animal rights, ocean/river, and toxics/nuclear were dominant action areas in 
the American EMS for the given period. Surprisingly, however, there were not many 
EMOs dedicated to air/climate, historic preservation, recycle/energy, public 
transportation (total 7 EMOs; 5%), which may be popular issues outside the United 
States. 
 
5.1.2   Environmental Government Agencies (EGAs) 
The data set includes 33 EGAs against which the 143 EMOs have mostly been filed 
lawsuits. Although the organizational characteristics of those EGAs were different in as 
those of the EMOs, they will not further be described beyond the list of the EGAs in 
Appendix B because this dissertation research aims to focus primarily on the EMOs and 
their (litigation, alliance) activities. One can assume that they are different in background 
and relationship with other branches and agencies in the government. All local and 
regional EGAs have been excluded despite their important roles in American 
environmentalism. 
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5.2   Environmental Ties 
The EORGs described above are interconnected in various ways. This dissertation 
research considers the inter-EORG relations only in terms of two different kinds: 
litigation and alliances. As mentioned, the alliances considered were only for the purpose 
of joint litigation. Since there were EORGs that filed lawsuits independently of other 
EORGs, the EORGs in alliances were a subset of the EORGs in litigation. The 
description of the (litigation, alliance) ties will be minimal as more will be provided in 
the following chapters. 
 
5.2.1   Environmental Litigation 
First, the EMS comprises the litigation ties between the EORGs. Litigation relations refer 
to the involvement in the federal environmental lawsuit cases filed by national EORGs 
against each other. The ways in which the EORGs are interconnected with each other in 
lawsuit ties inform important structural aspects of the EMS and may play an important 
role in the EMS facilitating and/or constraining the EORGs’ activities. The formation of 
lawsuits between the EORGs was active throughout the entire period. 
As Table 5.1 summarizes, the formation of lawsuit ties involved both EMOs and 
EGAs. Mostly, EMOs filed lawsuits against EGAs and yet a few EMOs were also filed 
lawsuits from other EORGs. EGAs also filed lawsuits, though they were the targets of 
most of the lawsuits.37 For the entire period, 154 EORGs filed lawsuits and 39 EORGs 
                                                          
37 The environmental lawsuits that EGAs filed are as follows: Period II (1975. Russell E. Train (US EPA) v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC); 1976. Russell E. Train (US EPA) v. Colorado Public Interest 
Research Group (PIRG); 1976. Kleppe (US DOI) v. Sierra Club (SC)). Period III (1979. Andrus (US DOI) 
v. Sierra Club (SC); 1980. Costle (US EPA) v. Pac. Legal Found. (PLF)). Period IV (1983. Ruckelshaus 
(US EPA) v. Sierra Club (SC)). Period VI (1992. Lujan (US DOI) v. Defenders of Wildlife (DW)). 
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were filed lawsuits. All 34 EGAs were involved in lawsuit ties in one way or another and 
11 EGAs filed lawsuits against others. Interestingly, thirteen lawsuits were exchanged 
between the EGAs.38 The total volume of lawsuits exchanged between the EORGs was 
411 throughout the entire period, which indicates that, on average, an EORG filed 2.67 
lawsuits (=mean outdegree) whereas an EORG was filed 10.54 lawsuits (=mean 
indegree). The variation of lawsuit ties was also large: a few EORGs filed more than ten 
lawsuits whereas a majority of them filed only one or two lawsuits (std.: 2.53). On the 
other hand, a majority of them were filed fewer than two lawsuits whereas a few EORGs 
were filed more than 50 lawsuits whereas (std.: 8.42). This suggests that the lawsuit ties 
were also concentrated against a few EORGs resulting in a hierarchical structure. 
                                                          
38  The environmental lawsuits between EGAs are as follows: Period I (1973. Brennan (US DOL) v. 
Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission (US OSHRC)). Period II (1974, 1975. Brennan (US 
DOL) v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission (US OSHRC); 1975, 1976. Earl L. Butz (US 
DOA) v. Russell E. Train (US EPA)). Period III (1981. Marshall (US DOL) v. M. W. Watson, Inc. (US 
OSHRC)). Period IV (1982. Ray Marshall (US DOL) v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review 
Commission (US FMSHRC); 1985. United States (US) v. S.S. (Joe) Burford (US DOI)). Period V 
(1987. Department of Navy (US Navy) v. Federal Labor Relations Authority (US FLRA); 1987. Nuclear 
Regulatory Comm'n (US NRC) v. Federal Labor Relations Auth. (US FLRA); 1989. Department of Interior, 
Bureau of Land Management (US DOI) v. Federal Labor Relations Authority (US FLRA); 1989. HHS, etc. 
(US HHS) v. Federal Labor Relations Authority (US FLRA)). Period VI (1990. Department of Interior, 
Bureau of Land Management (US DOI) v. Federal Labor Relations Authority (US FLRA); 1990. HHS 
Family Support Admin. (US HHS) v. Federal Labor Relations Authority (US FLRA); 1990. HHS, etc. (US 
HHS) v. Federal Labor Relations Authority (US FLRA); 1990. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n (US NRC) v. 
Federal Labor Relations Auth. (US FLRA); 1991. Martin (US DOL) v. OSHRC (US OSHRC); 1992. United 
States Dep't of Interior (US DOI) v. FERC (US FERC); 1992. Federal Labor Relations Auth. (US FLRA) v. 
US DOD (US DOD); 1992. Federal Labor Relations Auth. (US FLRA) v. Navy (US Navy); 1993. Reich (US 
DOL) v. OSHRC (US OSHRC)). Period VII (1994. United States Dep't of Defense (US DOD) v. Federal 
Labor Relations Auth. (US FLRA); 1996. DOT (US DOT) v. United States (US); 1996. Environmental 
Tech. Council (US EPA) v. Sierra Club (SC)). Period VIII (1998. Alexis M. Herman (US DOL) v. 
Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission (US OSHRC); 2000. United States (US) v. US DOI (US 
DOI)). 
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Table 5.1: Lawsuit Ties by EORG Type 
 No. Ties 
No. EORG 
OUT IN 
EMOs 398 (96.84%) 
143 
(92.86%) 
5 
(12.82%) 
EGAs 411 (100%) 
11 
(7.14%) 
34 
(87.18%) 
Total 411 (100%) 
154 
(100%) 
39 
(100%) 
 
5.2.2   Environmental Alliances 
Second, the EMS comprises the alliance ties between the EMOs. Alliance relations refer 
to joint efforts of the EMOs for environmental litigation with regard to federal 
environmental laws and regulations. The ways in which the EMOs are interconnected 
with each other in alliance ties may inform important structural aspects of the EMS and 
may play an important role in the EMS facilitating and/or constraining the EMOs’ 
activities. The formation of alliances between the EMOs for litigation was active 
throughout the entire period. Of 143 EMOs in the data set, 104 EMOs (73%) formed 
alliance relations with other EMOs whereas 39 EMOs (27%) did not. The total volume of 
the alliance ties between the EMOs was 411, which indicates that, on average, an EMO 
created 3.91 alliance ties over the period. The variation of the alliance ties was large: a 
few EMOs formed more than 40 alliances whereas some formed only a single alliance tie 
(std.: 8.22). This suggests that alliance ties were concentrated toward a few popular 
EMOs by relatively few EMOs resulting in a hierarchical structure. 
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 Chapter 6 
Movement Dynamics: Conflictual Structure 
 
The following three chapters in Part III investigate the structural dynamics in the 
environmental movement sector (EMS) in the United States over the period, 1970-2001, 
based on the discussions in the preceding parts. In all three chapters, the unit of analysis 
is environmentalist organizations (EORGs) including environmental movement 
organizations (EMOs) and environmental government agencies (EGAs) operating at the 
national level. Chapters 6 and 7 address the generative-structural emergence of the 
contemporary inter-EORG structure in terms of the conflictual and alliance relations, 
respectively, in the EMS while Chapter 8 investigates the dynamics of the structural 
conflictual and alliance relations combined in the EMS. The findings from these chapters 
will be used to discuss in the concluding chapter the structural characteristics of the 
contemporary inter-EORG relations in the EMS in the United States.39 
 
Recently, a segment of scholars studying social movements/collective action have 
considered the environmental movement as part of the “new social movements” (NSMs) 
with other movements including peace/anti-war and feminist movements. The 
characteristics of the contemporary environmental movement that the scholars have 
                                                          
39 While a SMI can be considered as a collection of all social movement organizations (SMOs), all of the 
SMIs in a society can be considered as the SMS. 
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identified can be briefly summarized as follows: increased professionalization, 
dependence on private foundations, widespread alliances, prevalent use of lobbying and 
litigation, growing movement conflicts, and growing right-wing conservative movement 
and counter-movement.40 41 Although the new social movements have shared movement 
characteristics with conventional social movements (Gamson, 1989), 42  this chapter 
considers the prevalent use of litigation by the national EMOs and the growing conflicts 
within the movement sector as signifying significant structural changes in the movement 
sector (Edwards, 1995).  
Nonetheless, this chapter notices that little systematic effort has been made to 
reveal and analyze the growing conflicts within the movement sector from a relational-
structural perspective. In fact, scholars have dealt with conflicts and tensions in social 
movements but the discussions have been limited to the contention between movements 
and the movement opponents. This chapter posits that this intellectual negligence of the 
within-sector conflicts has left the study of contemporary social movements incomplete 
and inaccurate. 
                                                          
40 The environmental resources that have flown into the EMS include financial, labor, and time and the 
available resources in the EMS for the period have increased significantly. In parallel, activities to mobilize 
those resources have also been professionalized. Particularly, national EMOs have been successful in 
raising large amounts of resources from their affluent constituents and especially from private foundations 
(e.g., Ford, Pew, and McArthur) (Jenkins and Halcli, 1999; Brulle and Caniglia, 1999). As a result, 
however, national EMOs could not avoid their dependence upon these institutional sources of support that 
have provided them with stable resources that were not subject to shifts in political opportunities. 
41 For a more detailed discussion of the structural changes in the contemporary environmental movement, 
refer to Chapter 2. For general narratives, refer to Liroff (1976), Trubek (1978), Fox (1981), Andrews 
(1999), Brulle (2000). See also journalistic accounts by Shabecoff, Silverstein, Cockburn, and St. Clair. 
42 The debate, however, has been fierce with regard to, among other topics, the questions of “newness” of 
the NSMs and whether the NSMs are a product of the shift to a postindustrial economy (for an overview, 
see Pichardo, 1997). The debate will not come to an end until we have more evidence to support varying 
theorization of the contemporary social movements. In addition, as scholars have pointed out, comparative 
study of varying social movements in different movement sectors will be a necessity before we can fully 
evaluate the nature of contemporary social movements (see Canel, 1992; Klandermans, 1986; Klandermans 
and Tarrow, 1986). 
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This chapter investigates the movement dynamics in the EMS with regard to 
conflicts and tensions between EORGs at the national level in the EMS in the United 
States, 1970-2001. It focuses on the increased use of litigation as a non-conventional 
movement strategy since 1970 when modern environmental social movement took off in 
the United States. The research questions that this chapter addresses are: “In what ways 
have the organizational characteristics been associated with lawsuit formation in the 
environmental movement sector (EMS) in the United States since 1970?” [Q1a] “Under 
what conditions have triadic dominant movement structures been formed in the 
environmental movement sector (EMS) in the United States since 1970?” [Q2a] and 
“What are the structural characteristics (e.g., connectedness, balance, and hierarchy) of 
the contemporary movement structure that has emerged in the environmental movement 
sector (EMS) in the United States since 1970?” [Q4]43 
To answer these questions, the following sections will explore the contentious 
structure within the movement sector and investigate the longitudinal dynamics of the 
inter-EORG lawsuit ties by using, first, statistical network analysis and, second, the E-
state structural models introduced in Chapter 2 (Berger, Wagner, and Zelditch, 1985; 
Fararo and Skvoretz, 1986). An investigation of the structural dynamics of the movement 
sector in terms of environmental litigation will help us not only understand the 
contemporary EMS but also predict the structural consequences in the EMS in the United 
States. 
                                                          
43 Given the overall increase in popularity of the environmental litigation, more specific questions could be 
further raised as follows, for example: “When was litigation employed most popularly?”, “Who has 
employed litigation against whom?”, and “What have been the outcomes of the litigation in the 
environmental movement?”, and “Is it a ‘unique’ strategy that represents the changing nature of the 
contemporary social movements?” Although they are not the main research questions in this dissertation 
research, the questions above will also be answered through investigation. 
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 6.1   From “Consensus” to “Conflict” Movement 
In studying social movements/collective action, scholars have focused on the contentious 
relationships between the movement and the movement opponents while leaving behind 
the contentious relationships within the movement itself. In fact, as pointed out at the 
outset of this chapter, the growing movement conflicts, i.e., conflictual relationships 
within the movement sector have characterized the modern American environmentalism. 
The literature has found evidence from both the relationships between the SMOs (Zald 
and McCarthy, 1987) and the relationships between the movement and the 
countermovement (Zald and Useem, 1987) in the movement sector. The evidence seems 
abundant to call the transition of the movement from “consensus movement” to “conflict 
movement.” 
The contemporary environmental movement in the United States has seen the 
growth of the organizations and institutions such as law-reform organizations (e.g., 
defense firms) and foundations specifically established for conflictual purposes such as 
legal activities. A few examples include the foundation of the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the NAACP Legal Defense and 
Education Fund (LDF) in general social movement and the Environmental Defense Fund 
(EDF), Sierra Club/Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund (SC), and the Natural Resources 
Defense Fund (NRDC) in the environmental movement in particular. 
The past decades have also seen the actual increase in the conflictual relationships 
between the EMOs in the movement sector. As the literature pointed out, not all EMOs 
share a common movement goal and have little interest in competition and conflict (Zald 
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and McCarthy, 1987). In fact, a wide range of forms of conflicts have existed in the 
environmental movement sector, which include verbal claims, direct confrontation, 
lobbying authorities, speaking disparate audiences, litigation, and so on. Litigation that 
this dissertation is focusing on may be the most highly structured type of antagonistic 
encounter between the EMOs (Handler, 1978; Barkin, 1979; Epp, 1990; Morag-Levine, 
2003). Evidence shows that it has gained more and more popularity as an effective 
movement strategy in the movement sector in general since the 1970s (Zald and Berger, 
1978; Barkan, 1979; Mueller and Judd, 1981; Balser, 1997; McCright and Dunlap, 2000). 
The evidence is also concerned with the growth of the combative coalitions in the 
movement sector. Activities for coalition formation have been diverse in the movement 
sector: an umbrella organization with membership SMOs, a joint project among 
participating SMOs, and so on.44 There have been multiple environmental coalitions in 
the EMS in the United States. A few examples include the “Wise-Use” group, the 
Townhall, the Project Relief, the Turning Point Project (TPP), and the Activist Cash. 
Environmental coalitions have been formed by both mainstream (pro-environmentalist) 
and conservative (anti-environmentalist) camps in the EMS since the 1980s. In fact, the 
coalitions formed by the conservative EMOs outnumber those by the mainstream EMOs. 
Coalitions formed exclusively by the radical EMOs (e.g., Earth First!) have not been 
found, though the radical EMOs have joined the coalitions formed by the mainstream 
EMOs. 
In sum, the growth of combative EMOs, oppositional coalitions, and the 
conflictual relationships within the movement sector over the past decades have turned 
the direction of the contemporary environmental movement in the United States from the 
                                                          
44 For a detailed discussion of the environmental coalitions, refer to Section 7.1 in Chapter 7. 
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“consensus” movement to the “conflict” movement. The activities to create conflicts have 
been widely used for achieving various movement goals in the EMS: publicity, fund 
raising, consciousness-raising, political leverage, enforcement of existing and new laws, 
and legitimacy.45 
 
6.1.1   Environmental Legislation 
The legislation for environmental laws and regulations in the EMS has provided the 
EMOs and the general public with environmental standards. As movement strategies, the 
EMOs have used lobbying for environmental legislation and, in turn, the legislation has 
provided the EMOs with the standards for which they can use litigation to achieve further 
movement goals since the 1970s. For example, the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) announced the policy of the federal government to create and maintain 
conditions of “productive harmony” between man and nature by assuring “safe, healthful, 
productive, and aesthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings.” To back up this 
pledge, the act required that all major federal projects significantly affecting the 
                                                          
45 Incidental events such as (inter-)national meetings including environmental summits and natural/man-
made environmental disasters have also played important roles in American environmentalism since 1970. 
For example, the first Earth Day (April 22, 1970) was such an event. As Shabecoff (2000) describes, “On 
that day, environmentalism emerged for the first time on the national state as an unmistakable mass social 
movement.” Since the first Earth Day until when the UN Report, Our Common Future was proposed in 
1987, efforts for establishing governance in civil society over environmental issues have been consensus 
domestically and internationally. A year later in 1988, however, a counter-environmental movement called 
“wise-use” movement fundamentally transformed the environment movement in the United States. That is, 
the rise of the right-wing conservative environmental movement by the “wise-use” affiliates and the 
property owners changed American environmentalism from the “consensus” movement to the “conflict” 
movement thereafter. Since then, the bipartite oppositional structure in the EMS between the pro-
environmental and the anti-environmental movements started characterizing American environmentalism. 
In contrast, however, the demand from the pro-environmentalists for global standards of environmental 
regulation seemed surfacing outside the United States. In 1997, global summits met to set the protocol for 
controlling ozone gases in Kyoto, Japan, though the protocol has not been observed by super powers 
including the United States. 
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environment be accompanied by a statement detailing the environmental impact of the 
proposed action. 
Of numerous enactment and amendments in environmental legislation, this 
section will only identify major developments. Major laws and regulations enacted from 
1970 to 2001 include Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA, 1970), Endangered 
Species Act (ESA, 1973), Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund, 1980), Pollution Prevention Act (PPA, 1990), and 
so on. The scope of the environmental legislation has covered most of the action areas 
that the EMOs have been working on. Since the 1970s, each decade has seen 25, 13, and 
6 enactments/amendments of 44 major legislations, respectively. 
  
6.2   Methods, Data, and Hypotheses 
The statistical network methods used in this chapter are three fold: (a) describing tie 
distribution (network size, density, centralization, clustering coefficient, transitivity, and 
centrality), (b) partitioning network structure into a set of positions of equivalent EORGs, 
and (c) estimating tie probability by using categorical data analysis to examine whether 
or not there is a (incoming, outgoing) lawsuit tie between two distinct EORGs. The data 
include both environmental movement organizations (EMOs) and environmental 
government agencies (EGAs) operating at the national level and the inter-EORG lawsuit 
ties in the United States for the period, 1970-2001. Of the hypotheses presented in 
Chapter 1, the following will be tested in this chapter:46 
 
                                                          
46 For more details of the methods, measures, and data, refer to Chapter 4. 
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Hypothesis 1a. “The environmental movement organizations (EMOs) that are 
specialized in modern strategies of litigation and lobbying have used litigation as a 
movement strategy against movement opponents in the environmental movement sector 
(EMS) in the United States since 1970.” [H1a] 
 
Hypothesis 2a. “The litigation structure has been transitive (x→y→z then, x→z) 
in the environmental movement sector (EMS) in the United States since 1970, i.e., an 
environmental organization (EORG) (x) that filed a lawsuit against EORG (y) that filed a 
lawsuit against EORG (z) has been more likely than others to file a lawsuit against EORG 
(z).” [H2a] 
 
Hypothesis 4. “The contemporary movement structure in the environmental 
movement sector (EMS) in the United States can be characterized as disconnected, 
decentralized, and yet balanced.” [H4] 
 
6.3   Emergence of Conflictual Structure (1970-2001) 
Now, this section investigates the structural dynamics of the inter-EORG lawsuit 
relations thereby the contemporary inter-EORG conflictual structure has emerged from a 
generative structural perspective (Epstein and Axtell, 1997; Fararo and Butts, 1999). In 
what follows, investigation will be done in two steps: (a) network analysis of degree 
distributions in eight consecutive periods and (b) statistical analysis of the association 
between the organizational attributes and lawsuit ties in eight consecutive periods by 
using categorical data analysis. The findings from these analyses will be used to discuss 
the structural dynamics of the EMS in Section 6.4. 
 
6.3.1   Description of Change 
Figure 6.1 displays the increase in the number of EORGs involved in lawsuit ties by 
period and the increase in the number of lawsuit ties by period, respectively. As shown, 
the number of EORGs has increased relatively more steadily throughout the period than 
the number of lawsuit ties. Both have increased steadily with two valleys–the third (1978-
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1981) and the seventh periods (1994-1997)–in the middle of the entire period. In the first 
period (1970-1973), 25 EORGs formed 34 lawsuit ties. The downturns in the third and 
seventh periods may reflect more fundamental changes (e.g., legislation) in the EMS. In 
the final period (1998-2001), 100 EORGs formed the highest 164 lawsuit ties, which was 
an increase of 300% in EORGs and 382.35% in lawsuit ties compared to the first period, 
respectively. 
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Figure 6.1: Increase in EMOs in Lawsuits (a) and Lawsuit Ties (b) 
 
A look at the degree distribution of the lawsuit networks provides a better 
understanding of the structural-relational dimension of the EMS. Table 6.1 summarizes 
 94
the investigation of the degree distribution of the lawsuit networks in eight periods: 
network size, lawsuit filing EORGs, and lawsuit filed EORGs. As shown, in terms of 
lawsuit filing, most lawsuits were filed by the EMOs and the number of EMOs that file 
lawsuits has grown considerably. Interestingly, the EGAs have also employed lawsuits in 
all periods. That is, in terms of lawsuits filed, most lawsuits were filed against the EGAs. 
The EMOs have also been filed lawsuits in a majority of the periods. Finally, a 
comparison of the total EORGs (154) in lawsuit filing and the total EORGs (39) in 
lawsuits filed suggests that the EORGs that filed lawsuits outnumber the EORGs that 
were filed lawsuits for the entire period, which indicates that the structural organization 
of lawsuit ties has a hierarchical structure. 
 
Table 6.1: Changes of EORGs in Lawsuits 
 
Period Year Network (Node, Arc) 
Lawsuit Filing Lawsuits Filed 
EMO EGA Total EMO EGA Total 
I 1970-1973 (25, 34) 15 1 16 0 9 9 
II 1974-1977 (38, 65) 23 4 27 3 14 17 
III 1978-1981 (37, 54) 25 3 28 2 11 13 
IV 1982-1985 (52, 96) 32 3 35 1 20 21 
V 1986-1989 (58, 109) 42 4 46 0 16 16 
VI 1990-1993 (67, 123) 48 5 53 1 18 19 
VII 1994-1997 (73, 124) 56 3 59 1 17 18 
VIII 1998-2001 (100, 164) 81 2 83 0 18 18 
Total 1970-2001 (177, 411) 143 11 154 5 34 39 
 
The lawsuit network is directed. Thus, investigation of the degree distributions of 
the lawsuit network involves consideration of the EORGs that filed lawsuits and the 
EORGs that were filed lawsuits. In terms of lawsuit filing, most lawsuits were filed by 
the EMOs and the number of EMOs that filed lawsuits has increased considerably. 
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Interestingly, the EGAs have also filed lawsuits throughout the period. In terms of 
lawsuits filed, most lawsuits were filed against the EGAs. The EMOs have also been filed 
lawsuits in most periods. Table 6.2 summarizes the outcomes from the investigation of 
the degree distribution of the lawsuit networks in eight periods: network size, network 
density, mean (out- and in-) degree, and network centralization. As the network size has 
increased over time, the measures of mean (out- and out-) degree and the network density 
have stayed at the same level. In contrast, the network centralization in out-degree has 
decreased significantly whereas the network centralization in in-degree has increased, 
which implies that the added lawsuits have been filed against a few EORGs, though more 
EORGs have engaged in the litigation. 
 
Table 6.2: Structural Properties in Lawsuit Networks 
 
Period Year Network (Node, Arc) 
Network 
Density 
Out-Degree In-Degree 
Mean 
(std.) Centralization 
Mean 
(std.) Centralization 
I 1970-1973 (25, 34) 0.06 1.36 (1.62) 20.14% 
1.36 
(2.36) 33.16% 
II 1974-1977 (38, 65) 0.05 1.71 (1.97) 17.46% 
1.71 
(2.80) 25.79% 
III 1978-1981 (37, 54) 0.04 1.46 (1.50) 15.82% 
1.46 
(2.86) 30.09% 
IV 1982-1985 (52, 96) 0.04 1.85 (2.27) 16.30% 
1.85 
(4.13) 40.29% 
V 1986-1989 (58, 109) 0.03 1.88 (1.73) 14.50% 
1.88 
(4.47) 30.56% 
VI 1990-1993 (67, 123) 0.03 1.84 (1.60) 9.48% 
1.84 
(4.36) 24.86% 
VII 1994-1997 (73, 124) 0.02 1.70 (1.69) 7.47% 
1.70 
(5.10) 41.26% 
VIII 1998-2001 (100, 164) 0.02 1.64 (1.53) 7.51% 
1.64 
(5.77) 39.14% 
Total 1970-2001 (177, 411) 0.01 2.322 (2.527) 6.67% 
2.322 
(8.417) 33.53% 
 
Note: Network density: average value within blocks 
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6.3.2   Formation of Litigative Ties 
Now, I move onto explaining the relationships between the EORGs’ attributes and the 
ways in which they exchange lawsuit ties with each other. In search of the conditions 
under which the EORGs have formed lawsuit ties, I employed a conventional model of 
categorical data analysis in which the existence of lawsuit ties was explained by the 
EORGs’ attributes such as organizational type, age, size, orientation, strategy. While the 
inter-EORG lawsuit ties were collected over time, the EORGs’ attributes were not. Thus, 
a caveat is that the analysis was based on the assumption that the EORGs did not change 
considerably in terms of organizational characteristics over the periods. All parameter 
estimation was done in SAS. Table 6.3 summarizes the estimation of the parameters from 
the analysis. As shown, up to the sixth period, it was only organizational type that was 
significant in affecting the use of litigation as a movement strategy. That is, EMOs, rather 
than EGAs, filed most lawsuits for the first six periods. The other variables such as 
organizational age, size, orientation, and strategy turned out not to be significant. The last 
two periods (1994-2001), however, saw that the EMOs founded later (i.e., young EMOs) 
tended to employ litigation as a movement strategy rather than the EMOs founded earlier 
(i.e., old EMOs). Yet, organizational size, orientation, and strategy did not affect the 
outcome. The results suggest that the environmental litigation were used by the EMOs 
regardless of their organizational characteristics until the early 1990s and yet, after the 
mid 1990s on, it was used by young EMOs with limited resources while old EMOs 
turned to diverse movement activities. 
Thus, the first hypothesis [H1a], “the environmental movement organizations 
(EMOs) that are specialized in modern strategies of litigation and lobbying have used 
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litigation as a movement strategy against movement opponents in the environmental 
movement sector (EMS) in the United States since 1970” was not supported from a 
categorical data analysis. As shown, the EMOs founded later tended to use litigation as a 
movement strategy against the EGAs while old EMOs turned to diverse movement 
activities. The findings resonate with those from organizational studies that traditional 
organizations with abundant resources tend to resort to the strategy of “exploitation” 
whereas other organizations “exploration” (March, 1991). 
 
Table 6.3: Estimation from Categorical Data Analysis 
 
Period Year Type Age Size Orientation Strategy 
I 1970-1973 -3.871 (0.049*) 
-0.021 
(0.189) n/a n/a 
0.629 
(0.337)   
II 1974-1977 -2.771 (0.023*) 
-0.004 
(0.730) n/a 
0.920 
(0.563) 
1.522 
(0.141) 
III 1978-1981 -4.489 (0.051) 
-0.027 
(0.118)    n/a 
1.742 
(0.198)    
0.689 
(0.263)    
IV 1982-1985 -4.110 (0.036*) 
-0.023 
(0.125) n/a 
0.246 
(0.786) 
0.552 
(0.262) 
V 1986-1989 n/a -0.027 (0.070)     n/a 
-0.841 
(0.273)    
0.936 
(0.101)    
VI 1990-1993 -3.744 (0.019*) 
-0.020 
(0.056) 
-0.615 
(0.694) 
-0.338 
(0.615) 
0.693 
(0.154) 
VII 1994-1997 n/a -0.079 (0.005**) 
1.770 
(0.170) 
-0.395 
(0.668) 
0.080 
(0.836) 
VIII 1998-2001 -3.738 (0.023*) 
-0.025 
(0.009**) n/a 
0.265 
(0.612) 
0.431 
(0.234) 
Total Total -2.591 (0.050*) 
-0.020 
((0.007**) 
1.160 
(0.280) 
0.257 
(0.521) 
0.421 
(0.121) 
 
Note: 1. Inside the parenthesis is the significance. 
         2. *Significant at α=0.05; **Significant at α=0.01 
         3. n/a indicates dropped variables in analysis due to multicollinearity. 
 
A preliminary observation of the cross-sectional structure of the lawsuit ties for 
the entire period before I investigate the structure in each period provides a summary 
view of the overall structural characteristics of the inter-EORG litigation network. From 
1970 to 2001, 177 EORGs (143 EMOs, 34 EGAs) formed 411 lawsuit ties. As 
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summarized in Table 6.1 above, the network was sparse (network density: 0.01) 
indicating that the network was open rather than closed. However, as shown in Figure 6.2, 
the litigation network in which 154 EORGs filed lawsuits against 39 other EORGs, was 
structured in 36 different levels of hierarchical positions (Burt, 1992).47  In terms of 
lawsuit-filing activities, measured as out-degree centrality, the network was not 
centralized. And yet, it was highly centralized in terms of lawsuit-receiving activities 
measured as in-degree centrality. The Sierra Club (SC) (14) filed most lawsuits followed 
by the Friends of the Earth (FOEI) (13), the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) 
(12), the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) (12), and the National Audubon Society 
(NAS) (10) (inside the parentheses are the out-degrees). On the other hand, the US 
Department of Agriculture (US DOA) (61) invoked most lawsuits followed by the US 
Department of Interior (US DOI) (54), the US Environmental Protection Agency (US 
EPA) (38), the US Army (including US Army Corps of Engineers) (37), and the US 
NOAA (including US National Marine Fisheries Service, NMFS) (NOAA) (36) (inside 
the parentheses are the in-degrees). 
                                                          
47 Burt's (1992) adjustment of constraint (equation 2.9, pg 71), indicating the extent to which constraint on 
ego is concentrated in a single alter. 
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Figure 6.2: Lawsuit Network (1970-2001) 
 
Note: L (177, 411) indicates a litigation network composed  
of 177 vertices interconnected through 411 arcs. 
 
6.3.3 Evolution of Conflictual Structure 
Looking at the structures of the lawsuit networks by period helps to better understand the 
patterns of the changes in lawsuit ties, i.e., who has filed lawsuits against whom over 
time. Figure 6.3 displays the structure of lawsuit ties for the first period (1970-1973). As 
shown, 25 EORGs were forming 34 lawsuit relations in the early 1970s. The network was 
not quite hierarchical at the initial stage: It was structured in only two levels of 
hierarchical positions (Burt, 1992). In terms of lawsuit-filing activities, measured as out-
degree centrality, the network was most hierarchical (network centralization: 20.14%) of 
all litigation networks whereas it was less hierarchical in terms of lawsuits received, 
measured as in-degree centrality, which indicates that there were few EORGs that filed 
lawsuits for the size of the network structure. The Sierra Club (SC) (6) filed most 
 100
lawsuits followed by the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) (5), and the National 
Audubon Society (NAS) (4). On the other hand, the US Department of Agriculture (US 
DOA) (9) received most lawsuits followed by the US DOI (US DOI) (6), and the US 
Army (US Army) (5). As shown, all attacks (or attempts to “dominate”) were directed 
from EMOs to EGAs. Since all EORGs were involved in either attacking or being 
attacked only, no transitive hierarchical (or “dominance”) structure was found, though the 
victim effect was observed (Berger, Wagner, and Zelditch, 1985; Fararo and Skvoretz, 
1986). 
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Figure 6.3: Lawsuit Network (Period I: 1970-1973) 
 
Figure 6.4a displays the litigation structure in the second period (1974-1977) 
when 38 EORGs were forming 65 lawsuit relations. In terms of both lawsuit-filing and 
lawsuit-receiving activities, the network became less hierarchical (network centralization: 
17.46% and 25.79%, respectively), which suggests that more EORGs were using 
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litigation against more EORGs compared to the first period. The network hierarchy 
measure indicates that the network was composed of eight different levels of hierarchical 
positions, which was a significant increase from the first period. In this period, the Sierra 
Club (SC) (8) filed most lawsuits followed by the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) 
(7), and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) (6). On the other hand, the US 
Department of Interior (US DOI) (11) received most lawsuits followed by the US 
Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) (8), and the US Department of Agriculture 
(US DOA) (8). 
In contrast to the litigation structure in the first period, the litigation network 
became complicated in varied respects in the second period: First, there were two cases 
of reciprocal lawsuits between the Sierra Club (SC) and the Department of Interior (DOI) 
and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and the US Environmental 
Protection Agency (US EPA). Second, EGAs also used litigation against other EGAs and 
EMOs. The US Department of Agriculture (US DOA) filed a lawsuit against the US 
Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA). The US Environmental Protection Agency 
(US EPA), in turn, used litigation against the Public Interest Research Group (PIRG). 
Third, EMOs used litigation against other EMOs as well; the Natural Resources Defense 
Council (NRDC) against the Citizens for a Better Environment (CBE), the Natural 
Resources Defense Council (NRDC) against the National Audubon Society (NAS), the 
Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) against the National Audubon Society (NAS), the 
Public Interest Research Group (PIRG) against the Project on Clean Air (PCA), the Trout 
Unlimited (TU) against the National Audubon Society (NAS), and the National Wildlife 
Federation (NWF) against the National Parks Conservation Association (NPCA). Figure 
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6.4b displays the reduced litigation network in which EORGs were involved in triadic 
hierarchical (or “dominance”) structures. 
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Figure 6.4a: Lawsuit Network (Period II: 1974-1977) 
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Figure 6.4b: Lawsuit Network (Reduced) (Period II: 1974-1977) 
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In the third period (1978-1981), 37 EORGs were forming 54 lawsuit relations as 
shown in Figure 6.6a. In terms of lawsuit-filing activities, the network became less 
hierarchical (network centralization: 15.82%) whereas, in contrast, in terms of lawsuit-
receiving activities, the network became more hierarchical (network centralization: 
30.09%), which suggests that more EORGs were using litigation against fewer EORGs 
compared to the previous period. The network hierarchy measure indicates that the 
network was composed of six different levels of hierarchical positions, which was a 
decrease from the second period. Still, the Sierra Club (SC) (7) filed most lawsuits 
followed by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) (5), and the National 
Wildlife Federation (NWF) (4). On the other hand, the US Department of Interior (US 
DOI) (12) received most lawsuits followed by the US Environmental Protection Agency 
(US EPA) (10), the United States (US) (6), and the US Army (US Army) (6). 
The litigation network in this period did not become complicated as did in the 
previous period. Nonetheless, the network was not simple: First, there were reciprocal 
lawsuits between the Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF) versus the US Environmental 
Protection Agency (US EPA) and the Sierra Club (SC) versus the Department of Interior 
(US DOI). Second, litigation continued between the EGAs: the Department of Labor (US 
DOL) filed a lawsuit against the US Occupational Safety and Health Review Committee 
(US OSHRC) and the US Department of Interior (US DOI) against the Sierra Club (SC). 
Unlike in the second period, there was no litigation between EMOs in this period. A 
reduced litigation network is not displayed since no EORGs were involved in the triadic 
hierarchical structures. 
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Figure 6.5: Lawsuit Network (Period III: 1978-1981) 
 
Compared to the prior periods, the litigation network expanded the most in the 
fourth period (1982-1985) as shown in Figure 6.6a. As shown, 52 EORGs were forming 
96 lawsuit relations in this period. Network hierarchy changed in opposite directions: in 
terms of lawsuit-filing activities, the network became less hierarchical (network 
centralization: 16.30%) whereas it became hierarchical (40.29%) in lawsuit-receiving 
activities. The observation suggests that the lawsuits were targeted on a few EORGs 
although more EORGs were using litigation as a movement strategy. The network 
hierarchy measure indicates that the network was composed of seven different levels of 
hierarchical positions. The Sierra Club (SC) (10) continued to file most lawsuits followed 
by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) (8), and the Friends of the Earth 
(FOEI) (8). On the other hand, the US Department of Interior (US DOI) (22) received 
most lawsuits followed by the United States (US) (15), and the US Environmental 
Protection Agency (US EPA) (12). 
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The litigation network in this period became complicated as did in the second 
period: First, there was a reciprocal lawsuit between the Sierra Club (SC) versus the US 
Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA). Second, there was a conflict between 
EGAs: the US Department of Labor (US DOL) filed a lawsuit against the US FMSHRC 
(US FMSHRC) and the US Department of Interior (US DOI) against the United States 
(US). There was no litigation between EMOs in this period. Figure 6.6b displays the 
reduced litigation network in which EORGs were involved in triadic hierarchical (or 
“dominance”) structures. The inter-EGA litigation between the United States (US) and 
the US Department of Interior (US DOI) created as many as nine triadic hierarchical 
structures in which the EMOs took the most dominant positions whereas the US 
Department of Interior (US DOI) the most subordinate position since it was attacked by 
both the EMOs and the United States (US) in transitive hierarchical structures. 
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Figure 6.6a: Lawsuit Network (Period IV: 1982-1985) 
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Figure 6.6b: Lawsuit Network (Reduced) (Period IV: 1982-1985) 
 
In the fifth period (1986-1989), the litigation network shown in Figure 6.7 
expanded even more in which 58 EORGs were forming 109 lawsuit relations. In terms of 
both lawsuit-filing and lawsuit-receiving activities, the network became less hierarchical 
(network centralization: 14.50% and 30.56%, respectively), which suggests that more 
EORGs were using litigation against more EORGs. The network hierarchy measure 
indicates that the network was composed of only two different levels of hierarchical 
positions, which was a significant decrease from the fourth period. Again, the Sierra Club 
(SC) (10) filed most lawsuits followed by the National Wildlife Federation (NWF) (5), 
the Public Citizen (PC) (5), and the National Audubon Society (NAS) (5). On the other 
hand, the US Navy (19) received most lawsuits followed by the US Environmental 
Protection Agency (US EPA) (17), and the US National Marine Fisheries Service 
(NMFS) (NOAA Fisheries Service) (US NOAA) (17). 
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In this period, no EORGs were involved in the triadic hierarchical structures. No 
reciprocal lawsuits were found. However, inter-EGA lawsuits continued to be found: the 
US Navy (US Navy), the US Department of Health and Human Services (US HHS), the 
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US NRC), and the US Department of Interior (US 
DOI) all filed a lawsuit against US Federal Labor Relations Authority (US FLRA). No 
litigation was found between EMOs. 
NWF
SC
FOEI
NAS
FOET
CLF
WS
HSUS
NRDC
IPPL
PETAGPNEPI
DW
HW
NPCA
NTHP
MSLF
EDF
PC
US Navy
NCAP
PIRG PSR
WWF
CAS
CBE
NCAMP
NEDC
TU
NRC
US DOI
US HHS
US NRC ALDF
API
ASPCA
AVAR
EII
IDA
ISAR
IWC
NEAVS
PAWS
TDP
UAN
US
US Army
US DOA
US DOT
US EPA
US FERC
US NIH
US NOAA
US Air Force
US DOD
US FDA
US FLRA
Pajek  
L (58, 109) 
 
Figure 6.7: Lawsuit Network (Period V: 1986-1989) 
 
The sixth period (1990-1993) did not see a significant expansion of the litigation 
network. As shown in Figure 6.8a, 67 EORGs were forming 123 lawsuit relations in this 
period. In terms of both lawsuit-filing and lawsuit-receiving activities, the network 
became considerably less hierarchical compared to the fifth period (network 
centralization: 9.48% and 24.86%, respectively), which suggests that more EORGs were 
using litigation against more EORGs. The network hierarchy measure indicates that the 
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network was composed of seven different levels of hierarchical positions, which was an 
increase from the fifth period. The Sierra Club (SC) (8) continued to file most lawsuits 
followed by the National Wildlife Federation (NWF) (7), and the Environmental Defense 
Fund (EDF) (6). On the other hand, the US National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) 
(NOAA Fisheries Service) (US NOAA) (18) received most lawsuits followed by the US 
Department of Interior (US DOI) (16) and the US Department of Agriculture (US DOA) 
(16). 
As in the second and the fourth periods, the litigation network in this period 
became complicated: First, there was a reciprocal lawsuit between the Defenders of 
Wildlife (DW) and the US Department of Interior (US DOI). Second, the inter-EGA 
litigation continued: the US Department of Labor (US DOL) filed a lawsuit against US 
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC). US Health and Human 
Services (US HHS), the US Department of Agriculture (US DOA), and the US Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (US NRC) all filed a lawsuit against the US Federal Labor 
Relational Authority (US FLRA) while (US FLRA), in turn, against (US Navy) and (US 
DOD). However, there was no inter-EMO litigation. Figure 6.8b displays the reduced 
litigation network, which includes only imbalanced triples in a Heiderian sense. The 
figure shows that the National Trust for Historic Preservation (NTHP) and the National 
Wildlife Federation (NWF) took the most dominant positions whereas the US Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (US FERC) most subordinate position because it was 
attacked by both the EMOs and the US Department of Interior (US DOI) in the transitive 
hierarchical structures. 
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Figure 6.8a: Lawsuit Network (Period VI: 1990-1993) 
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Figure 6.8b: Lawsuit Network (Reduced) (Period VI: 1990-1993) 
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The seventh period (1994-1997) saw a further expansion of the litigation network. 
As displayed in Figure 6.9, 73 EORGs were forming 124 lawsuit relations in this period. 
In terms of lawsuit-filing activities, the network became least hierarchical (network 
centralization: 7.47%) whereas, in contrast, in terms of lawsuit-receiving activities, the 
network became most hierarchical (network centralization: 41.26%), which suggests that 
fewest EORGs were using litigation against most EORGs throughout the entire period. 
The network hierarchy measure indicates that the network was composed of four 
different levels of hierarchical positions, which was a significant decrease from the sixth 
period. The Sierra Club (SC) (7), the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) (7), 
and the National Wildlife Federation (NWF) (7) filed most lawsuits. On the other hand, 
the US Department of Agriculture (US DOA) (31) received most lawsuits followed by 
the US Department of Interior (US DOI) (23) and the US Army (US Army) (16). 
In this period, no EORGs were involved in triadic hierarchical structures. 
Nonetheless, a reciprocal litigation was found between the Sierra Club (SC) and the 
Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA). The inter-EGA litigation continued: the 
Department of Transportation (US DOT) versus the United States (US) and the 
Department of Defense (US DOD) versus the Federal Labor Relations Authority (US 
FLRA). No litigation was found between EMOs. 
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Figure 6.9: Lawsuit Network (Period VII: 1994-1997) 
 
Finally, the litigation network expanded to the full extent in the final period 
(1998-2001) when 100 EORGs were exchanging 164 lawsuit ties. Figure 6.10a displays 
the litigation network in this period. The litigation network became less hierarchical. In 
terms of lawsuit-filing activities, the network centralization was at the lowest level 
(7.51%) of all litigation networks whereas it was at the highest level (39.14%) in terms of 
lawsuits received, which indicates that there was a great increase in the number of 
EORGs that used litigation as a movement strategy, while the lawsuits were concentrated 
on a few EORGs only. By the hierarchy measure, the network was structured in six 
different levels of hierarchical positions. The Sierra Club (SC) (9) filed most lawsuits 
followed by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) (7) and the Defenders of 
Wildlife (6). On the other hand, the US Department of Agriculture (US DOA) (40) 
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received most lawsuits by the US Department of Interior (US DOI) (29) and the US 
Army (US Army) (21). 
The litigation network, however, did not become considerably complicated for the 
expansion of it: There was no reciprocal litigation. Two lawsuits between EGAs were 
observed: the United States (US) versus the US Department of Interior (US DOI) and the 
US Department of Labor (US DOL) versus US Occupational Safety and Health Review 
Commission (US OSHRC). There was no litigation observed between EMOs in this 
period. Figure 6.10b displays the transitive hierarchical structure in this period in which 
the EMOs took the most dominant positions whereas the Department of Interior (US 
DOI) most subordinate position while being attacked by the EMOs and the United States 
(US). 
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Figure 6.10a: Lawsuit Network (Period VIII: 1998-2001) 
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Figure 6.10b: Lawsuit Network (Reduced) (Period VIII: 1998-2001) 
 
In sum, the litigation network has seen a few common observations found in most 
of the periods: The Sierra Club (SC), the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), 
the National Wildlife Federation (NWF), and the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) 
have been consistently most central in lawsuit filing activities whereas the US 
Department of Interior (US DOI) and the US Department of Agriculture (US DOA) 
central in lawsuit receiving activities. In addition, there have been events that made the 
structure complicated: First, EGAs were also active in using litigation to advance their 
claims against other EGAs or EMOs. Second, litigation has often been reciprocated. Both 
cases have brought about changes in the pattern of the direction of litigation from the 
dominant pattern of “EMO→EGA” to either “EGA→EGA” or “EGA→EMO.” Third, 
EMOs used litigation against other EMOs as well in the second period, which created the 
pattern of “EMO→EMO”. Finally, in three periods (Periods IV, VI, and VIII), transitive 
hierarchical litigation structures were found such that multiple EMOs attack two EGAs 
and the EGAs were also involved in a litigation with each other at the same time. 
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Thus, the second hypothesis [H2a], “the litigation structure has been transitive 
(x→y→z then, x→z) in the environmental movement sector (EMS) in the United States 
since 1970, i.e., an environmental organization (EORG) (x) that filed a lawsuit against 
EORG (y) that filed a lawsuit against EORG (z) has been more likely than others to file a 
lawsuit against EORG (z)” was supported in three different periods. As shown, most 
lawsuits were filed by EMOs against EGAs, which made the development of the 
transitive dominance structures infrequent. And thus, it does not disapprove of E-state 
structuralism (Berger, Wagner, and Zelditch, 1985; Fararo and Skvoretz, 1986). The 
Sierra Club (SC) was involved in all the transitive dominance structures found attacking 
the United States (US), US Department of Agriculture (US DOA), US Department of 
Interior (US DOI), and US Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) that were most 
often victimized in the transitive dominance structures in all three periods. Although it 
may be not possible to measure the extent to which the transitive dominance structures 
affected the hierarchical structure of the contemporary EMS, it must have made the 
structure more complicated. 
However, the fourth hypothesis [H4], “the contemporary movement structure in 
the environmental movement sector (EMS) in the United States can be characterized as 
disconnected, decentralized, and yet balanced” was not supported from an investigation 
of the structural dynamics of the litigative network.48 It was noticeable that the litigative 
structure in the most recent period and the one that emerged in structural dynamics was, 
overall, connected rather than disconnected and hierarchical rather than homogenized. As 
an exception, there were two sets of dyadic litigative ties separated from the main 
                                                          
48 Whether or not the contemporary movement structure in the EMS has been balanced will be tested in 
Chapter 8. 
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component. The main component was highly centralized–few EGAs were being attacked 
by most EMOs. That is, there were relatively few movement opponents jointly filed 
lawsuits by common EMOs. The fact that many EMOs were sharing common movement 
opponents suggested a possibility for future collective action. For example, resources 
(e.g., finance, labor) may be mobilized and movement activities (e.g., advancing claims) 
may be coordinated between the EMOs that have had common movement opponents. 
 
6.4   Discussion 
This chapter has investigated how organizational and relational characteristics have been 
associated with each other in the structural dynamics of the litigative structure and how 
the litigative structure has evolved over time in the EMS in the United States since 1970. 
Specifically, this chapter has been concerned with what forms a series of dyadic and 
triadic litigative ties resulting in the emergence of the structural characteristics (e.g., 
connectedness, hierarchy) of the contemporary EMS. EMOs have played different roles 
in creating litigative ties depending on their organizational characteristics and locations in 
the movement structure. The development of triadic litigation substructures was also 
related to the organizational characteristics and locations, though future research has yet 
to explicate the extent to which those triadic substructures aggregate to the entire network 
structures. 
Overall, the interorganizational structure in the EMS in the United States since 
1970 has expanded, connected, and hierarchicalized over time. Particularly, 
organizational type and age, rather than organizational size, orientation or strategy, have 
affected the formation of dyadic litigative ties between EORGs. As summarized above, 
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environmental litigation was used by the EMOs regardless of their organizational 
characteristics until the early 1990s and yet, after the mid 1990s on, it was used by young 
EMOs with limited resources while old EMOs turned to diverse movement activities. 
Organizational size, orientation, and strategy did not affect the outcome. The findings 
resonate with those from organizational studies that traditional organizations with 
abundant resources tend to resort to the strategy of “exploitation” whereas other 
organizations “exploration” (March, 1991). 
In only a few periods, transitive dominant structures were found in which case 
dominated EORGs tended to be attacked by most EORGs as well. Most lawsuits were 
filed by EMOs against EGAs, which made the development of the transitive dominance 
structures infrequent. Particularly, the Sierra Club (SC) was involved in all the transitive 
dominance structures while attacking the United States (US), US Department of 
Agriculture (US DOA), US Department of Interior (US DOI), and US Environmental 
Protection Agency (US EPA) that were most often victimized in the transitive dominance 
structures. The findings do not disapprove of E-state structuralism (Berger, Wagner, and 
Zelditch, 1985; Fararo and Skvoretz, 1986). 
The cross-sectional litigative structure for the entire period was mostly connected, 
except for the two sets of isolated dyadic ties, and hierarchical–few EGAs were being 
attacked by most EMOs. Other than the two sets of isolated dyadic ties, the main 
component was highly centralized–few EGAs were being attacked by most EMOs. The 
fact that many EMOs were sharing common movement opponents suggested a possibility 
for future collective action. For example, resources (e.g., finance, labor) may be 
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mobilized and movement activities (e.g., advancing claims) may be coordinated between 
the EMOs that have common movement opponents. 
This chapter, however, did not attempt to explain what has made the EORGs 
employ litigation as a movement strategy among other strategies. As a result, the findings 
do not directly answer why the EORGs that were active in litigation have employed 
litigation rather than other strategies. Although we might need further study to answer 
this question, which is beyond the scope of this dissertation, active environmental 
legislation since the 1970s must have provided environmental standards that allowed the 
EORGs to be able to use litigation. This chapter did not attempt to study what structural 
outcomes the success or failure of the environmental litigation has brought about in the 
movement sector. 
The statistical network model used in this chapter was designed to explain 
whether or not the EORGs had lawsuit ties, rather than whether or not there was a 
relational tie between the EORGs from both attributes and network configuration. To 
fully explain the formation of lawsuit ties between certain EORGs based on both 
organizational characteristics and relational properties, future research may have to use 
conditional logit model (McFadden, 1973, 1981; Ben-Akiva, and Lerman, 1989). The 
conditional logit models are advantageous when the research aims to consider as 
variables the organizational characteristics of the focal parties involved, the parties’ 
neighbors, the parties’ neighbors’ neighbors’, and so on. Although the development of 
such models may require skills such as programming and data management, it seems 
clear that future research in this line will benefit more from them. 
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Currently, there is no knowledge of what inter-EORG structures might look like 
at the regional and local levels, let alone the overall network structure when all the 
EORGs at those three different levels were aggregated. Future research might include 
EORGs at the regional and local levels in analysis for a complete understanding of the 
movement structure. In addition, future research may include other types of organizations 
such as trade associations, corporations, labor unions other than EMOs and EGAs since 
they also play vital roles in EMS in the United States. 
It was not clearly shown what structural mechanisms have brought about the 
contemporary litigative structure, though it aimed to investigate the structural dynamics 
thereby dyadic and triadic substructures emerged over time. As a result, to a large extent, 
the current work had to be satisfied with describing the network dynamics rather than 
explaining it. The current work points to the consideration of more systematic models 
(e.g., “actor network utility”; Doreian, 2005) beyond the models of “triadic completion.” 
Recent advances in structural theorization, methodological approaches, and computer 
packages will help discover the structural mechanisms (Doreian and Stokman, 1997; 
Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1998; ICS, [2002] 2007). 
 
6.5   Summary 
This chapter has investigated how organizational and relational characteristics have 
associated with each other in the structural dynamics of the litigative structure and how 
the litigative structure has evolved over time in the EMS in the United States since 1970. 
A longitudinal analysis of the environmental lawsuit ties in the United States showed the 
findings such as the following: First, environmental litigation was used by the EMOs 
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regardless of their expressed strategies or organizational characteristics until the early 
1990s. And yet, after the mid 1990s on, young EMOs with limited resources tended to 
use litigation more actively while old EMOs tended to turn to diversify movement 
activities, though they were still actively involved in legal activities. Second, most 
lawsuits were filed by EMOs against EGAs, which made the development of the 
transitive dominance structures infrequent. The litigation structure was closed by the 
EGAs in legal disputes rather than by the EMOs, which suggests that the transitive 
dominance structures emerged in part due to the organizational type rather than the pure 
“bystander effect”. Third, the cross-sectional litigative structure for the entire period was 
mostly connected, except for the two sets of isolated dyadic ties, and hierarchical–few 
EGAs were being attacked by most EMOs. The findings provide more structural 
knowledge of the contemporary movement structure beyond the literature that noted a 
simple increase in conflicts and litigation within the movement sector. The fact that many 
EMOs were sharing common movement opponents suggested a possibility for future 
collective action. For example, resources (e.g., finance, labor) may be mobilized and 
movement activities (e.g., advancing claims) may be coordinated between the EMOs that 
have common movement opponents. 
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 Chapter 7 
Movement Dynamics: Alliance Structure 
 
While Chapter 6 characterized the environmental movement as the conflict movement 
and analyzed the conflictual structure of the movement sector in the United States, the 
environmentalist organizations (EORGs) have not been engaged in the conflictual 
relationships alone. They have cooperated in various forms of alliances. As presented in 
Chapter 2, scholars pointed out the structural changes due to the expansion of alliances 
for both mobilization and protest in contemporary social movements. This chapter 
focuses on the structural dynamics in environmental alliances among the environmental 
movement organizations (EMOs). 
In reality, however, EMOs are in basic competition because they share, to a 
greater or lesser extent, the same adherent pools, both individual and institutional. Thus, 
it appears that scholars in social movements share the same idea that a variety of EMOs 
or groups compete with each other for resources, control, and legitimacy. The 
competitive relations among the EMOs may turn to either antagonistic attacks or 
cooperative relations depending on the circumstances. Basically, the EMOs ought to 
cooperate in goal accomplishment because they seek similar goals. There have been a 
number of factors that serve to facilitate and shape cooperation among EMOs: task 
specialization (i.e., similar conceptions of goals and tactics), external social control, 
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overlapping constituents (i.e., interlocking boards or memberships), and elite/third-party 
constraints (Brulle, 2000). Inter-EMO cooperation takes the forms of alliances, cartels, 
federations, and mergers.49 
This chapter investigates the movement dynamics in the EMS with regard to 
alliances between the EORGs at the national level in the EMS in the United States, 1970-
2001. It focuses on the increased alliances between the EORGs since 1970 when modern 
environmental social movement took off in the United States. The research questions that 
this chapter addresses are: “In what ways have the organizational characteristics been 
associated with alliance formation in the environmental movement sector (EMS) in the 
United States since 1970?” [Q1b] “Under what conditions have triadic collaborative 
movement structures been formed in the environmental movement sector (EMS) in the 
United States since 1970?” [Q2b] and “What are the structural characteristics (e.g., 
connectedness, balance, and hierarchy) of the contemporary movement structure that has 
emerged in the environmental movement sector (EMS) in the United States since 1970?” 
[Q4]. 
To answer these questions, the following sections will explore the alliance 
structure within the movement sector and investigate the longitudinal dynamics of the 
inter-EORG alliance ties by using, first, an exponential random graph model (ERGM) or 
p* logit model (Frank and Strauss, 1986; Strauss and Ikeda, 1992; Wasserman and 
Pattison, 1996; Crouch and Wasserman, 1998) and, second, strategic actor models 
introduced in Chapter 2 (Burt, 1992; Doreian, 2004). An investigation of the structural 
dynamics of the environmental alliances will help us not only understand the 
                                                          
49 In a general context, alliances have been studied in social sciences in relation to varied topics including 
general theory, innovation, culture, collective action, management, and uncertainty. In organizational 
theory, they have been studied in terms of both inter-organizational and intra-organizational contexts. 
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contemporary EMS but also predict the structural consequences in the EMS in the United 
States. 
 
7.1   Alliances for Opposition 
Organizations have been involved in alliances with other organizations in the 
environment to overcome unfavorable conditions and effectively mobilize resources. By 
definition, organizational environment refers to the interface or interconnections between 
organizations and their environments–resources, organizational population, institutions, 
technological uncertainty, and so on. That is, in achieving the judicial and extrajudicial 
purposes, alliances have been widespread between the EMOs that were relatively 
disadvantaged. As discussed above, Handler (1978) notes that there have been a number 
of factors that serve to facilitate alliances among EMOs: task specialization (i.e., similar 
conceptions of goals and tactics), external social control (e.g., norms, resources), 
overlapping constituents (i.e., interlocking boards, memberships), and elite/third-party 
constraints. 
While the environmental movement in the United States in the 1980s depended on 
market forces and negotiation with business and government as tools to preserve 
environmental goals, since then, a number of EMOs, chiefly those operating at the 
national level, sought to develop new skills and tactics.50 They were in response to the 
counterattack from Corporate America, which had been caught off guard by the militant 
environmentalism that emerged in the 1960s and the 1970s. Their chief tools were 
litigation among other strategies and later lobbying for legislation designed to protect the 
                                                          
50 According to Shabecoff (2000), this characterizes the “third-wave” of American environmentalism. 
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environment. They took the battles to the courts to try to enforce the new environmental 
laws and to defend citizens threatened by environmental degradation. 
 
7.1.1   Collective Action: Alliances and Coalitions 
Alliances and coalitions in social movements have occurred in varied forms: educational 
programs, protests, campaigns, press conferences, online activities, publications, and so 
on. Alliances and coalitions between SMOs is a form of collective action that has often 
occurred and yet often understudied in the study of social movements. As collective 
action occurs in varied forms, so do the alliances and coalitions themselves in social 
movements: for example, an umbrella organization with membership SMOs, a joint 
project among participating SMOs, and so on. Alliances and coalitions as collective 
action allow the participating SMOs to be exposed to similar experiences and further 
coordinate strategies for future movement activities. Investigating under what conditions 
SMOs join alliances and coalitions will help better understand the structural organization 
of the social movement sector. 
Depending on the movement circumstances, temporary alliances between SMOs 
can develop into longer lasting coalitions. For the past decades, there have been multiple 
environmental coalitions in the EMS in the United States. Table 7.1 lists a few examples 
including the “Wise-Use” group, the Townhall, the Project Relief, the Turning Point 
Project (TPP), and the Activist Cash. As shown, environmental coalitions have been 
formed by both mainstream (pro-environmentalist) and conservative (anti-
environmentalist) camps in the EMS since the 1980s. Looking at the table, in fact, the 
coalitions formed by the conservative EMOs outnumber those by the mainstream EMOs. 
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Coalitions formed exclusively by the radical EMOs (e.g., Earth First!) have not been 
found, though the radical EMOs have joined the coalitions formed by the mainstream 
EMOs. 
The first environmental coalition in the table is the “Wise-Use” formed by 
conservative organizations in 1988. The “Wise-Use” is a loose affiliation of activists 
inspired by the work of Ron Arnold, a vice-president of the Center for the Defense of 
Free Enterprise (CDFE). The coalition’s goals are to increase what they see as 
responsible commercial use of public lands for uses such as timber, mining, and oil, and 
to open recreational wilderness areas for easier access by the general public.51 
Pro-environmentalist coalitions were also noticeable during the period, of which 
the Turning Point Project (TPP) is particularly notable. The Turning Point Project (TPP) 
was formed by the 99 mainstream and radical EMOs to campaign pro-environmentalist 
causes in 1999. The participating EMOs included a few labor unions and trade 
associations that endorsed the advertisements. As a coalition of pro-environmentalist 
movement organizations (pro-EMOs), the Turning Point Project (TPP) published a series 
of 25 educational advertisements in The New York Times. The 25 educational 
advertisements were classified in five categories in which each category had four to six 
advertisements. 
                                                          
51  The “wise-use” groups contrast with free-market environmentalists in that the latter is associated 
with libertarian political views and efforts to protect the environment through private initiatives such 
as land trusts. Critics believe that the “wise-use” groups may be more accurately called anti-
environmentalist. 
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Table 7.1: Selected Environmental Coalitions 
Coalition Year Membership Key Player Orientation 
Wise-Use 1988 200 Center for the Defense of Free Enterprise (CDFE) Conservative 
Townhall 1991 135 Heritage Foundation Conservative 
Project Relief 1994 350 Environmental Working Group (EWG) Conservative 
Turning Point Project 1999 108 Turning Point Project (TPP) Mainstream/ Radical 
Activist Cash/ 
Undue Influence 2000 200 
Center for Consumer Freedom (CCF) 
Center for the Defense of Free Enterprise (CDFE) Conservative 
 
Note: Membership indicates the number of member organizations. 
 
7.2   Methods, Data, and Hypotheses 
The statistical network methods used in this chapter are three fold: (a) describing tie 
distribution (network size, density, centralization, clustering coefficient, transitivity, and 
centrality), (b) partitioning network structure into a set of positions of equivalent EMOs, 
and (c) estimating tie probability by using exponential random graph models (ERGM or 
p-star) to examine what EMOs have formed partnership ties with each other. The data 
include only environmental movement organizations (EMOs) operating at the national 
level and the inter-EMO alliance relations in the United States for the period, 1970-2001. 
Of the hypotheses presented in Chapter 1, the following will be test in this chapter: 
 
Hypothesis 1b. “The environmental movement organizations (EMOs) with 
similar organizational characteristics–in particular, action areas and strategies–have 
cooperated with each other for litigation in the environmental movement sector (EMS) in 
the United States since 1970.” [H1b] 
 
Hypothesis 2b. “The environmental movement organizations (EMOs) located in 
the positions that are strategically disadvantageous have been more likely than others to 
cooperate with other EMOs in the environmental movement sector (EMS) in the United 
States since 1970.” [H2b] 
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Hypothesis 4. “The contemporary movement structure in the environmental 
movement sector (EMS) in the United States can be characterized as disconnected, 
decentralized, and yet balanced.” [H4] 
 
7.3   Emergence of Alliance Structure 
Now, this section investigates the structural dynamics of the inter-EMO alliance relations 
thereby the contemporary inter-EMO alliance structure has emerged from a generative 
structural perspective (Epstein and Axtell, 1997; Fararo and Butts, 1999). In what follows, 
investigation will be done in two steps: (a) network analysis of degree distribution in 
eight consecutive periods and (b) statistical network analysis of the association between 
the organizational attributes and alliance ties in the entire cross-sectional period by using 
a exponential random graph model or p* logit model. The findings from these analyses 
will be used to discuss the structural dynamics of the EMS in Section 6.5. 
 
7.3.1   Description of Change 
Figure 7.1 displays the increase in the number of EMOs that formed alliances for joint 
litigation by period and the increase in the number of alliance ties by period, respectively. 
As shown, both the number of EMOs and the alliance ties have increased considerably 
throughout the period despite some fluctuations in the process. The number of EMOs has 
increased relatively steadily across the periods compared to the number of alliance ties as 
the latter increases exponentially as the former increases. In the first period (1970-1973), 
only seven EMOs formed fourteen alliance ties among them. The overall pattern of 
increase fluctuated with peaks in the third (1978-1981) and the fifth period (1986-1989) 
and the valleys in the following periods (1982-1985; 1990-1993). The downturns in the 
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two periods–particularly, in the early 1990s–may reflect more fundamental changes (e.g., 
legislation, counter movement) in the EMS. Yet, 60 EMOs formed 147 alliance ties in the 
final period (1998-2001), which is the highest in the entire period. 
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Figure 7.1: Increase in EMOs in Alliances (a) and Alliance Ties (b) 
 
A look at the degree distribution of the alliance networks provides a better 
understanding of the structural-relational dimension of the EMS. Table 7.2 summarizes 
the investigation of the degree distribution of the alliance networks in eight periods: 
network size, mean degree, network density, and network centralization. As shown 
above, as the network size has increased steadily, mean degree to measure the average 
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degree of the EMOs skyrocketed during the fourth and fifth periods (1978-1981; 1982-
1985). On average, each EMO was maintaining approximately eight partners at the same 
time during those periods, though the number of partners has reduced since then. As the 
network has expanded, network density and centralization have decreased significantly 
throughout the period. 
 
Table 7.2: Degree Distribution in Alliance Networks 
 
Period Year Network Size Mean Degree (Std.) 
Network 
Density 
Network  
Centralization 
I 1970-1973 A (7, 14) 4.00  (1.07) 0.67 46.67% 
II 1974-1977 A (11, 23) 4.18  (2.29) 0.42 46.67% 
III 1978-1981 A (13, 14) 2.15  (1.23) 0.18 28.03% 
IV 1982-1985 A (23, 90) 7.82  (4.50) 0.36 50.65% 
V 1986-1989 A (33, 128) 7.76  (5.05) 0.24 20.77% 
VI 1990-1993 A (26, 75) 5.77  (4.34) 0.23 48.67% 
VII 1994-1997 A (40, 91) 4.55  (4.27) 0.12 44.40% 
VIII 1998-2001 A (60, 147) 4.90  (4.20) 0.08 33.49% 
Total 1970-2001 A (105, 411) 7.83  (8.29) 0.07 40.36% 
 
     Note: A (7, 14) indicates an alliance network composed of 7 vertices interconnected through 14 edges. 
 
In parallel with the generative structural processes, the substructures in the 
alliance network have also evolved and investigating them provides an identification of 
subsets of the EMOs that may have similar attributes and/or play similar roles (Lorrain 
and White, 1971). Table 7.3 below summarizes the changes in clustering coefficients and 
cliques throughout the period. The measures of clustering coefficient have maintained at 
the similar level, which implies that the EMOs have actively formed cohesive subgroups 
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despite the overall expansion of the network. Investigation of cliques provides a more 
concrete view of the substructures. By definition, a clique is a maximally complete 
subgraph. Thus, basically, all the EMOs that prepared litigation together belong to the 
same clique. The number of cliques has increased considerably while the average EMOs 
in cliques have fluctuated over time. For example, in the first period, there were four 
cliques found. That is, four groups of EMOs jointly filed lawsuits and, on average, 3.50 
EMOs belonged to a clique. A significant change occurred in the fourth period when the 
number of cliques reached nine with an average of 5.89 EMOs in a clique. The number of 
cliques reached the highest of 26 in the final period, though average number of EMOs 
(4.12) in a clique has not changed as such. There have been partners that have belonged 
to the same cliques over time. For example, the Sierra Club (SC)–National Audubon 
Society (NAS) alliance and the Sierra Club (SC)–Natural Resources Defense Council 
(NRDC) alliance have been consistently found throughout the entire period. 
 
     Table 7.3: Substructure in Alliance Networks 
 
Period Year Network Size 
Clustering  
Coefficient Cliques 
I 1970-1973 A (7, 14) 0.73 (0.65*) 
4 
(3.50**) 
II 1974-1977 A (11, 23) 0.78 (0.62) 
4 
(4.25) 
III 1978-1981 A (13, 14) 0.44 (0.35) 
3 
(3.00) 
IV 1982-1985 A (23, 90) 0.85 (0.68) 
9 
(5.89) 
V 1986-1989 A (33, 128) 0.80 (0.91) 
9 
(4.78) 
VI 1990-1993 A (26, 75) 0.82 (0.57) 
10 
(5.00) 
VII 1994-1997 A (40, 91) 0.68 (0.40) 
19 
(4.05) 
VIII 1998-2001 A (60, 147) 0.63 (0.48) 
26 
(4.12) 
Total 1970-2001 A (105, 411) 0.74 (0.45) 
65 
(4.97) 
 
Note: 1. *Weighted overall graph clustering coefficient 
          2. **Average size of the cliques, which is the average number of EMOs in a clique  
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7.3.2   Formation of Alliance Ties 
Thus far, I have described the processes by which the contemporary alliance structure has 
emerged over eight consecutive periods in the EMS in the Untied States. Now, I move 
onto explaining the relationships between the EMOs’ attributes and the ways in which 
they are tied to each other. The investigation in this section will be carried out for the 
cross-sectional alliance structure for the entire period shown in Figure 7.5 below since the 
longitudinal data for the entire EMOs’ attributes are not available. In search of the 
conditions under which the EMOs have formed alliances, I employ an exponential 
random graph model (ERGM) or p* logit model to estimate the extent to which the 
differential attachment (as apposed to random attachment) is contingent on the 
characteristics of the attached EMOs and the characteristics of the configurations of the 
alliance network. 
The parameter estimation was done in MultiNet (Richards and Seary, [1999] 
2006). 52  While most network programs perform one or another type of structural 
analysis, MultiNet does contextual analysis: for example, it looks at the EMOs’ attributes 
in the context of the relationships between them, and it looks at the characteristics of 
relationships between the EMOs in the context of their attributes. MultiNet currently 
allows fitting to the fifteen (non-null) triads described by Frank and Strauss (1986) and 
Pattison, Robins, and Wasserman (1999) and adds the blockmodel parameters described 
                                                          
52 MultiNet (Richards and Seary, [1999] 2006) is a data analysis package that can be used for ordinary data 
and for network data. MultiNet uses sparse methods throughout. The sparse matrix implementation of p* is 
based on the simple observation that all of the triad change statistics can be calculated for each node 
independently. The program finds fits at a number of probability levels (default: P=0.5). The current 
Multinet implementation allows p* fit only to the dependency graphs that are well-understood and 
fortunately the logistic regression loop which finds p* fit parameters uses a Newton-Raphson algorithm. An 
earlier text-based DOS program called PSPAR (Seary, 1999). For mechanics of p* fitting in MultiNet, see 
Seary and Richards (1999). 
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in Wasserman and Pattison (1996). The fifteen parameters are Edges (Choice), REdges 
(Mutuality), 2Stars (Out-star, In-star, Mixed-star), Triads (Transitivity, Cyclicity), and 
R2Stars (R*2Stars, R*Triads) (inside the parentheses are the parameters used in other p* 
literature). This section employs MultiNet to fit Edges (Choice), 2Stars (Out-star), and 
Triads (Cyclicity), which are only relevant in undirected networks, to triad counts with 
blocking based on the EMOs’ attributes. 
MultiNet allows for block-modeling by using the EMOs’ attribute information in 
the Node variables.53 It permutes the adjacency display by the value of “Orient”. As 
shown, the EMOs’ attributes are related to the alliance ties because the dots are 
positioned inside the blocks on the diagonal rather than off the diagonal. I have chosen all 
Node variables one at a time and then allowed MultiNet to fit to the subsets of actors (not 
to the whole network) that share certain Node variables–thus, simple blocks vis-à-vis 
complex blocks. In simple blocks, MultNet assumes, by default, that an attribute will be 
used to define a simple cohesive block structure. This block structure assumes that any 
pair of EMOs sharing the same ideological orientation are considered as belonging to the 
same block. Since there is only one type of block (with value 1), any pair of EMOs with 
the same ideological orientation are counted together–for example, “Choice within 
Blocks”. 
Figure 7.2 displays the p* results with the tie distribution after permuting based 
on Node variable “Orient”. On the left of the matrix are analytic information that 
                                                          
53  The recent development of p-star methods (Wasserman and Pattison, 1996) provides a valuable 
confirmatory tool for evaluating and comparing the blockings produced by the eigenspace methods 
available in MultiNet. If we can assume a Chi-squared distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the 
difference in the number of parameters, then the 4-parameter blocking model is significantly better (than 
the 2-parameter model without blocking). While the simple block method may be sufficient for fitting to 
global and “within block” effects, some models may also require “between blocks” effects as well. 
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includes: (a) the Link (network) variable, (b) the Node (attribute) variable (in this case 
“Orient”), (c) the permutation state (in this case “ON”), and (d) the value of -2*Log 
Pseudolikelihood for this fit.54 As shown, there are 104 EMOs in 814 alliance ties and the 
-2*Log Likelihood is 2630.246. The matrix permuted based on “Orient” reveal 
significant patterns of ties between the EMOs in similar ideological orientation in the 
same blocks. For complete graphs, refer to Appendix C. The dots inside the matrix 
represent three kinds of alliance ties: (a) green: an alliance exists and was successfully 
predicted at the selected probability level (default is P=0.5), (b) blue: an alliance exists 
but was not successfully predicted (False Negative), and (c) red: an alliance does not 
exist but was falsely predicted (False Positive). 
Similarly, the network crosstabulation below the model fit summarizes the 
“OBSERVED” link in the rows and the “PREDICTED” links in the columns. The cells 
represent the following: (a) the total unobserved (and unpredicted) alliances in grey, (b) 
the total number of false negative in blue, (c) of false positives in red, and (d) of correctly 
predicted alliances in green. The total number of observed alliances is in black with the 
percentages (of this total) of false negatives in blue and correct predictions in green. The 
total number of predicted alliances is in black and percentages (of this total) of false 
positives in red and correct predictions in green. As shown, of 531 PREDICTED ties, 475 
ties (89.5%) were actually observed while leaving 56 ties (10.5%) unobserved. Table 7.4 
provides the output in more detail and further parameter estimation when the three (1, 3, 
6) of 15 parameters relevant in symmetric networks such as in alliance network were 
included. 
                                                          
54 -2*Log Pseudolikelihood is the most important result for evaluating the fit in the p-star literature. One 
goal of p* fitting is to get the lowest such value with the fewest parameters. 
 133
 0  20 40 60 80 100
  0
 20
 40
 60
 80
100
LINK: PARTNERSHIP
NODE: Orient
Permutation: ON
-2 * Log PL =     2630.2
P = 0.5       PREDICTED
  <P           >P
OBS  0
         1
          56
         339
        9842
         475
         814       41.6%        58.4%
         531
       10.5%
       89.5%
Orient
1      Leftist
2      Mainstream
3      Conservative
 
 
Figure 7.2: p* Fitting (permuted by Orientation) 
 
Table 7.4: p* Fitting with Variable “Orientation” 
 
 
 LINK: "PARTNERSHIP"  LINKS =    814  NODES =  104  (DIAGONAL NOT INCLUDED)                    
 NODE = "Orient "                                                                             
 BLOCKING                                                                                      
    1   0   0                                                                                  
    0   1   0                                                                                  
    0   0   1                                                                                  
                                                                                               
  -2 Log PseudoLikelihood =             2630.246                                               
          Goodness of Fit =             9407.740                                               
        Model Chi-squared =            12219.739     df = 6                                    
                                                                                              
 FIT AT P = 0.5                          RESIDUALS                                             
                PRED           531                                                            
             <P   ¦   >P                 Absolute =         667.422                            
         ------------------              Squared  =         336.636                            
       0 ¦    9842¦      56  10.5%                                                             
 OBS     ¦--------¦--------  -----                                                             
       1 ¦     339¦     475  89.5%                                                            
         ¦        ¦                                                                            
 814     ¦   41.6%¦   58.4%                                                                   
                                                                                               
 PARM  BLOCK     b    "Std.Err"    PLWald    p(df=1)    exp(b)    Counts    Errors             
   1     1    1.0303    0.2534    16.5294    < 0.01      2.80        566    0.00000            
   3     1    0.0270    0.0141     3.6596    < 0.10      1.03       9020    0.00000            
   6     1   -0.0999    0.0222    20.2238    < 0.01      0.90      11046    0.00000 
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Table 7.5 summarizes the model properties for all organizational attributes. As 
shown, the models (-2*Log Pseudolikelihood) improved as Node variables were included 
compared to the models without Node variables. Including orientation, region, area, size, 
strategy, and age in order of magnitude substantially improved the models. Model 
improvement was computed by considering the differences between the -2*Log 
Likelihood without attributes (2669.7) and those with attributes. Now, we have evidence 
that the EMOs with similar attributes tended to form alliance ties with each other. 
Particularly, the EMOs that were similar in terms of orientation were most likely than 
others to form alliance ties with each other. 
 
Table 7.5: Model Properties 
 
  Attributes 
Parameters None Orientation Region Area Size Strategy Age 
-2 Log  
PseudoLikelihood 2669.7 2630.2 2639.6 2646.2 2656.6 2663.8 2666.2 
Goodness of Fit 9255.7 9407.7 9435.1 9217.5 9515.1 9375.0 9320.3 
Model  
Chi-squared 12180.3 12219.7 12210.3 12203.8 12193.4 12186.2 12183.8 
Df 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 
Table 7.6 summarizes parameter values, Wald statistic, and p-value from p* 
fitting for the entire period, although MultiNet reports other important results including -
2*Log Pseudolikelihood, Goodness of fit, and model Chi-square. The results show the 
following outcomes: First, with respect to “edges” (i.e., mutuality), since the estimated 
edges parameters are positive for orientation, region, area, and size, the probability that 
an alliance is present between two distinct EMOs i and j is larger than the probability that 
it is absent in the one block where the EMOs are similar in those organizational 
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attributes, while holding all other effects constant in the model (significant at α=0.10). 
That is, the EMOs with similar orientation, region, area, and size tended to form alliance 
ties (“edges” or “mutuality”, i↔j) with each other. 
Second, with respect to “2-stars”, since the estimated 2-stars parameters are 
positive for orientation and strategy, the probability that alliances are present versus 
absent among three distinct EMOs i, j, and k can be explained by the popularity or 
expansiveness of the focal EMO i in the one block where the EMOs are similar in those 
organizational attributes. In contrast, the estimated 2-stars parameter is negative for 
region, which indicates that the probability that alliances are present among three distinct 
EMOs i, j, and k cannot be explained by the popularity or expansitiveness of the focal 
EMO i. That is, the EMOs tended to “expand” alliances to the EMOs similar in 
orientation and strategy (“popularity” or “expansiveness”, j↔i↔k). 
Finally, with respect to “Triads”, since the estimated triads parameters are 
negative for orientation and size, the probability that alliances are absent versus present 
among three distinct EMOs i, j, and k can be explained by the tendency of triadic closure 
by the focal EMO i in the one block where the EMOs are similar in those organizational 
attributes. That is, the EMOs tended not to “close” the alliances with the EMOs similar in 
orientation and size (“triads” or “closure”, i↔j, j↔k, i↔k). 
Overall, the EMOs similar in orientation, region, area, and size tended to form 
alliances with each other. Moreover, the EMOs tended to maintain alliances 
simultaneously with others similar in orientation and strategy. However, the EMOs 
tended not to close the triadic alliance structure when they are similar in orientation and 
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size. The other twelve network configurations could not be considered in analysis 
because the statistics were linearly dependent when they were included. 
 
Table 7.6: Estimation of Model Parameters 
 
  Attributes 
Parameters Orientation Region Area Size Strategy Age 
Edges (1) 
b 
Wald 
P(df=1) 
1.0303** 
16.5294 
< 0.01 
0.8942**  
20.3820
    < 0.01
0.7861**  
14.5306
    < 0.01
0.8025**
      5.6563
    < 0.02
-0.2121  
1.0402 
    > 0.10 
0.2376
1.1537  
> 0.10  
2Stars (3) 
 
 
0.0270* 
3.6596 
< 0.10 
-0.0195**  
2.9636
    < 0.10
-0.0186  
2.2055
    > 0.10
0.0223  
1.1550
   > 0.10
0.0227*  
2.9293 
< 0.10 
-0.0130
0.9707
    > 0.10
Triads (6) 
 
 
-0.0999** 
20.2236 
< 0.01 
-0.0108  
0.3428
    > 0.50
-0.0069  
0.1413
    > 0.50
-0.0684**  
5.9123
    < 0.02
0.0105  
0.3372 
    > 0.50 
-0.0189
1.0078
    > 0.10
 
Note: 1. Inside the parenthesis is the significance (*significant at α=0.10, **significant at α=0.05). 
           2. Standard error (SE) and exp(b) are not specified due to space. 
           3. Estimation of model parameters has been done within blocks. 
 
In sum, the first hypothesis [H1b], “the environmental movement organizations 
(EMOs) with similar organizational characteristics–in particular, action areas and 
strategies–have cooperated with each other for litigation in the environmental movement 
sector (EMS) in the United States since 1970” was supported in the p-star analysis. The 
EMOs similar in organizational characteristics have formed alliance ties with each other for 
environmental litigation than with the EMOs dissimilar. In principle, the findings resonate 
with the popular rules of preferential attachment, “homophily” (McPherson and Smith-
Lovin, 1987; McPherson et al., 2001). However, the EMOs similar in “orientation” and 
“strategy” in particular have been more active in forming alliances with each other than 
others, whereas the EMOs similar in size and age have not. This finding is rather 
counterintuitive because the EMOs will like to cooperate with large and old EMOs with 
abundant resources for expensive and long-lasting environmental litigation. 
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A preliminary observation of the cross-sectional structure of the alliance ties for 
the entire period before I investigate the structure in each period provides a summary 
view of the overall structural characteristics of the inter-EMO alliance network. From 
1970 to 2001, 104 EMOs formed 411 alliance ties. As summarized in Table 7.2 above, 
the network was sparse (network density: 0.07) indicating that the network was open 
rather than closed. However, as shown in Figure 7.3, the alliance network was structured 
in 37 different levels of hierarchical positions (Burt, 1992). The Sierra Club (SC) (48) 
had the most allies followed by the National Audubon Society (NAS) (40), the Defenders 
of Wildlife (DW) (29) and the Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) (29) (inside 
the parentheses are the number of allies). Since all alliances were formed to file joint 
lawsuits, all EMOs that joined at least a joint lawsuit belonged to a clique.55 However, all 
of them were forming a clique with the Wilderness Society (WS), the National Wildlife 
Fund (NWF), the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), and the Friends of the 
Earth (FOEI). 
                                                          
55 A clique is a maximally complete subgraph in which every vertex is linked directly to every other vertex. 
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Figure 7.3: The Alliance Network (1970-2001) 
 
7.3.3   Evolution of Alliance Structure 
As was in the previous chapter, looking at the structures of the alliance networks for the 
periods when significant structural expansion occurred helps to better understand the 
patterns of the changes in alliance ties, i.e., who has partnered with whom over time. 
Figure 7.4 displays the structure of alliance ties for the first period (1970-1973). As 
shown, seven EMOs were forming fourteen alliance relations in the early 1970s. The 
initial network was quite small but hierarchical: (a) the network was structured in nine 
different levels of hierarchical positions and (b) network centralization was 46.67%. The 
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) (6) had most allies followed by the Friends of the 
Earth (FOEI) (5), the National Audubon Society (NAS) (4), and the Wilderness Society 
(WS) (4). 
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As shown, the alliance network was quite dense–most EMOs were partnering 
with each other. To investigate the structural dynamics in terms of the processes thereby 
triadic alliance structures develop from disparate dyadic alliances, I observed how triadic 
alliance structures were closed depending on the alliance forming activities of the EMOs 
that were taking constrained and unconstrained positions (Burt, 1992; 2001). 56  The 
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) (network constraint measure: 0.503) was most 
constrained whereas the Sierra Club (SC) (0.664) and the Canadian Wildlife Federation 
(CWF) (0.664) were least constrained in terms of the nature of the investment, which 
indicates that the latter is heavily invested in other EMOs that are in turn heavily invested 
in other EMOs whereas the latter is scarcely invested in other EMOs. Thus, the focal 
EMO is heavily constrained by other EMOs directly and indirectly whereas the others are 
not. 
EDFNWF
WS
FOEI
NAS
CWF
SC
Pajek  
A (7, 14) 
 
Figure 7.4: Alliance Network (Period I: 1970-1973) 
                                                          
56 Scholars have discussed how a network is closed in a triadic structure by the strategic actors attempting 
to enhance the benefits that the positions they are occupying provide (Burt, 2001; Doreian, 2004). 
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 Figure 7.5 displays the structure of alliance ties for the second period (1974-1977). 
As shown, eleven EMOs were forming 23 alliance relations in the mid 1970s. The 
network structure was quite hierarchical: (a) the network was structured in nine different 
levels of hierarchical positions and (b) network centralization was 46.67%. The 
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) (8) had most allies followed by the Natural 
Resources Defense Council (NRDC) (7), the Sierra Club (6), and the Friends of the Earth 
(FOEI) (6). 
As was done for the first period, I observed how triadic alliance structures were 
closed depending on the alliance forming activities of the EMOs. In comparison with the 
first period, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) that was most constrained in the first 
period remained being involved in the same number of triads (8 triads) whereas the Sierra 
Club (SC), which was least constrained in the first period, became involved in more 
triads (5 triads) and yet the Canadian Wildlife Federation (CWF), which was also least 
constrained, disappeared. 57  In this period, the Natural Resources Defense Council 
(NRDC) (0.365) was most constrained whereas the Project on Clean Air (PCA) (1.000) 
and the U.S. Public Interest Research Group (PIRG) (1.000) were least constrained. 
                                                          
57 The “structural hole” measures compute several measures developed by Ron Burt (1992). The measures 
include effective size, efficiency, constraint, and hierarchy. Of the measures, the “constraint” measure 
measures the extent to which ego is invested in people who are invested in other of ego's alters. The 
“hierarchy” is the Burt's adjustment of constraint indicating the extent to which constraint on ego is 
concentrated in a single alter. 
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Figure 7.5: Alliance Network (Period II: 1974-1977) 
 
Figure 7.6 displays the structure of alliance ties for the third period (1978-1981). 
As shown, thirteen EMOs were forming fourteen alliance relations circa 1980. The 
network structure was quite hierarchical: (a) the network was structured in seven 
different levels of hierarchical positions and (b) network centralization was 28.03%. The 
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) (5) had most allies followed by the Friends of the 
Earth (FOEI) (4), the Natural Resources Defense Council (3), and the Sierra Club (3). In 
comparison with the second period, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) that 
was most constrained in the second period became involved in only two triads whereas 
the Project on Clean Air (PCA) and the U.S. Public Interest Research Group (PIRG) 
disappeared in the third period. In this period, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) 
(constraint: 0.354) was most constrained whereas five EMOs including the Humane 
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Society of the United States (HSUS) (1.000) (i.e., AHPA, CAS, HSUS, PC, and SCAPL) 
were least constrained. 
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Figure 7.6: Alliance Network (Period III: 1978-1981) 
 
Compared to the third period, the number of average partners skyrocketed in the 
fourth period (1982-1985). Figure 7.7 displays the structure of alliance ties for this period. 
As shown, 23 EMOs were forming 90 alliance relations in the early 1980s of which 
fifteen EMOs and the 82 alliances were new. Compared to the third period, network 
density (0.36) and clustering coefficient (0.85) doubled, which implies that the network 
was closed rather than open. At the same time, the network became hierarchical: (a) the 
network was structured in the twelve different hierarchical positions, which was the 
highest of all periods and (b) the network was more centralized (50.65%). The National 
Audubon Society (NAS) (18) was most central followed by the Sierra Club (SC) (17), the 
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Defenders of Wildlife (DW) (14), and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) 
(12). 
In comparison with the third period, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) that 
was most constrained in the third period became involved in as many as eight triads 
whereas the EMOs that were least constrained disappeared in the fourth period except for 
the Humane Society of the United States (HSUS), which formed multiple triads with 
other EMOs. The National Audubon Society (NAS) (0.200) was most constrained 
whereas the Citizens for a Better Environment (CBE) (1.000) and the Legal 
Environmental Assistance Foundation (LEAF) (1.000) were least constrained.  
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Figure 7.7: Alliance Network (Period IV: 1982-1985) 
 
Figure 7.8a displays the structure of alliance ties for the fifth period (1986-1989). 
For a closer look, Figure 7.8b displays the core region (κ=4) obtained from the k-core 
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measure of the alliance network in this period.58 I used the k-core such that the routine 
selects the EMOs that have minimum degree greater than or equal to four. As shown, 33 
EMOs were forming 128 alliance relations in the late 1980s. The network structure was 
quite hierarchical: (a) the network was structured in fifteen different levels of hierarchical 
positions and (b) network centralization was 20.77%. The People for Ethical Treatment 
of Animals (PETA) (14) and the Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) (14) had 
most allies followed by twelve other EMOs including the Animal Legal Defense Fund 
(ALDF) (13). In comparison with the fourth period, the National Audubon Society (NAS) 
that was most constrained in the fourth period became involved in only six triads whereas 
the Citizens for a Better Environment (CBE) and the Legal Environmental Assistance 
Foundation (LEAF) disappeared. In this period, the Sierra Club (SC) (constraint: 0.220) 
was most constrained whereas four EMOs including GP (1.000) (i.e., GP, IPPL, NCAP, 
and NRC) were least constrained.  
                                                          
58 The k-core measure lists all k-cores of a graph. A k-core in an undirected graph is a connected maximal 
induced subgraph which has minimum degree greater than or equal to k. This procedure finds all k-cores 
for every possible value of k (Seidmann, 1983). 
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Figure 7.8a: Alliance Network (Period V: 1986-1989) 
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Figure 7.8b: Alliance Network (κ-core) (Period V: 1986-1989) 
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Figure 7.9a displays the structure of alliance ties for the sixth period (1990-1993). 
Figure 7.9b displays the core region (κ=2) obtained from the k-core measure of the 
alliance network in the sixth period. As shown, 26 EMOs were forming 75 alliance 
relations in the early 1990s. The network structure was quite hierarchical: (a) the network 
was structured in fifteen different levels of hierarchical positions and (b) network 
centralization was 48.67%. The Sierra Club (SC) (17) had most allies followed by the 
Wilderness Society (WS) (14) and the National Audubon Society (NAS) (13). In 
comparison with the fifth period, the Sierra Club (SC) that was most constrained in the 
fifth period became involved in more triads whereas the EMOs that were least 
constrained (i.e., GP, IPPL, NCAP, and NRC) disappeared. The Sierra Club (SC) 
(constraint: 0.188) was most constrained whereas five EMOs including the Green Peace 
(GP) (1.000) (i.e., ALS, CBE, COA, GP, and NEPI) were least constrained. 
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Figure 7.9a: Alliance Network (Period VI: 1990-1993)  
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Figure 7.9b: Alliance Network (κ-core) (Period VI: 1990-1993) 
 
Figure 7.10a displays the structure of alliance ties for the seventh period (1994-
1997). Figure 7.10b displays the core region (κ=3) obtained from the k-core measure of 
the alliance network in the seventh period. As shown, 40 EMOs were forming 91 alliance 
relations in the mid 1990s. The network structure was quite hierarchical: (a) the network 
was structured in 21 different levels of hierarchical positions and (b) network 
centralization was 44.40%. The Sierra Club (SC) (21) had most allies followed by the 
Wilderness Society (WS) (14) and the National Audubon Society (NAS) (14). In 
comparison with the sixth period, the Sierra Club (SC) that was most constrained in the 
sixth period became involved in as many triads as before whereas the EMOs that were 
least constrained either remained without being involved in any triad (i.e., COA, ALS) or 
disappeared (i.e., CBE, GP). The Sierra Club (SC) (0.137) was most constrained whereas 
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ten EMOs including the FOEI (1.000) (i.e., ABF, ALS, COA, CWWG, DPC, ELPC, 
FOEI, FOWS, HSUS, and PRC) were least constrained. 
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Figure 7.10a: Alliance Network (Period VII: 1994-1997)  
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Figure 7.10b: Alliance Network (κ-core) (Period VII: 1994-1997) 
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 The next structural expansion in the structure of alliance ties occurred in the final 
period (1998-2001). Figure 7.11a displays the structure of alliance ties in the final period 
when 60 EMOs were connected through 147 alliance ties. Figure 7.11b displays the core 
region (κ=5) obtained from the k-core measure of the alliance network in the eighth 
period. As shown, the core alliance network was quite d ense. Due to the significant 
expansion of the structure, the network density became even sparser (0.08), though the 
clustering coefficient maintained the same (0.63). Evidence suggests that the network 
was open rather than closed. The network became less hierarchical: (a) the network was 
structured in only six different hierarchical positions and (b) the network was less 
centralized (33.49%). The Sierra Club (SC) (24) was most central followed by National 
Audubon Society (NAS) (14), and the Defenders of Wildlife (DW) (14). 
In comparison with the seventh period, the Sierra Club (SC) that was most 
constrained in the seventh period became involved in still as many triads as before 
whereas the EMOs that were least constrained disappeared (i.e., ABF, COA, CWWG, 
ELPC, FOWS, and PRC), became involved in a few triads (i.e., ALS, FOEI, DPC), or 
became involved in more triads (i.e., HSUS). The Sierra Club (SC) (constraint: 0.098) 
was most constrained whereas twelve EMOs including the ALS (ALS) (1.000) (i.e., ALS, 
AWR, BDLF, FG, HD, NAC, NFS, NRPP, PERC, SAF, WKA, and WLP) were least 
constrained. 
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Figure 7.11a: Alliance Network (Period VIII: 1998-2001) 
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Figure 7.11b: Alliance Network (κ-core) (Period VIII: 1998-2001) 
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In sum, the alliance network has seen a few common observations found in most 
of the periods: The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and the Natural Resources 
Defense Council (NRDC) were most central in alliance activities in the earlier periods 
while the Sierra Club (SC) and the National Audubon Society (NAS) in the later periods. 
In addition, there have also been some findings regarding the development of triadic 
alliance structures over time: First, for most of the periods, the EMOs that were most 
constrained (e.g., EDF, SC, NAS, and NRDC) in a period, while being involved in 
multiple triads, were still most constrained in the subsequent period. On the other hand, 
the EMOs that were least constrained (e.g., FOEI, GP) in a period, while being involved 
in a few triads or none, either became involved in more triads (e.g., SC, HSUS) or 
disappeared in the subsequent period. That is, network closure that contributes to network 
utility or social capital was achieved mostly by the already most influential EMOs rather 
than by the marginal EMOs throughout the period, which is, according to the empirical 
evidence, somewhat counterintuitional against the popular theorization by network 
analysts (Burt, 1992, 2001). 
Thus, the second hypothesis [2b], “the environmental movement organizations 
(EMOs) located in the positions that are strategically disadvantageous have been more 
likely than others to cooperate with other EMOs in the environmental movement sector 
(EMS) in the United States since 1970” was also supported from an investigation of the 
structural dynamics. The structural hole measures showed that the EMOs located in least 
constrained positions have tended to close triadic structures in subsequent periods trying 
to take advantage of the strategically advantageous positions. In contrast, the EMOs 
located in already advantageous positions seemed not likely to be highly motivated to 
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create additional alliances. As in the preceding chapter, an aggregate of the closed triads 
must have made the structure more complicated, though it may be not possible to 
measure the extent to which the triadic structures affected the hierarchical structure of the 
contemporary EMS. 
However, the fourth hypothesis [H4], “the contemporary movement structure in 
the environmental movement sector (EMS) in the United States can be characterized as 
disconnected, decentralized, and imbalanced” was not supported from an investigation of 
the structural dynamics of the alliance network. It was noticeable that the alliance 
structure in the most recent period and the one that emerged in structural dynamics was, 
overall, connected rather than disconnected and hierarchical rather than homogenized – 
few EMOs have cooperated with many other EMOs. There was no exception throughout 
the entire period. It may be problematic if the “connectedness” should be interpreted as 
“solidarity” in social movements/collective action. However, the fact that most EMOs 
have been connected to each other as a collectivity suggests a possibility for future 
collective action. For example, resources (e.g., finance, labor) may be mobilized and 
movement activities (e.g., advancing claims) may be coordinated between the EMOs 
through connected alliance ties. 
 
7.4   Discussion 
This chapter has investigated how organizational and relational characteristics have been 
associated with each other in the structural dynamics of the alliance structure and how the 
alliance structure has evolved over time in the EMS in the United States since 1970. 
Specifically, this chapter has been concerned with what forms a series of dyadic and 
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triadic alliance ties resulting in the emergence of the structural characteristics (e.g., 
connectedness, balance, and hierarchy) of the contemporary EMS. EMOs have played 
different roles in creating alliance ties depending on their organizational characteristics 
and locations in the movement structure. The development of triadic alliance 
substructures was also related to the organizational characteristics and locations, though 
future research has yet to explicate the extent to which those triadic substructures 
aggregate to the entire network structures. 
Overall, the interorganizational structure in the EMS in the United States since 
1970 has expanded, connected, and hierarchicalized over time. Particularly, the EMOs 
with similar organizational characteristics in “orientation” and “strategy,” not necessarily 
in “size and “age,” have cooperated with each other. Thus, as noted above, the EMOs 
with similar organizational characteristics in “orientation” and “strategy,” not necessarily 
in “size and “age,” have cooperated with each other. In principle, the findings resonate 
with the popular rules of preferential attachment, “homophily” (McPherson and Smith-
Lovin, 1987; McPherson et al., 2001). However, the fact that the EMOs similar in 
“orientation” and “strategy” in particular have been more active in forming alliances with 
each other than others, whereas the EMOs similar in size and age have not is rather 
counterintuitive because the EMOs will like to cooperate with large and old EMOs with 
abundant resources for expensive and long-lasting environmental litigation. 
The EMOs located in most constrained positions (e.g., EDF, SC, NAS, and 
NRDC) in a period, while being involved in multiple triads, were still located in most 
constrained positions in the subsequent period. On the other hand, the EMOs located in 
least constrained positions (e.g., FOEI, GP) in a period, while being involved in a few 
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triads or none, either became involved in more triads (e.g., SC, HSUS) or disappeared in 
the subsequent period. That is, network closure that is believed to contribute to network 
utility or social capital was achieved mostly by the already most influential EMOs rather 
than by the marginal EMOs throughout the period, which is, according to the empirical 
evidence, somewhat counterintuitional against the popular theorization by network 
analysts (Burt, 1992, 2001). 
The cross-sectional alliance structure for the entire period was connected rather 
than disconnected and hierarchical rather than homogenized–few EMOs have cooperated 
with many other EMOs. There was no exception throughout the entire period. Although it 
may be problematic if the “connectedness” should be interpreted as “solidarity” in social 
movements/collective action, the fact that most EMOs have been connected to each other 
as a collectivity suggests a possibility for future collective action. For example, resources 
(e.g., finance, labor) may be mobilized and movement activities (e.g., advancing claims) 
may be coordinated between the EMOs through connected alliance ties. 
This chapter considered EMOs as “open” systems embedded in the environment 
in which they operate (Aldrich, 1979; Galaskiewitz, 1979). Even if they were considered 
open systems, the EMOs were selective in forming (and removing) interorganizational 
ties when the ties were “expensive” such as litigation and alliances for which they had to 
pay the costs for future benefits. The current work has found some conditions under 
which the EMOs switched interorganizational ties and yet points to discovering more 
conditions from both organizational characteristics and structural locations in the 
interorganizational structure in non-profit and for-profit sectors. 
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This chapter exemplified a network-structural analysis of the EMS (particularly, 
mobilizing structure for opposition) in the United States, 1970-2001. The theoretical and 
methodological framework used in the current work is useful to the resource mobilization 
approach in general that has attempted to discover mobilizing structures in social 
movement/collective action. The current work provides some knowledge of how social 
movement organizations behave to make the movement sector strong by managing 
interorganizational ties for future collective action. 
To fully explain the formation of alliance ties between certain EMOs based on 
both organizational characteristics and relational properties, future research may have to 
use conditional logit model (McFadden, 1973, 1981; Ben-Akiva, and Lerman, 1989). The 
conditional logit models are advantageous when the research aims to consider as 
variables the organizational characteristics of the focal parties involved, the parties’ 
neighbors, the parties’ neighbors’ neighbors’, and so on. Although the development of 
such models may require skills such as programming and data management, it seems 
clear that future research in this line will benefit more from them. 
Currently, there is no knowledge of what inter-EORG structures might look like 
at the regional and local levels, let alone the overall network structure when all the 
EORGs at those three different levels were aggregated. As noted above in Section 9.3, 
future research might include EORGs at the regional and local levels in analysis for a 
complete understanding of the movement structure. In addition, future research may 
include other types of organizations such as trade associations, corporations, labor unions 
other than EMOs and EGAs since they also play vital roles in EMS in the United States. 
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It was not clearly shown what structural mechanisms have brought about the 
contemporary litigative and alliance structures, though it aimed to investigate the 
structural dynamics thereby dyadic and triadic substructures emerged over time. As a 
result, to a large extent, the current work had to be satisfied with describing the network 
dynamics rather than explaining it. The current work points to the consideration of more 
systematic models (e.g., “actor network utility”; Doreian, 2005) beyond the models of 
“triadic completion.” Recent advances in structural theorization, methodological 
approaches, and computer packages will help discover the structural mechanisms 
(Doreian and Stokman, 1997; Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1998; ICS, [2002] 2007). 
 
7.5   Summary 
This chapter has investigated how organizational and relational characteristics have been 
associated with each other in the structural dynamics of the alliance structure and how the 
alliance structure has evolved over time in the EMS in the United States since 1970. A 
longitudinal analysis of the alliance ties for environmental litigation in the United States 
showed the findings such as the following: First, the EMOs with similar organizational 
characteristics in “orientation” and “strategy,” not necessarily in “size and “age,” have 
cooperated with each other. That is, in allying for litigation, the EMOs cooperated 
regardless of their ages and sizes as long as they shared similar orientation and strategies. 
Second, network closure that was believed to contribute to network utility or social 
capital was achieved mostly by the already most embedded EMOs rather than by the 
marginal EMOs throughout the period, which is, according to the empirical evidence, 
somewhat counterintuitional against the popular theorization by network analysts (Burt, 
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1992, 2001). Third, the cross-sectional alliance structure for the entire period was 
connected rather than disconnected and hierarchical rather than homogenized–few EMOs 
have cooperated with many other EMOs. As in the litigation structure, the findings 
provide more structural knowledge of the contemporary movement structure beyond the 
literature that noted a simple increase in alliances within the movement sector. Although 
the “connectedness” may not be interpreted as “solidarity” in social 
movements/collective action, the fact that most EMOs have been connected to each other 
as a collectivity suggests a possibility for future collective action. For example, resources 
(e.g., finance, labor) may be mobilized and movement activities (e.g., advancing claims) 
may be coordinated between the EMOs through connected alliance ties. 
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 Chapter 8 
Movement Dynamics: Signed Structure 
 
As pointed out earlier, environmental organizations (EORGs) are in basic competition 
with each other because they share, to a greater or lesser extent, the same adherent pools, 
both individual and institutional. Thus, scholars in social movements agree, to a great 
extent, that a variety of EORGs compete with each other for resources, control, and 
legitimacy. The competitive relations among the EORGs may turn to either cooperative 
relations or antagonistic attacks depending on the circumstances. Basically, the EORGs 
ought to cooperate in goal accomplishment because they seek similar goals. 59  The 
literature on the movement dynamics, however, caution that it is naïve to assume that 
social movement organizations (SMOs) all share a common goal and therefore have little 
interest in competition and conflict (Zald and McCarthy, 1987). The literature has noted a 
considerable increase in competition and conflicts between SMOs within the SMS (Zald 
and McCarthy, 1987; Zald and Useem, 1987).60 
                                                          
59 The factors that serve to facilitate and shape cooperation among EMOs have included task specialization 
(i.e., similar conceptions of goals and tactics), external social control, overlapping constituents (i.e., 
interlocking boards or memberships), and elite/third-party constraints while the forms of cooperation, 
alliances, cartels, federations, and mergers. 
60 A wide range of forms of conflicts have existed: verbal claims, direct confrontation, lobbying authorities, 
speaking disparate audiences, litigation, and so on. Of those conflictual relations, most highly structured 
type of an antagonistic encounter may be the litigation (Handler, 1978; Barkin, 1979; Barkan, 1980; Epp, 
1990; Morag-Levine, 2003). While litigation may be a form of the most antagonistic relationships between 
social actors, it has gained more and more popularity as an effective movement strategy since the 1970s 
(Zald and Berger, 1978; Balser, 1997; Barkan, 1979; Mueller and Judd, 1981; Michaelson, 1994; Norris 
and Cable, 1994; McCright and Dunlap, 2000). 
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The previous two chapters discussed the structural dynamics in the U.S. 
environmental movement sector (EMS) by investigating the exchanges of litigation and 
alliances between the national EORGs since 1970. The analyses helped better understand 
how the contemporary inter-EORG structure has emerged from the differential 
attachments in litigation and alliances, respectively. And yet, the fact that the analyses 
investigated structural dynamics of litigation and alliances separately prevented us from 
understanding how both types of inter-EORG relations interplay while generating a 
complex contemporary movement structure. Thus, this chapter combines both types of 
ties in a single analytical framework and investigates the structural dynamics of the 
movement sector as such–in network terms, the evolving inter-EORG network structure 
in which exchanges of “signed” ties generate a complex contemporary inter-EORG 
network structure in the EMS in the United States since 1970. 
This chapter investigates the movement dynamics with regard to how litigation 
and alliance relations have brought about the contemporary movement structure in the 
EMS in the United States, 1970-2001. The research questions that this chapter addresses 
are: “Under what conditions have triadic signed structures been balanced in the 
environmental movement sector (EMS) in the United States since 1970?” [Q3] and 
“What are the structural characteristics (e.g., connectedness, balance, and hierarchy) of 
the contemporary movement structure that has emerged in the environmental movement 
sector (EMS) in the United States since 1970?” [Q4] 
To answer these questions, the following sections will explore the signed 
(litigation, alliance) structure and investigate the longitudinal dynamics of the inter-
EORG signed relations by relying on recent advances in social balance models (Heider, 
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1946, 1958; Hummon and Doreian, 2003). An investigation of the structural dynamics of 
the EMS in terms of both litigation and alliances will help us not only understand the 
contemporary EMS but also predict the structural consequences in the EMS in the United 
States. 
 
8.1   Dynamics: Social Balance 
For a detailed introduction of social balance models, refer to Section 2.4.1 above. This 
section briefly revisits the major tenets and recent advances in social balance models for 
the discussion in the following sections. Social balance theory, as a fundamental model 
for network processes, focuses on imbalance as the driving force of network processes. 
Heider’s formulation (Heider, 1946; 1958) was concerned with cognitive inconsistencies 
in ‘unit-formation relations (U)’ whereas Cartwright and Harary’s (1956) and others, 
‘affect relations’ (R) affective inconsistencies in a more generalized context. A recent 
revival of interest in social balance theory has provided social balance models that 
emphasize balance mechanisms and measures of (im)balance at equilibrium (Doreian et 
al, 1997; Doreian and Krackhardt, 2001; Doreian, 2002). In their simulation research, 
Hummon and Doreian (2003) proposed a theoretical model for social balance in the form 
of an agent based simulation (ABS) model that simulates distinct but interdependent 
social actors making positive and negative selections of each other in efforts to reach 
balanced cognitive states. 
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8.2   Methods, Data, and Hypotheses 
This chapter uses structural partitioning and balance partitioning at the same time so that 
EORGs are partitioned into a set of plus-sets and a set of equivalent positions in a 
sequential manner. A temporal observation of the equivalent positions within and 
between plus-sets through time may suggest what EORGs play similar roles across 
distinct periods. The statistical network methods used in this chapter are two fold: (a) 
describing tie distribution (network size, density, centralization, clustering coefficient, 
balance, contentiousness, transitivity, and centrality) and (b) partitioning network 
structure into a set of positions of equivalent EORGs. The data include both 
environmental movement organizations (EMOs) and environmental government agencies 
(EGAs) operating at the national level and the inter-EORG relations including both 
lawsuit and alliance ties in the United States for the period, 1970-2001. Of the hypotheses 
presented in Chapter 1, the following will be test in this chapter: 
 
Hypothesis 3. “The environmental government agencies (EGAs) in imbalanced 
structures have been more likely than the environmental movement organizations 
(EMOs) to make the structures balanced in the environmental movement sector (EMS) in 
the United States since 1970.” [H3] 
 
Hypothesis 4. “The contemporary movement structure in the environmental 
movement sector (EMS) in the United States can be characterized as disconnected, 
decentralized, and yet balanced.” [H4] 
 
8.3   Exploration: EORGS in Signed Relations 
The following parts in this section will explore the EORGs and the signed (i.e., both 
litigation and alliance) relations between them for the given period in the United States. 
Focus will be on the triadic structures, in which EORGs are sign related, that generate a 
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more complicated structure in the following phase in time. The descriptives will include 
the organizational characteristics such as organizational age, size, geographical location, 
ideological orientation, primary action area, strategy, and so on. Particularly, focus will 
be on the longitudinal dynamics–that is, the temporal changes in the number of both 
alliances and litigation. An exploration of the signed relations in the EMS will help 
investigate the structural dynamics of the sector in terms of the movement conflicts and 
alliances in the following section. 
 
8.3.1   Alliance Ties 
First, I investigate how the structure of alliance ties has changed in terms of the patterns 
of entry and exit of the partnering EORGs and the alliance ties across eight consecutive 
periods. The structural change in terms of the number of EORGs has occurred in two 
ways: old EORGs exit or new EORGs enter. The EORGs that existed between two 
consecutive periods did not bring about the structural change. As Table 8.1 shows, an 
investigation of the changes in the EORGs by type that exited and entered the alliance 
relations across the consecutive periods allows us to understand the structural dynamics 
of the sector. While there were no EGAs that formed alliance ties throughout the entire 
period, the changes in the number of EMOs in alliance relations have been positive 
except for the sixth period. The largest exits occurred in the sixth and the eighth whereas 
the largest entries in the fourth, fifth, seventh, and eighth. The reason for the reduction of 
the EMOs in alliances in the sixth period may be due to the unusual increase in the prior 
two periods (Periods IV and V; 1982-1989). A look at the cumulative change of the 
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number of EORGs in the last column of the table shows that the change quadrupled in 
two decades after 1970 and, after the late 1980s, it doubled in the final period. 
 
Table 8.1: Patterns of Entry and Exit of EORGs in Alliance Networks 
 
Period Year 
EMOs EGAs Total 
- + ∆ - + ∆ ∆ Cumul ∆ 
I 1970-1973 n/a +7 +7 n/a 0 0 +7 7 
II 1974-1977 -1 +5 +4 0 0 0 +4 11 
III 1978-1981 -3 +5 +2 0 0 0 +2 13 
IV 1982-1985 -5 +15 +10 0 0 0 +10 23 
V 1986-1989 -11 +21 +10 0 0 0 +10 33 
VI 1990-1993 -18 +11 -7 0 0 0 -7 26 
VII 1994-1997 -8 +22 +14 0 0 0 +14 40 
VIII 1998-2001 -14 +34 +20 0 0 0 +20 60 
Total 1970-2001 -60 +120 +60 0 0 0 +60 177 
 
Note: ‘n/a’ indicates ‘not applicable’ 
 
An examination of the changes in the alliance ties that exited from and entered the 
sector across the consecutive periods allows us to understand the structural dynamics of 
the sector. The structural change in terms of the number of ties has occurred in two ways: 
old ties exit or new ties enter. The alliance ties that existed across the consecutive periods 
did not change the network structure. Table 8.2 summarizes the patterns of exit and entry 
of the alliance ties across the eight periods. Since there were no EGAs found in the 
alliance network, the changes in the alliance ties were all those of the EMOs. The total 
number of changes has been positive except for the third and the sixth periods. The large 
entries have occurred since the fourth period while the large exits in the second half of 
the entire period (1986-2001). A look at the cumulative change of the number of ties in 
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the last row of the table shows that the biggest change occurred between the third and the 
fourth period and between the seventh and eighth. 
 
Table 8.2: Patterns of Entry and Exit of Alliance Ties 
 
Period I II III IV V VI VII VIII Total 
Year 1970- 1973 
1974- 
1977 
1978- 
1981 
1982- 
1985 
1986- 
1989 
1990- 
1993 
1994- 
1997 
1998- 
2001 
1970- 
2001 
Exit of old ties n/a -4 -14 -6 -76 -109 -43 -65 -317 
Entry of new ties +14 +13 +5 +82 +114 +56 +59 +121 +464 
Change +14 +9 -9 +76 +38 -53 +16 +56 +147 
Cumul Change 14 23 14 90 128 75 91 147 411 
 
8.3.2   Litigative Ties 
Second, I investigate how the structure of lawsuit ties has changed in terms of the 
patterns of entry and exit of the EORGs and the lawsuit ties across eight consecutive 
periods. The structural change in terms of the number of EORGs has occurred in two 
ways: old EORGs exit or new EORGs enter. An examination of the changes in the 
EORGs by type that exited and entered the lawsuit relations across the consecutive 
periods allows us to understand the structural dynamics of the sector. Table 8.3 
summarizes the patterns of exit and entry of EORGs across the eight periods. In contrast 
to the alliance ties, both types of EORGs are involved in the lawsuit relations and thus the 
changes in the number of the EORGs are summarized by EORG type. The change in the 
total number of EORGs was substantial in the first, fourth, and eighth periods. 
Interestingly, the number of EORGs in lawsuit ties decreased in the third period. As far 
as the EMOs are concerned, a large number of EMOs entered the network in the first, 
fifth, seventh, and eighth periods whereas a number of EMOs exited in the fifth and 
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seventh periods resulting in a significant increase in the number of EORGs in the first, 
fifth, and eighth periods. As far as the EGAs are concerned, the changes were steady 
across the periods. However, more EGAs entered the network in the first and fourth 
periods whereas more EGAs exited in the fifth period resulting in fluctuations in the 
number of EGAs in lawsuit ties. In the first and fourth periods, the EGAs increased 
largest whereas the EGAs decreased in the third, fifth, and seventh periods. A look at the 
cumulative change of the number of EORGs in the last column shows that the change 
doubled in two decades since 1970 and, since the mid-1980s, doubled again in the final 
period. 
 
Table 8.3: Patterns of Entry and Exit of EORGS in Lawsuit Networks 
 
Period Year 
EMOs EGAs Total 
- + ∆ - + ∆ ∆ Cumul ∆ 
I 1970-1973 n/a +15 +15 n/a +10 +10 +25 25 
II 1974-1977 -4 +12 +8 -1 +6 +5 +13 38 
III 1978-1981 -9 +11 +2 -4 +1 -3 -1 37 
IV 1982-1985 -11 +18 +7 -2 +10 +8 +15 52 
V 1986-1989 -16 +26 +10 -6 +2 -4 +6 58 
VI 1990-1993 -7 +13 +6 -2 +5 +3 +9 67 
VII 1994-1997 -23 +31 +8 -5 +3 -2 +6 73 
VIII 1998-2001 -14 +39 +25 -5 +7 +2 +27 100 
Total 1970-2001 -84 +165 +81 -25 +44 +19 +100 177 
 
Note: n/a indicates not applicable 
 
An investigation of the changes in the lawsuit ties that exited and entered the 
lawsuit network across the consecutive periods allows us to understand the structural 
dynamics of the sector. The structural changes in terms of the number of lawsuit ties have 
occurred in two ways: old ties exit and new ties enter. The ties that have existed across 
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the periods did not change the network structure. Table 8.4 summarizes the patterns of 
exit and entry of the ties across the eight periods. The total numbers of changes were 
substantial in the first, fourth, and eighth periods. Interestingly, the number of lawsuit ties 
decreased in the third period. A large number of lawsuit ties disappeared in the third, fifth, 
seventh, and eighth periods. In contrast, a large number of lawsuit ties were created in the 
fourth, fifth, seventh, and eighth periods, which resulted in considerable additions of 
lawsuit ties in the first, second, fourth, and eighth periods. A look at the cumulative 
change of the number of ties in the last row of the table shows that the change tripled in 
two decades since 1970 and almost doubled in the final period since the mid-1980s. 
 
Table 8.4: Patterns of Entry and Exit of Lawsuit Ties 
 
Period I II III IV V VI VII VIII Total 
Year 1970- 1973 
1974- 
1977 
1978- 
1981 
1982- 
1985 
1986- 
1989 
1990- 
1993 
1994- 
1997 
1998- 
2001 
1970- 
2001 
Exit of old ties n/a -10 -44 -26 -61 -38 -76 -65 -320 
Entry of new ties +34 +41 +33 +68 +74 +52 +77 +105 +484 
Change +34 +31 -11 +42 +13 +14 +1 +40 +164 
Total 34 65 54 96 109 123 124 164 411 
 
8.4   Emergence of Signed Structure (1970-2001) 
As the current network structure comprises both alliance and lawsuit ties, it is a signed 
(balanced or imbalanced) network whose structural properties are completely different 
than in networks of either ties only. While a signed network is a special case of the 
networks of multiplex ties, the network dynamics occur according to the (im)balanced 
state of the network. Now, this section investigates the structural dynamics of the inter-
EMO signed relations thereby the contemporary inter-EMO movement structure has 
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emerged from a generative structural perspective (Epstein and Axtell, 1997; Fararo and 
Butts, 1999). In what follows, investigation will be done in two steps: (a) identification of 
the sources of imbalance (i.e., imbalanced triples and inconsistent dyads in particular and 
(b) comparison of the imbalanced triples between the periods before and after to observe 
how inconsistent dyads change. The findings from these analyses will be used to discuss 
the structural dynamics of the EMS in Section 8.3. 
 
8.4.1   Evolution of Signed Structure 
Table 8.5 summarizes the structural characteristics (network size, number of plus-sets, 
imbalanced triples, EORGs in imbalanced triples, and level of contentiousness) of the 
signed networks in all eight periods. As summarized, there were multiple periods 
(Periods I, III, V, VI, and VII) where no imbalanced triples were found, which indicate 
that the network structures were in perfect balance. In contrast, imbalanced triples were 
found in three periods (Period II, IV, and VIII) suggesting that there were structural 
tensions among the EORGs involved. In the second period, there were three imbalanced 
triples with five EORGs involved. The number of imbalanced triples was largest in the 
fourth period where fourteen imbalanced triples with sixteen EORGs involved. Finally, 
four imbalanced triples composed of six EORGs involved in the final period. To mention 
the level of contentiousness, which is measured by the ratio of the number of negative 
(i.e., lawsuit) ties to the total number of ties, overall the level of contentiousness has 
decreased through time. It was 0.52 or 52% in the first period and yet decreased down to 
0.32 or 32% in the last period indicating that the number of alliance ties has increased at a 
faster pace than the number of lawsuit ties, though the latter characterizes the period, 
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1970-2001. The role of contentious relations within the social movement sector (SMS) 
has been discussed by contemporary scholars working on social movements (Tilly and 
Wood, 2003). 
 
Table 8.5: Structural Properties of Signed Networks 
 
Period Year Total (Node, +, -) 
Imbalanced 
Triple 
EORGs in 
Imbalanced Triple 
Level of 
Contentiousness 
I 1970-1973 (25, 48) 0 0 0.52 
II 1974-1977 (38, 86) 3 5 0.44 
III 1978-1981 (37, 66) 0 0 0.56 
IV 1982-1985 (52, 185) 14 16 0.28 
V 1986-1989 (58, 237) 0 0 0.24 
VI 1990-1993 (67, 189) 0 0 0.35 
VII 1994-1997 (73, 214) 0 0 0.34 
VIII 1998-2001 (100, 311) 4 6 0.32 
Total Total (177, 810) 24 21 0.22 
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Figure 8.1: Signed Network (1970-2001) 
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 Figure 8.2 displays the initial signed network in the early 1970s when 25 EORGs 
were exchanging 48 ties of alliance and litigation with each other. In the graph, alliance 
ties were represented as solid lines whereas lawsuit ties as dotted lines. There were no 
imbalanced triples in the initial network structure, i.e., the network was perfectly 
balanced. However, the level of contentiousness was high (0.52), which indicates that the 
number of lawsuit ties outnumbered the number of alliance ties. Although the network 
was divided into three components, there was only one plus-set composed of seven 
EMOs linked through fourteen alliance ties. In the plus-set, there were EMOs that had 
common movement opponents, which can be considered equivalent allies against 
equivalent opponents. The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)–Sierra Club (SC) alliance 
tie had most common movement opponents (4) while contending with the US Army, the 
US DOA, the US DOI, and the US EPA (inside the parentheses is the number of common 
opponents). Similarly, the Sierra Club (SC)–Friends of the Earth (FOEI) alliance tie had 
three movement opponents in common while contending with the US DOA, the US DOI, 
and the US DOT. 
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Figure 8.2: Signed Network (Period I: 1970-1973) 
 
Note: S (25, 14, 34) indicates a signed network composed of 25 vertices 
interconnected through 14 positive and 34 negative edges. 
 
Figures 8.3a and 8.3b display the signed network and the imbalanced subgraph of 
the second period when imbalanced triples were found. As shown in Figure 8.3a, 38 
EORGs were linked through 86 signed ties (23 alliances, 65 lawsuits) in this period. 
While the network was divided into four components, there was only one plus-set found 
in the network, which was composed of eleven EMOs linked through 23 alliance ties. As 
was in the first period, there were EMOs that had common movement opponents. The 
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)–Friends of the Earth (FOEI), Environmental 
Defense Fund (EDF)–Sierra Club (SC), and Natural Resources Defense Council 
(NRDC)–Sierra Club (SC) alliance tie had most (5) common movement opponents while 
all alliance ties contending with the US Department of Interior (US DOI) and some with 
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the US Department of Agriculture (US DOA) and the US Department of Transportation 
(US DOT). 
Figure 8.3b highlights the imbalanced subgraph in which five EORGs were linked 
through nine signed ties in a Heiderian sense. According to Davis (1967), the subgraph is 
balanced with three plus-sets. A closer look at the network shows that there were two 
lawsuit ties between the EGAs (US DOL–US OSHRC, US DOA–US EPA), which 
involved four EGAs altogether creating three imbalanced triples of five EORGs.61 As 
shown, the negative tie between the US Department of Agriculture (US DOA) and the 
US Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) formed three imbalanced triples with 
the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), the Public Interest Research Group (PIRG) and 
the Sierra Club (SC), respectively. The structural tension among the involved EORGs 
created due to the structural imbalance brought about a structural change (i.e., balanced 
structure) in the following period by making the EGAs (i.e., US DOA and US EPA) 
remove the ties between themselves to make the structure balanced. 
                                                          
PA). 
61  The environmental lawsuits formed between EGAs in the second period are as follows: 1) 1974, 
1975. Brennan (US DOL) v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission (US OSHRC). 2) 1975, 
1976. Earl L. Butz (US DOA) v. Russell E. Train (US E
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Figure 8.3a: Signed Network (Period II: 1974-1977) 
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Figure 8.3b: Imbalanced Subgraph (Period II: 1974-1977) 
 
Note: 1. I (5, 9) indicates an imbalanced network composed  
            of five vertices interconnected through nine edges. 
     2. The signed network is 3-balanced (Davis, 1967) 
 173
 Figure 8.4 displays the signed network and the imbalanced subgraph of the third 
period. As shown, 37 EORGs were linked through 66 signed ties (14 alliances, 42 
lawsuits) in this period. While the network was divided into three components, there were 
three plus-sets found in the network. As was in the previous periods, there were EMOs 
that had common movement opponents. The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)–Sierra 
Club (SC) alliance tie had most (4) common movement opponents while all alliance ties 
contending with the US Army (US Army), US Department of Interior (US DOI), US 
Department of Transportation, and the US Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA). 
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Figure 8.4: Signed Network (Period III: 1978-1981) 
 
Figures 8.5a and 8.5b display the signed network and the imbalanced subgraph of 
the fourth period when imbalanced triples were found, respectively. As shown in Figure 
8.5a, 52 EORGs were linked through 185 signed ties (90 alliances, 96 lawsuits) in this 
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period. As in other periods, there was only one principal plus-set formed in the network, 
though the network was divided into three components. The plus-set was composed of 23 
EMOs linked through 90 alliance ties. As were in the previous periods, there were EMOs 
that had common movement opponents. The Sierra Club (SC)–Friends of the Earth 
(FOEI), Sierra Club (SC)–Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), Natural 
Resources Defense Council (NRDC)–Friends of the Earth (FOEI) alliance ties had most 
(7) common movement opponents while all alliance ties contending with the US Army 
(US Army), US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US NRC), US Environmental 
Protection Agency (US EPA), US National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) (NOAA 
Fisheries Service) (US NOAA), United States (US), US Department of Interior (US 
DOI). 
Figure 8.5b highlights the imbalanced subgraph in which sixteen EORGs were 
linked through 29 signed ties. A closer look at the network shows that there was only one 
lawsuit tie between EGAs (US–US DOI), which involved two EGAs and yet created as 
many as fourteen imbalanced triples of sixteen EORGs.62 As shown, the negative tie 
between the United States (US) and the US Department of Interior (US DOI) formed 
fourteen imbalanced triples with Mountain States Legal Foundation (MSLF), Animal 
Rights Coalition (ARC), Humane Society of the United States (HSUS), Friends of the 
Boundary Waters Wilderness (BWCA), Animal Welfare Institute (AWI), International 
Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW), Wilderness Society (WS), North American Wildlife 
Park Foundation (NAWPF), Defenders of Wildlife (DW), Natural Resources Defense 
Council (NRDC), National Audubon Society (NAS), Friends of the Earth (FOEI), The 
                                                          
62 The environmental lawsuits formed between EGAs in the fourth period are as follows:  1) 1982. Ray 
Marshall (US DOL) v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission (US FMSHRC). 2) 1985. 
United States (US) v. S.S. (Joe) Burford (US DOI). 
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Fund for Animals (TFA), and Sierra Club (SC), respectively. The structural tension 
among the involved EORGs created due to the structural imbalance brought about a 
structural change (i.e., balanced structure) in the following period by making the EGAs 
(i.e., US and US DOI) remove the ties between themselves to make the structure 
balanced. 
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Figure 8.5a: Signed Network (Period IV: 1982-1985) 
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Figure 8.5b: Imbalanced Subgraph (Period IV: 1982-1985) 
 
Note: 4-balanced (Davis, 1967) 
 
Figure 8.6 displays the signed network of the fifth period. As shown, 58 EORGs 
were linked through 237 signed ties (128 alliances, 109 lawsuits) in this period. As the 
network was not divided into components, there was only one plus-set found in the 
network. Figure 8.7 displays the signed network of the sixth period. As shown, 67 
EORGs were linked through 189 signed ties (75 alliances, 114 lawsuits) in this period. 
While the network was divided into two components, there were two plus-sets found in 
the network. 
 177
FOEI
SC
IPPL
WS
NRDC
CLF
DW
NPCA
NCAP
NASEDF
HW
PSR
ASPCA
PAWS ALDF
API
AVARNRC
NWF
PC
TDP EII
HSUS
IDA
IWC
ISAR
NEAVS
PETA
FOET
GP
NEPI
NTHP
MSLF
US Navy
PIRG
WWF
CAS
CBE
NCAMP
NEDC
TU
US DOI
US HHS
US NRC
UAN
US
US Army
US DOA
US DOT
US EPA
US FERC
US NIH
US NOAAUS Air Force
US DODUS FDA
US FLRA
Pajek  
S (58, 128, 109) 
 
Figure 8.6: Signed Network (Period V: 1986-1989) 
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Figure 8.7: Signed Network (Period VI: 1990-1993) 
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Figure 8.8 displays the signed network of the seventh period. As shown, 73 
EORGs were linked through 214 signed ties (91 alliances, 123 lawsuits) in this period. 
While the network was divided into two components, there were plus-sets found in the 
network. 
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Figure 8.8: Signed Network (Period VII: 1994-1997) 
 
Finally, Figures 8.9a and 8.9b display the signed network and the imbalanced 
subgraph of the eighth period when imbalanced triples were found, respectively. As 
shown in Figure 8.9a, 100 EORGs were linked through 311 ties (147 alliances, 164 
lawsuits) in this period. As in the previous periods, there was only one plus-set formed in 
the network, though the network was divided into three components. The plus-set was 
composed of 59 EMOs linked through 147 alliance ties. As were in the previous periods, 
there were EMOs that had common movement opponents. The Sierra Club (SC)–
Defenders of Wildlife (DW) alliance tie had most (5) common movement opponents 
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while the alliance tie contending with the US Army (US Army), Department of 
Agriculture (US DOA), US Department of Interior (US DOI), US National Marine 
Fisheries Service (NMFS) (NOAA Fisheries Service) (US NOAA), and Department of 
Commerce (US DOC). 
A closer look at the network shows that there were two lawsuit ties between the 
EGAs (US–US DOI, US DOL–US OSHRC), which involved four EGAs creating four 
imbalanced triples of six EORGs.63 Figure 8.9b highlights the imbalanced subgraph in 
which six EORGs were linked through eleven signed ties. As shown, the negative tie 
between the United States (US) and the US Department of Interior (US DOI) formed four 
imbalanced triples with Mountain States Legal Foundation (MSLF), Humane Society of 
the United States (HSUS), Sierra Club (SC), and Natural Resources Defense Council 
(NRDC). The structural tension among the involved EORGs created due to the structural 
imbalance would demand a structural change (i.e., balanced structure) in the following 
period by making the EGAs (i.e., US–US DOI, US DOL–US OSHRC) remove the ties 
between themselves to make the structure balanced. 
                                                          
63 The environmental lawsuits formed between EGAs in the final period are as follows:  1) 1998. Alexis M. 
Herman (US DOL) v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission (US OSHRC). 2) 2000. United 
States (US) v. US DOI (US DOI). 
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Figure 8.9a: Signed Network (Period VIII: 1998-2001) 
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Figure 8.9b: Imbalanced Subgraph (Period VIII: 1998-2001) 
 
Note: 4-balanced (Davis, 1967) 
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As presented above, three imbalanced triples were discovered in the Periods II, IV, 
and VIII. A comparison of the imbalanced triples in the prior and posterior to those 
periods confirms the Fundamental Structural Balance Hypothesis (FSBH) (Doreian and 
Krackhardt, 2001). A close look at the subgraphs reveals that all imbalanced triples 
involve two EGAs and an EMO that are negatively connected to each other and the 
imbalanced triples became balanced by the two occurrences: (a) the negative ties–
potentially “inconsistent dyads”–between the EGAs disappeared in the next period or (b) 
one or two of the negative ties between the EGAs and the EMO disappeared. That is, in 
the periods where imbalanced triples were found, all imbalanced triples evolved into 
balanced triples in the next period and inconsistent dyads (negative inconsistencies) 
tended to disappear or other negative ties tended to be removed due to the inconsistent 
dyads. There was no case where the negative ties reversed to the positive ties directly. It 
seemed that negative ties were removed before they were reversed to positive ties. 
Thus, the third hypothesis [H3], “the environmental government agencies (EGAs) 
in imbalanced structures have been more likely than the environmental movement 
organizations (EMOs) to make the structures balanced in the environmental movement 
sector (EMS) in the United States since 1970” was supported from an investigation of the 
signed structures over time. There have been inconsistent dyads throughout the entire 
period and the number reached highest in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. The number 
of imbalanced triples was highest in the early-mid 1980s when fourteen imbalanced 
triples were found. All imbalanced triples involved signed ties among two EGAs and an 
EMO. All imbalanced triples involved two EGAs and an EMO that were negatively 
connected to each other and the imbalanced triples became balanced by inconsistent 
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dyads (negative inconsistencies) disappearing or other negative ties being removed due to 
the inconsistent dyads. Importantly, it seems that the EGAs have been more actively 
attempting to make the EMS without structural tensions than the EMOs have in the 
contemporary EMS in the United States since 1970. 
However, the fourth hypothesis [H4], “the contemporary movement structure in 
the environmental movement sector (EMS) in the United States can be characterized as 
disconnected, decentralized, and imbalanced” was not supported from an investigation of 
the structural dynamics of the signed network. As shown, the main plus-set has existed 
connected rather than disconnected and hierarchical rather than homogenized throughout 
the entire period, though the state of (im)balance has changed over time. As in the 
preceding chapters, the findings are counterintuitive as the EMS has been thought to be 
structurally uninteresting–i.e., fragmented, decentralized, and imbalanced. Evidence 
suggests that the movement structure may continue to be connected and hierarchical and 
yet it may continue to experience structural tensions depending on the changes in 
environmental litigation in the near future. 
 
Table 8.6: Structural Dynamics in Balance Structure 
 
Period Year Imbalanced Type Change State 
I 1970-1973 0 n/a n/a Balance 
II 1974-1977 3 (- - -) (- 0 -) Balanced 
III 1978-1981 0 n/a n/a Balance 
IV 1982-1985 14 (- - -) (- 0 -) Balanced 
V 1986-1989 0 n/a n/a Balance 
VI 1990-1993 0 n/a n/a Balance 
VII 1994-1997 0 n/a n/a Balance 
VIII 1998-2001 4 (- - -) (- 0 -) Balanced 
Total Total 24    
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 Table 8.7 summarizes the results from balance partitioning arranged by plus-sets, 
inconsistent dyads (i.e., sources of imbalance), EORGs in inconsistent dyads, imbalanced 
triples, and EORGs in imbalanced triples. As shown, the number of plus-sets was mostly 
small except for the third, sixth, and seventh periods where three, two, and two plus-sets 
were observed, respectively. There have been inconsistent dyads throughout the entire 
period and the number reached highest in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Interestingly, 
the sources of imbalance all came from the inconsistent dyads between the EGAs. For 
example, in the second period, there were three inconsistent dyads involving four EGAs. 
In the fourth period, there were two inconsistent dyads involving four EGAs. In the 
eighth period, there was one inconsistent dyad involving two EGAs. Nonetheless, not all 
inconsistent dyads translated into imbalanced triples. In some cases, two EGAs in conflict 
existed unattached to the main component. However, in the second, fourth, and eighth 
periods, the inconsistent dyads did translate into imbalanced triples (3, 14, and 4 
imbalanced triples, respectively) involving a few EORGs (5, 16, and 6, respectively). 
Finally, I investigate the structural dynamics of the signed networks by which the 
partition structures (i.e., equivalent positions) have evolved over time. Of varied methods 
to partition network structures, I used balance partitioning and structural partitioning in 
sequence so that equivalent actors can be identified within and between the signed 
networks. That is, I partition signed networks in a consecutive manner as follows: (a) 
partitioning a signed network into plus-sets and (b) partitioning the plus-sets into 
equivalent positions. Looking at the signed networks, it is not possible to identify 
equivalent positions across plus-sets when the plus-sets are disconnected from each other. 
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In fact, several positive dyads disconnected from the main plus-set (e.g., two EORGs 
linked to each other in an alliance) have been found. However, it is possible to identify 
equivalent positions within the plus-sets. As discussed above, the EORGs in equivalent 
positions within a plus-set may be “competitors”, while those in non-equivalent positions 
within the plus-set may be “allies”. Similarly, the EORGs in equivalent positions between 
plus-sets may be “contenders”, while those in non-equivalent positions between plus-sets 
may be simply “others”. 
No contenders have been found. Each period, however, saw several sets of 
competing EMOs located within the same plus-set attacking equivalent other EGAs. In 
the first period, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and the Sierra Club (SC) were 
located in equivalent positions while attacking equivalent EGAs. In the second period, 
three sets of EMOs located in equivalent positions were found. The Environmental 
Defense Fund (EDF)–Friends of the Earth (FOEI), Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)–
Sierra Club (SC), and Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)–Sierra Club (SC) 
were located in equivalent positions while attacking equivalent EGAs. In the fourth 
period, three sets of EMOs located in equivalent positions were found. The Sierra Club 
(SC)–Friends of the Earth (FOEI), Sierra Club (SC)–Natural Resources Defense Council 
(NRDC), Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)–Friends of the Earth (FOEI) were 
located in equivalent positions while attacking equivalent EGAs. In the eighth period, the 
Sierra Club (SC) and the Defenders of Wildlife (DW) were located in equivalent 
positions while attacking equivalent EGAs. 
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Table 8.7: Balance Partitioning and Structural Imbalance 
Period Year Plus-set Size of  Main Plus-set 
Inconsistent 
Dyad 
(EGA-EGA) 
EORG in 
Inconsistent 
Dyad 
Imbalanced 
Triple 
EORG in 
Imbalanced 
Triple 
I 1970-1973 1 P (7, 14) 1 2 0 0 
II 1974-1977 1 P (11, 23) 3 4 3 5 
III 1978-1981 3 P (9, 12) 1 2 0 0 
IV 1982-1985 1 P (23, 90) 2 4 14 16 
V 1986-1989 1 P (33, 128) 4 5 0 0 
VI 1990-1993 2 P (24, 74) 7 9 0 0 
VII 1994-1997 2 P (38, 90) 2 4 0 0 
VIII 1998-2001 1 P (59, 147) 2 4 4 6 
Total 1970-2001 1 P (105, 411) 22 15 24 21 
 
Note: Total 21 unique imbalanced triples and 21 EORGs involved 
 
8.5   Discussion 
This chapter has investigated how organizational and relational characteristics have been 
associated with each other in the structural dynamics of the signed (i.e., combined 
litigative and alliance) structure in the EMS and how the signed structure has evolved 
over time in the United States since 1970. Specifically, this chapter has been concerned 
with what affects the imbalanced triadic structure to move toward the balanced structure 
resulting in the emergence of the structural characteristics (e.g., connectedness, balance, 
and hierarchy) of the contemporary EMS. EMOs have played different roles in creating 
movement ties depending on their organizational characteristics and locations in the 
movement structure. The development of triadic (litigation, alliance) substructures was 
also related to the organizational characteristics and locations, though future research has 
yet to explicate the extent to which those triadic substructures aggregate to the entire 
network structures. 
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Overall, the signed interorganizational structure in the EMS in the United States 
since 1970 has expanded, connected, hierarchicalized, and balanced over time. As shown, 
there have been inconsistent dyads (US DOL–US OSHRC, US DOA–US EPA, and US–
US DOI) between EGAs. Not all inconsistent dyads led to developing imbalanced 
structures. The number of imbalanced triples was highest in the early-mid 1980s when 
fourteen imbalanced triples were found. All imbalanced triples involved two EGAs and 
an EMO that were negatively connected to each other and the imbalanced triples became 
balanced by inconsistent dyads (negative inconsistencies) disappearing or other negative 
ties being removed due to the inconsistent dyads. Importantly, it seems that the EGAs 
have more actively attempted to make the EMS without structural tensions. 
A comparison of the imbalanced triples in the prior and posterior to the focal 
period confirms the Fundamental Structural Balance Hypothesis (FSBH) (Doreian and 
Krackhardt, 2001). Although the main plus-set has existed connected and hierarchical 
throughout the entire period, the state of (im)balance has changed over time. The findings 
may be counterintuitive to the popular belief since the EMS has been thought to be 
structurally fragmented, decentralized, and imbalanced. Evidence suggests that the 
movement structure may continue to be connected and hierarchical and yet it may 
continue to experience structural tensions depending on the changes in environmental 
litigation in the near future. 
From a methodological perspective, this chapter attempted a combined use of 
structural partitioning and balance partitioning of signed networks in a consecutive 
manner. As shown, the main plus-set was only one in all eight periods. Accordingly, no 
contenders have been found across plus-sets. Each period, however, saw several sets of 
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competing EMOs located within the same plus-set attacking equivalent other EGAs. 
While being considered “competitors”, they shared similar organizational attributes in 
orientation, strategy, region, area, size, and age. For example, in the first period, the 
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)–Sierra Club (SC) alliance tie had most common 
movement opponents while contending with US Army, US DOA, US DOI, and US EPA. 
The two EMOs were equivalent within the plus-set as they were equivalently negatively 
tied to the common opponents while the four EGAs were also negatively equivalent for 
the two EMOs. Similarly, in the eighth period, the Sierra Club (SC) and the Defenders of 
Wildlife (DW) were located in equivalent positions while attacking equivalent EGAs. An 
oppositional structure in which the EORGs were negatively tied to each other across 
plus-sets was not developed. Future research may be directed toward studying the roles 
that the competitors are playing for movement allies and against movement opponents. 
 
8.6   Summary 
This chapter has investigated how organizational and relational characteristics have 
associated with each other in the structural dynamics of the signed (i.e., combined 
litigative and alliance) structure and how the signed structure has evolved over time in the 
EMS in the United States since 1970. A longitudinal analysis of the environmental signed 
ties in the United States showed the findings such as the following: First, there have been 
conflicting relationships (US DOL–US OSHRC, US DOA–US EPA, and US–US DOI) 
between EGAs. All imbalanced triples involved two EGAs and an EMO that were 
negatively connected to each other and the imbalanced triples became balanced by the 
inter-EGA conflicts disappearing or other negative ties being removed due to the 
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inconsistent dyads. In part, the findings support the hypothesized equivalent roles in 
signed structures because the two EGAs equivalently tied to an EMO tended to behave in 
a similar fashion (i.e., dropped the negative tie between them). Importantly, it seemed 
that the EGAs attempted more actively to make the EMS without structural tensions. 
Second, a comparison of the imbalanced triples in the prior and posterior to the focal 
period supported the Fundamental Structural Balance Hypothesis (FSBH) for some 
periods (Doreian and Krackhardt, 2001). Although the main plus-set has existed 
connected and hierarchical throughout the entire period, the state of (im)balance has 
changed over time. The findings may be counterintuitive to the popular belief that the 
contemporary EMS is structurally imbalanced as well as fragmented and decentralized. 
The evidence suggests, however, that the movement structure may continue to be 
connected and hierarchical and yet it may continue to experience structural tensions 
depending on the changes in environmental litigation in the near future. 
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Part IV 
 
Concluding Elements 
 190
 Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
 
Below, I summarize some of the primary contributions of this dissertation including 
empirical findings and theoretical/methodological developments. Further, I address some 
limitations of this dissertation, particularly with respect to its confined scope and limited 
explication of the structural dynamics. Finally, I present substantive implications for the 
literature of social movements/collective action and potential directions for future 
research in studying interorganizational relations in nonprofit sectors. 
 
9.1   Empirical Findings 
While Zald and McCarthy (1987) pointed out that the literature on social movements 
lacked systematic analysis of the interaction of social movement organizations (SMOs), 
this dissertation attempted exclusively at a systematic investigation of the inter-
organizational relations in the environmental movement sector (EMS) for the given 
period. This dissertation found that, as the literature (Handler, 1978; Pellow, 1999) 
presented, there was a significant increase in litigative ties as well as alliance ties 
between the EORGs in the EMS in the United States and the increases in both types of 
inter-EORG ties were not random: organizational characteristics and their locations in the 
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inter-EORG relations mattered in forming (litigation, alliance) ties in the subsequent 
periods. 
Until the early 1990s, environmental litigation had been widely used by the 
EMOs founded early regardless of their expressed strategies or ideologies. As the 
literature noted, judicial activism in the 1960s and the 1970s in social movements 
stimulated and encouraged the use of litigation as a movement strategy, resulting in the 
increased number of EMOs resorting to litigation. And yet, after the mid-1990s on, young 
EMOs with limited resources have used litigation more actively than old EMOs, though 
old EMOs still have played central roles in environmental litigation. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, there are objectives that the EMOs attempt to obtain from movement conflicts: 
legitimacy of constituent representation, exclusive membership, symbolic dominance 
(Zald and McCarthy, 1987).64 The finding implies that the EMOs founded earlier did not 
avoid conflicts with the government agencies until the early 1990s whereas the EMOs 
founded later, since the mid-1990s just as the old EMOs did. It seems clear that the 
benefits that the EMOs could potentially obtain were more appealing to younger EMOs 
than to old EMOs for organizational survival and further success. This finding also 
resonates with that of organizational studies that traditional organizations with abundant 
resources tend to resort to the strategy of “exploitation” whereas new organizations, 
“exploration” (March, 1991). 
                                                          
64 From environmental litigation as a particular type of inter-organizational conflicts, the EMOs must have 
benefited the following extrajudicial as well as judical outcomes: political leverage, publicity, fund raising, 
consciousness-raising, and legitimacy (Handler, 1978; Zald and McCarthy, 1987). Handler (1978) 
contended that extrajudicial uses of the litigation might have been the most important accomplishment of 
the environmentalists. 
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As observed in Chapter 6, environmental litigation occurred mostly between the 
EMOs and the EGAs.65 Zald and Useem (1987) contends that direct attack by movement 
organizations against authorities occur because movement organizations are not 
sufficiently stable to implement major changes in society and, accordingly, they attempt 
to shift the cost of achieving change from themselves to the government and polity at 
large. While their argument appears tenable in general, the fact that the EMOs in stable 
condition such as the Sierra Club (SC), the National Audubon Society (NAS), and the 
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) as well as newly started EMOs were active in 
attacking the EGAs, particularly, before the mid-1990s suggests that their argument 
cannot be supported throughout the period studied in this dissertation. 
Transitive hierarchical structures, which E-state structuralism focused on, were 
found in only a few periods when dominated EORGs in triadic hierarchical structures 
tended to be attacked by other EORGs as well. Substantively, a triadic hierarchical 
structure in litigation implies that an EGA, sued by an EMO for negligence of 
enforcement of environmental laws/regulations, turns to another EGA and then the EMO, 
in turn, sues the EGA as well because it looks vulnerable under the assumption that the 
lawsuits occurred this way in time sequence. Particularly, the Sierra Club (SC) was 
involved in all the transitive hierarchical structures while attacking the United States (US), 
US Department of Agriculture (US DOA), US Department of Interior (US DOI), and US 
Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) that were most often dominated in the 
                                                          
65  No significant litigation activities were observed between the anti-environmental groups and the 
authorities despite the activism by the anti-environmental groups such as the “Wise-Use” group, while a 
few conservative EMOs were found to attack the EGAs (e.g., Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF) vs. US DOI 
and US EPA). Thus, models C and D of triadic conflictual structures among movement, counter-movement, 
and authority by Zald and Useem (1997) were not relevant to explaining the inter-organizational litigation 
in the current dissertation. 
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transitive hierarchical structures. The fact that most lawsuits were filed by EMOs against 
EGAs made the development of the transitive hierarchical structures infrequent. However, 
the transitive hierarchical structures occurred due to the tendency that the EGAs tended to 
attack other EGAs whereas the EMOs did not tend to attack other EMOs. As a result, the 
litigation structure was closed most often by the EGAs rather than by the EMOs, which 
suggests that the transitive hierarchical structures emerged in part due to the 
organizational type rather than pure “bystander effect” presented by E-state structuralism 
(Berger, Wagner, and Zelditch, 1985; Fararo and Skvoretz, 1986). 
The most recent litigative structure in the final period (1998-2001), which were 
thought to represent the contemporary inter-EORG conflictual structure, was connected, 
except for the two sets of isolated dyadic ties, and hierarchical–a large number of EMOs 
attacked a small number of EGAs. This provides more structural knowledge of the 
conflictual relations in the contemporary environmental movement beyond the typical 
narratives in the literature to show a simple increase in inter-EORG conflicts. The fact 
that many EMOs were sharing common movement opponents suggests a possibility of 
forming alliance ties or joint affiliation with collective action in the future. As a result, 
movement activities (e.g., advancing claims) may be coordinated and resources (e.g., 
finance, labor) may be mobilized between the EMOs with common movement opponents. 
On the other hand, the EMOs have allied with other EMOs in their organizational 
environment to achieve movement objectives. As noted, the literature identified the 
factors that served to facilitate alliances between EMOs such as task specialization, 
external social control, overlapping constituents, and elite/third-party constraints. It 
seems that the first two factors (e.g., similar goals/tactics; need of resource mobilization) 
 194
clearly served in promoting inter-EMO alliances in the EMS. Particularly, it was 
observed that the EMOs with similar ideological “orientation” and movement “strategy,” 
not necessarily in organizational “size” and “age,” have allied with each other. That is, in 
allying for joint litigation, the EMOs worked together regardless of their ages and sizes as 
long as they shared similar orientation and strategies. For example, the large EMOs that 
existed for a while in the movement sector allied for joint litigation with the small EMOs 
founded recently because they were similar in ideological orientation and movement 
strategies. This might have been unavoidable particularly for unstable EMOs that were 
newly founded to mobilize resources considering the nature of long-lasting and costly 
environmental litigation. In principle, this finding resonates with one of the popular rules of 
preferential attachment, “homophily” (McPherson and Smith-Lovin, 1987; McPherson et 
al., 2001). Nonetheless, it raises an important question of why the large EMOs, though 
they could have litigated by themselves, allied with the small EMOs just because they 
shared similar orientation and strategies. Here, no prompt answers can be given and 
future research might be able to address this question. 
The EMOs located in most constrained positions (i.e., embedded in alliance 
triads) (e.g., EDF, SC, NAS, and NRDC) in a period were still located in most 
constrained positions in the subsequent period. On the other hand, the EMOs located in 
least constrained positions in a period either closed alliance triads (e.g., FOEI, HSUS) or 
disappeared (e.g., CBE) in the subsequent period. In fact, a number of the EMOs in 
marginal locations simply disappeared in alliance structures. While the literature in 
network analysis contended that network closure is one of the mechanisms to increase 
social capital (Burt, 1992, 2001) and achieved by the actors in least constrained locations, 
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an analysis of the dynamics in alliance formation informs that network closure and 
subsequent increase in social capital has been achieved by the already most embedded 
EMOs, which is somewhat counterintuitive. 
The most recent alliance structure for the final period (1998-2001), which were 
thought to represent the contemporary inter-EORG alliance, was connected and 
hierarchical–a large number of EMOs allied with a small number of EMOs. As in the 
litigation structure, this provides more structural knowledge of the alliance relations in 
the contemporary environmental movement beyond the typical narratives in the literature 
to show a simple increase in inter-EMO alliances. Although the “connectedness” may not 
necessarily suggest “solidarity” in social movements/collective action, the fact that all 
EMOs, as long as they litigate, were connected to each other as a collectivity suggests a 
possibility of joint affiliation with collective action in the future. Accordingly, movement 
activities (e.g., advancing claims) may be coordinated and resources (e.g., finance, labor) 
may be mobilized between the EMOs in alliance relations. 
Finally, several cases of inter-EGA conflicting relations have been repeatedly 
observed throughout the period (US DOL–US OSHRC, US DOA–US EPA, and US–US 
DOI). Not all of these inter-EGA conflicts led to imbalanced structures from a balance-
theoretic perspective. The number of (Heiderian) imbalanced triples was highest in the 
early to mid-1980s when fourteen imbalanced triples were found. All imbalanced triples 
involved two EGAs and an EMO that were negatively tied to each other in litigation and 
the imbalanced triples became balanced by the inter-EGA conflicts disappearing due to 
the structural tension among the EORGs involved or the EMOs themselves disappearing. 
An observation of the dynamics of the triadic imbalanced structures implies that the 
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EGAs have attempted more actively to make the movement sector without structural 
tension. 
A comparison of the imbalanced triples across periods supported partially the 
Fundamental Structural Balance Hypothesis (FSBH) (Doreian and Krackhardt, 2001). 
Although the main plus-set (i.e., alliance structure) has existed connected and hierarchical, 
the state of (im)balance has alternated throughout the period. This finding may seem 
counterintuitive to the popular belief regarding the contemporary movement structure that 
it is structurally imbalanced (i.e., shifting allies and enemies) as well as fragmented and 
decentralized. The evidence implies, however, that the inter-EORG structure has 
continued to be connected and hierarchical and yet it has experienced structural tension 
on and off. 
 
9.2   Theoretical/Methodological Contributions 
In addition to investigating empirical questions regarding the inter-organizational 
(litigation, alliance) relations in the EMS, I have also attempted to add to the theoretical 
and methodological literatures on social network analysis, organization theory, and social 
movement/collective action. The basic contributions may be summarized as follows: 
This dissertation considered EMOs as “open” systems embedded in the 
organizational environment in which they operate (Aldrich, 1979; Galaskiewitz, 1979). 
Even as open systems, the EMOs were selective in forming (and removing) 
interorganizational ties when the ties were “costly” such as litigation and alliances for 
which they had to pay the costs for potential benefits. The current work discovered some 
conditions under which the EMOs have switched interorganizational ties. It further asks 
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for an exploration of more (attributal, relational) conditions under which organizations 
manage inter-organizational ties in both non-profit and for-profit sectors. 
This dissertation exemplified a network-structural analysis of the EMS 
(particularly, its alliance structures for opposition) in the United States, 1970-2001. The 
theoretical and methodological framework used in the current work is useful to the 
resource mobilization approach in particular that has aimed to explicate mobilizing 
structures in social movements/collective action. The current work provided some 
knowledge of the structural characteristics that may facilitate (or constrain) resource 
mobilization in the contemporary environmental movement. Analysis of the extent to 
which those structural characteristics contributed to the success of resource mobilization 
belongs to future research. 
Finally, this dissertation has illustrated how dyadic and triadic (litigation, alliance) 
substructures develop by investigating inter-EORG relations in the EMS in the United 
States. While research practices in studying social movements/collective action have 
largely neglected systematic analysis of interaction of the organizations in studying 
movement structures, this dissertation has represented and explicated the structure and 
dynamics of the environmental social movement by employing systematic network 
methods. The current work also addressed the importance and difficulty of explicating 
structural dynamics beyond formation of triadic structures to fully explain the emergence 
of the structural characteristics of the contemporary movement structure (e.g., 
connectedness, hierarchy, and balance). This dissertation suggests that future research 
consider models of network dynamics beyond the models of “triadic completion.” 
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9.3   Limitations 
Since the current work is concerned with the EORGs that have been involved in 
environmental litigation between 1970 and 2001 in the United States, the data set did not 
include the EORGs that have not litigated: i.e., EMOs, while still active, that have not 
used litigation as a movement strategy were excluded in data collection. Currently, it is 
not known how many national EORGs have existed without being involved in 
environmental litigation so far. The inter-EORG relations in this dissertation to represent 
the movement structure might have represented rather combative part of the 
environmental movement sector. 
Second, I did not attempt to explain what has made the EORGs employ litigation 
as a movement strategy among other strategies. As a result, the findings do not directly 
answer why the EORGs that were active in litigation have employed litigation, not other 
strategies. The current work can only note, according to the literature, that active 
environmental legislation since the 1960s have provided environmental standards that 
allowed the EORGs to use litigation. Moreover, the current work did not study what 
structural outcomes the success or failure of the environmental litigation has brought 
about in the movement sector. Since the focus of this dissertation was only on legal 
activities, the current work cannot be used to explain or evaluate whether or not the 
environmental movement has shifted from the “contentious” movement to the “conflict” 
movement over the past decades in the United States. 
Third, the current work did not consider organizational environments other than 
the interorganizational relations in which the EMOs were embedded. Those 
organizational environments may include technical or normative environments 
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(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). In environmental movements, recent historical events 
have also played important roles in organizational environments. For example, the 
current work started from an analysis of the period beginning in 1970 when the first Earth 
Day was observed. In dividing the entire period into subperiods, however, this 
dissertation did not use historical events in the development of the contemporary 
environmental movement. For example, it might have been appropriate to use historical 
events (e.g., the global summit to set the protocol for controlling ozone gases in 1997 in 
Kyoto, Japan) as criteria to divide the periods and then construct network structures as 
such. 
Finally, it was not clearly shown what structural mechanisms have brought about 
the contemporary litigative and alliance structures, though this dissertation did investigate 
the structural dynamics thereby dyadic and triadic substructures emerged over time. As a 
result, to a large extent, the current work had to be satisfied with describing the network 
changes rather than explaining it. Recent advances in structural theorization, 
methodological approaches, and computer packages may help discover the structural 
mechanisms by which the complicated contemporary social movement has emerged 
(Doreian and Stokman, 1997; Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1998; ICS, [2002] 2007). 
 
9.4   Implications 
Beyond the findings presented above, this research has some implications for the study of 
interorganizational relations in social movement/collective action. Here, I briefly present 
such implications. It is hoped that the implications below are useful for others pursuing 
research in this area. 
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The findings allow us to consider the differing roles of the EMOs in the expansion 
and continuity of the movement structure over time in the EMS in the United States. 
Taken together, the findings reveal that the “expansion” of the inter-EORG structure has 
been achieved by the young EMOs that actively adopted litigation as a movement 
strategy and that widely allied with other EMOs with similar movement orientation and 
strategies. Nonetheless, the “continuity” of the inter-EORG structure has been achieved 
by the old EMOs that have used litigation and that have allied with other EMOs. The new 
EMOs have tended to be intermittent in the inter-EORG structure. It may need a further 
thought to assess which of expansion and continuity has been more important in 
strengthening the EMS in the United States over the past decades. 
The findings also allow us to think the extent to which the connected yet 
hierarchical inter-EMO structure in the EMS may be efficient in future resource 
mobilization. As described, the inter-EMO alliance structure has been composed of a few 
embedded EMOs in the core and the marginal EMOs in the periphery. The fact that the 
contemporary inter-EMO structure is “connected” implies that resources may flow 
throughout the network structure whereas that the inter-EMO structure is “hierarchical” 
implies that the flow of resources may be controlled by the EMOs located in the core. It 
may need further thought to suggest the ways to make the inter-EMO structure more 
connected and less hierarchical, if this would be more efficient. 
 
9.5   Future Directions 
To fully explain the formation of dyadic ties based on both organizational characteristics 
and relational properties, future research may have to use conditional logit model 
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(McFadden, 1973, 1981; Ben-Akiva, and Lerman, 1989) as well as exponential random 
graph models (ERGM) or p-star logit models. The conditional logit models are more 
advantageous when the research aims to consider as variables the organizational 
characteristics of the focal parties involved, the parties’ neighbors, the parties’ neighbors’ 
neighbors’, and so on. Although the development of such models may require skills such 
as programming and data management, it seems clear that future research in this line will 
benefit more from them. 
More data may need to be collected in future research regarding the EORGs at the 
regional and local levels and other types of EORGs. Currently, there is no knowledge of 
what inter-EORG structures might look like at the regional and local levels, let alone the 
overall network structure when all the EORGs at those three different levels were 
aggregated. In addition, future research may have to include other types of organizations 
such as trade associations, corporations, labor unions other than EMOs and EGAs since 
they have also played essential roles in EMS in the United States. 
Future research might also have to consider more types of ties (e.g., interlocking, 
event affiliation, etc.) among more diverse types of entities (such as personnel, 
ideologies, resources, events, etc.). In this regard, tripartite structural analysis (Fararo and 
Doreian, 1984) and meta-network analysis (Krackhardt and Carley, 1998; Carley and 
Hill, 2001) may be useful in investigating the multi-modal multiplex structures. They are 
an effective scheme to represent and analyze the macrostructure of the inter-EORG 
relations in which multiple (e.g., social, cultural, and behavioral) substructures are 
interdependent on each other. While analysis of multiplex ties of multiple forms of nodes 
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may be computationally challenging, advances in the development of network packages 
such as ORA allow analysis feasible today (Carley, [2001] 2007). 
 
9.6   Final Thoughts 
In closing, while network has been used as a representation and analytical scheme, its use 
has been mainly toward social structures. Cultural structures also await network and the 
task seems not completely impossible because early cultural analysts were already 
conceptualizing cultural structures from a relational (and dynamic) perspective as 
follows: 66 
 
“[T]he culture concept … denotes an historically transmitted pattern of 
meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions 
expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, 
perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life.” 
(Geertz, [1966] 1973) 
 
Yet, it seems essential to study the dynamics–how a cultural structure emerges, 
sustains, and dissolves and what each process means to the people who conduct their 
lives while embedded in the structure. A long journey is before us. 
                                                          
66 In a similar fashion, while defining social network, White (1992) contends that “a social network is a 
network of meanings.” 
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 Appendix 
 
A. List of Environmental Movement Organizations 
ID Short Organization 
e1 ABC American Bird Conservancy (ABC) 
e2 ABF American Buffalo Foundation 
e3 ACA American Canoe Association (ACA) 
s1 ACORN Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) 
e4 AHPA American Horse Protection Association 
e5 AIANA Asbestos Information Association/North America (AIANA) 
e6 ALA American Lands Alliance 
e7 ALDF Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF) 
e8 ALS Americal Littoral Society 
e9 ANS Association of Northwest Steelheaders 
e10 AOC American Oceans Campaign 
e11 APHA American Public Health Association 
e12 API Animal Protection Institute 
e13 AR American Rivers 
e14 ARC Animal Rights Coalition 
e15 ARDF Alternatives Research & Development Foundation 
e16 ASLF Atlantic States Legal Foundation 
e17 ASPCA American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals 
e18 AV Appalachian Voices 
e19 AVAR Association of Veterinarians for Animal Rights 
e20 AW American Whitewater Affiliation (AW) 
e21 AWI Animal Welfare Institute (AWI) 
e22 AWL American Wildlands (AWL) 
e23 AWR Alliance for the Wild Rockies 
e24 BLF Biodiversity Legal Foundation 
e25 BWCA Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness (BWCA) 
e26 CAN Citizens Awareness Network (CAN) 
e27 CAS Center for Auto Safety 
e28 CBD Center for Biological Diversity 
e29 CBE Citizens for a Better Environment (CBE) (MCESPP) 
e30 CBF Chesapeake Bay Foundation 
s2 CC Common Cause 
s3 CEI Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI) 
s4 CFA Consumer Federation of America 
e31 CLAW Constitutional Law Foundation (CLF) 
 227
e32 CLF Conservation Law Foundation (CLF) 
e33 CMC Center for Marine Conservation (CMC) 
s5 CNI Community Nutrition Institute (CNI) 
e34 CNR Committee for Nuclear Responsibility 
e35 COA Clean Ocean Action (COA) 
e36 CRG Cabinet Resource Group (CRG) 
e37 CWA Clean Water Action (Clean Water Fund) 
e38 CWF Canadian Wildlife Federation 
e39 CWWG Chemical Weapons Working Group (CWWG) (KEF) 
e40 DPC Desert Protective Council (DPCINC) 
e41 DW Defenders of Wildlife 
e42 EC Ecology Center 
e43 EDF Environmental Defense Fund 
s6 EI  Edmonds Institute 
e44 EII Earth Island Institute 
e45 ELF Environmental Law Foundation 
e46 ELPC Environmental Law & Policy Center of the Midwest (ELPC) 
e47 FCC Forest Conservation Council 
e48 FG Forest Guardians 
e49 FHOA Foundation for Horses & Other Animals (FHOA) 
e50 FNAWS Foundation for North American Wild Sheep 
e51 FOEI Friends of the Earth (FOEI) 
s7 FOET Foundation on Economic Trends  
e52 FOTB Friends of the Bow (Biodiversity Associates) 
e53 FOWS Friends of the Wild Swan (FOWS) 
e54 GP Greenpeace, USA (Greenpeace Fund) 
e55 HD Heartwood 
e56 HSUS Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) 
e57 HW Headwaters 
e58 IDA In Defense of Animals (IDA) 
e59 IFAW International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW) 
e60 IPPL International Primate Protection League (IPPL) 
e61 ISAR International Society for Animal Rights (ISAR) 
e62 IWC International Wildlife Coalition (IWC) 
e63 IWLA Izaak Walton League (IWLA) 
e64 KRCG Kettle Range Conservation Group 
e65 LEAF Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation (LEAF) 
e66 LOWD League of Wilderness Defenders (LOWD) (BMBP) 
s8 LWV League of Women Voters (LWV) 
s9 MSLF Mountain States Legal Foundation (MSLF) 
e67 MTP Military Toxics Project (MTP) 
e68 NAC National Airspace Coalition 
e69 NAS National Audubon Society 
e70 NAWPF North American Wildlife Park Foundation 
e71 NCAMP National Coalition against Misuse of Pesticides (NCAMP) 
e72 NCAP Northwest Coalition for Alternatives to Pesticides (NCAP) 
e73 NCPL National Center for Preservation Law 
e74 NCSOM National Coalition to Save Our Mall 
 228
e75 NEA Northwest Environmental Advocates 
e76 NEAVS New England Anti-Vivisection Society (NEAVS) 
e77 NEC Northcoast Environmental Center (NEC) 
e78 NECNP New England Coalition (on Nuclear Pollution) (NECNP) 
e79 NEDC Northwest Environmental Defense Center (NEDC) 
s10 NELF New England Legal Foundation (NELF) 
e80 NEPI National Environmental Policy Institute (NEPI) 
e81 NFC Native Forest Council 
e82 NFN Native Forest Network 
e83 NFS Native Fish Society 
e84 NIRS Nuclear Information & Resource Service (NIRS) 
e85 NORS National Organization for Rivers (NORS) 
e86 NPCA National Parks Conservation Association (NPCA) 
e87 NRC National Recycling Coalition (NRC) 
e88 NRDC Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) 
e89 NRIC Northwest Resource Information Center (NRIC) 
e90 NRPP Northern Rockies Preservation Project (NRPP) 
e91 NTHP National Trust for Historic Preservation 
e92 NWEA Northwest Ecosystem Alliance (NWEA; Now, CNW) 
e93 NWF National Wildlife Federation 
e94 NWI National Wilderness Institute 
e95 NWR Northwoods Wilderness Recovery 
e96 NWRA National Wildlife Refuge Association (NWRA) 
e97 OA Ocean Advocates 
e98 OS Oceanic Society 
e99 PAWS Progressive Animal Welfare Society (PAWS) 
s11 PC Public Citizen (Public Citizen Foundation) 
e100 PCA Project on Clean Air 
e101 PERC Pacific Environment and Resources Center 
e102 PETA People for Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) 
s12 PIRG U.S. Public Interest Research Group (PIRG) 
s13 PLF Pacific Legal Foundation 
e103 PRC Pacific Rivers Council (PRC) 
s14 PSR Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) 
e104 RNW RESTORE: The North Woods 
e105 RPF Raymond Proffitt Foundation (RPF) 
e106 SAF Save America's Forests (Fund) 
e107 SAPL Society for Animal Protective Legislation (SAPL) 
e108 SC Sierra Club (Sierra Club Foundation) 
e109 SCAPL Seacoast Anti-Pollution League (SAPL) 
e110 SCI Safari Club International (SCI) 
s15 SIPI  Scientists' Institute for Public Information (SIPI)
e111 SOWL Save Our Wetlands (SOWL) 
e112 STB Save the Bay 
e113 TAF The Animal Fund (TAF) 
e114 TDP The Dolphin Project 
e115 TFA The Fund for Animals 
e116 TLC The Lands Council (TLC) 
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e117 TM The Mountaineers 
s16 TRS The Ripon Society 
e118 TU Trout Unlimited (TU) 
e119 UAN United Animal Nations 
e120 UCS Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) 
e121 WAN Wetlands Action Network 
e122 WI Wilderness Inquiry 
e123 WKA Waterkeeper Alliance  
e124 WLP Western Lands (Exchange) Project 
e125 WS Wilderness Society 
e126 WW Wilderness Watch 
e127 WWF World Wildlife Fund (WWF) 
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B.   List of Environmental Government Agencies 
ID Short Organization 
g1 US United States 
g2 US Air Force US Department of Air Force 
g3 US Army US Army Corps of Engineers 
g4 US BPA US Bonneville Power Administration 
g5 US CEQ US Council of Environmental Quality (CEQ) 
g6 US DOA US Department of Agriculture (DOA) 
g7 US DOC US Department of Commerce 
g8 US DOD US Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) (DOD) 
g9 US DOE US Department of Energy (DOE) 
g10 US DOI US Department of Interior (DOI) 
g11 US DOL US Department of Labor (DOL) 
g12 US DOS US Department of State 
g13 US DOT US Department of Transportation (DOT) 
g14 US EPA US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
g15 US FAA US Federal Aviation Administration 
g16 US FDA US Federal Drug Administration 
g17 US FEMA US Federal Emergency Management Agency 
g18 US FERC US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
g19 US FLRA US Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) 
g20 US FMSHRC US FMSHRC 
g21 US GSA US General Services Administration 
g22 US HEW US Department of Health, Education & Welfare (HEW) 
g23 US HHS US Department of Health & Human Services (HHS) 
g24 US HUD US Department of Housing & Urban Development (HUD) 
g25 US NAS US National Academy of Science 
g26 US Navy US Department of Navy 
g27 US NIH US National Institute of Health 
g28 US NOAA US National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) (NOAA Fisheries Service) 
g29 US NPS US National Park Services 
g30 US NRC US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
g31 US NRP US National 
g32 US NSF US National Science Foundation 
g33 US NWPPC US NWPPC 
g34 US OSHRC US Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission 
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C.   Estimation from Exponential Random Graph Model 
(ERGM or p-star) 
 
1. No attributes selected. 
 
 LINK: "PARTNERSHIP"  LINKS =    814  NODES =  104  (DIAGONAL NOT INCLUDED)                                     
                                                                                                                
  -2 Log PseudoLikelihood =             2669.693                                                                
          Goodness of Fit =             9255.662                                                                
        Model Chi-squared =            12180.292     df = 3                                                     
                                                                                                                
 FIT AT P = 0.5                          RESIDUALS                                                              
                PRED           529                                                                              
             <P   ¦   >P                 Absolute =         671.603                                             
         ------------------              Squared  =         338.936                                             
       0 ¦    9845¦      53  10.0%                                                                              
 OBS     ¦--------¦--------  -----                                                                              
       1 ¦     338¦     476  90.0%                                                                              
         ¦        ¦                                                                                             
 814     ¦   41.5%¦   58.5%                                                                                     
                                                                                                                
   PARM BLOCK           b   "Std.Err"      PLWald   p(df=1)    exp(b)      Counts    Errors                     
      1           -4.7027      0.0987   2269.4225    < 0.01      0.01         814   0.00000                     
      3            0.0167      0.0055      9.2957    < 0.01      1.02       12580   0.00000                     
      6            0.2773      0.0087   1024.6482    < 0.01      1.32       16938   0.00000                     
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NODE: <NONE>
Permutation: OFF
-2 * Log PL =     2669.7
P = 0.5       PREDICTED
  <P           >P
OBS  0
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         338
        9845
         476
         814       41.5%        58.5%
         529
       10.0%
       90.0%
                 
 
 
2. “Age” selected. 
 
 LINK: "PARTNERSHIP"  LINKS =    814  NODES =  104  (DIAGONAL NOT INCLUDED)                                     
 NODE = "Age "                                                                                               
 BLOCKING                                                                                                       
    1   0   0   0                                                                                               
    0   1   0   0                                                                                               
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    0   0   1   0                                                                                               
    0   0   0   1                                                                                               
                                                                                                                
  -2 Log PseudoLikelihood =             2666.165                                                                
          Goodness of Fit =             9320.294                                                                
        Model Chi-squared =            12183.820     df = 6                                                     
                                                                                                                
 FIT AT P = 0.5                          RESIDUALS                                                              
                PRED           534                                                                              
             <P   ¦   >P                 Absolute =         671.052                                             
         ------------------              Squared  =         338.300                                             
       0 ¦    9842¦      56  10.5%                                                                              
 OBS     ¦--------¦--------  -----                                                                              
       1 ¦     336¦     478  89.5%                                                                              
         ¦        ¦                                                                                             
 814     ¦   41.3%¦   58.7%                                                                                     
                                                                                                                
   PARM BLOCK           b   "Std.Err"      PLWald   p(df=1)    exp(b)      Counts    Errors                     
      1     1      0.2376      0.2212      1.1537    > 0.10      1.27         270   0.00000                     
      3     1     -0.0130      0.0132      0.9707    > 0.10      0.99        4523   0.00000                     
 
 
     6     1     -0.0189      0.0188      1.0078    > 0.10      0.98        6696   0.00000    
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LINK: PARTNERSHIP
NODE: Age
Permutation: ON
-2 * Log PL =     2666.2
P = 0.5       PREDICTED
  <P           >P
OBS  0           56        9842
         534
       10.5%
         1         336          478
         814       41.3%        58.7%
       89.5%
Age
1      1968 or belo
2      1969-1976
3      1977-1988
4      1989 or abov
  
 
 
3. “Size” selected. 
 
 LINK: "PARTNERSHIP"  LINKS =    814  NODES =  104  (DIAGONAL NOT INCLUDED)                                     
 NODE = "Size "                                                                                               
 BLOCKING                                                                                                       
    1   0                                                                                                       
    0   1                                                                                                       
                                                                                                                
  -2 Log PseudoLikelihood =             2656.631                                                                
          Goodness of Fit =             9515.101                                                                
        Model Chi-squared =            12193.354     df = 6                                                     
                                                                                                                
 FIT AT P = 0.5                          RESIDUALS                                                              
                PRED           526                                                                              
             <P   ¦   >P                 Absolute =         669.104                                             
         ------------------              Squared  =         337.102                                             
       0 ¦    9848¦      50   9.5%                                                                              
 OBS     ¦--------¦--------  -----                                                                              
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       1 ¦     338¦     476  90.5%                                                                              
         ¦        ¦                                                                                             
 814     ¦   41.5%¦   58.5%                                                                                     
                                                                                                                
   PARM BLOCK           b   "Std.Err"      PLWald   p(df=1)    exp(b)      Counts    Errors                     
      1     1      0.8025      0.3374      5.6563    < 0.02      2.23         714   0.00000                     
      3     1      0.0223      0.0208      1.1550    > 0.10      1.02       11326   0.00000                     
      6     1     -0.0684      0.0281      5.9123    < 0.02      0.93       14826   0.00000 
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LINK: PARTNERSHIP
NODE: Size
Permutation: ON
-2 * Log PL =     2656.6
P = 0.5       PREDICTED
  <P           >P
OBS  0
         1
          50
         338
        9848
         476
         814       41.5%        58.5%
         526
        9.5%
       90.5%
Size
1      Small
2      Large
                 
 
 
4. “Orientation” selected. 
 
 LINK: "PARTNERSHIP"  LINKS =    814  NODES =  104  (DIAGONAL NOT INCLUDED)                                     
 NODE = "Orient "                                                                                               
 BLOCKING                                                                                                       
    1   0   0                                                                                                   
    0   1   0                                                                                                   
    0   0   1                                                                                                   
                                                                                                                
  -2 Log PseudoLikelihood =             2630.246                                                                
          Goodness of Fit =             9407.740                                                                
        Model Chi-squared =            12219.739     df = 6                                                     
                                                                                                                
 FIT AT P = 0.5                          RESIDUALS                                                              
                PRED           531                                                                              
             <P   ¦   >P                 Absolute =         667.422                                             
         ------------------              Squared  =         336.636                                             
       0 ¦    9842¦      56  10.5%                                                                              
 OBS     ¦--------¦--------  -----                                                                              
       1 ¦     339¦     475  89.5%                                                                              
         ¦        ¦                                                                                             
 814     ¦   41.6%¦   58.4%                                                                                     
                                                                                                                
   PARM BLOCK           b   "Std.Err"      PLWald   p(df=1)    exp(b)      Counts    Errors                     
      1     1      1.0303      0.2534     16.5294    < 0.01      2.80         566   0.00000                     
      3     1      0.0270      0.0141      3.6596    < 0.10      1.03        9020   0.00000                     
      6     1     -0.0999      0.0222     20.2238    < 0.01      0.90       11046   0.00000 
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LINK: PARTNERSHIP
NODE: Orient
Permutation: ON
-2 * Log PL =     2630.2
P = 0.5       PREDICTED
  <P           >P
OBS  0
         1
          56
         339
        9842
         475
         814       41.6%        58.4%
         531
       10.5%
       89.5%
Orient
1      Leftist
2      Mainstream
3      Conservative
 
 
 
                
5. “Strategy” selected. 
 
 LINK: "PARTNERSHIP"  LINKS =    814  NODES =  104  (DIAGONAL NOT INCLUDED)                                     
 NODE = "Strategy "                                                                                       
 BLOCKING                                                                                                       
    1   0   0   0                                                                                               
    0   1   0   0                                                                                               
    0   0   1   0                                                                                               
    0   0   0   1                                                                                               
                                                                                                                
  -2 Log PseudoLikelihood =             2663.769                                                                
          Goodness of Fit =             9374.990                                                                
        Model Chi-squared =            12186.216     df = 6                                                     
                                                                                                                
 FIT AT P = 0.5                          RESIDUALS                                                              
                PRED           536                                                                              
             <P   ¦   >P                 Absolute =         669.673                                             
         ------------------              Squared  =         337.964                                             
       0 ¦    9839¦      59  11.0%                                                                              
 OBS     ¦--------¦--------  -----                                                                              
       1 ¦     337¦     477  89.0%                                                                              
         ¦        ¦                                                                                             
 814     ¦   41.4%¦   58.6%                                                                                     
                                                                                                                
   PARM BLOCK           b   "Std.Err"      PLWald   p(df=1)    exp(b)      Counts    Errors                     
      1     1     -0.2121      0.2080      1.0402    > 0.10      0.81         524   0.00000                     
      3     1      0.0227      0.0133      2.9293    < 0.10      1.02        8573   0.00000                     
      6     1      0.0105      0.0181      0.3372    > 0.50      1.01       10728   0.00000 
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LINK: PARTNERSHIP
NODE: Strategy
Permutation: ON
-2 * Log PL =     2663.8
P = 0.5       PREDICTED
  <P           >P
OBS  0
         1
          59
         337
        9839
         477
         814       41.4%        58.6%
         536
       11.0%
       89.0%
Strategy
1      Research and
2      Public Aware
3      Policy and L
4      Litigation
 
 
 
 
6. “Area” selected. 
 
 LINK: "PARTNERSHIP"  LINKS =    814  NODES =  104  (DIAGONAL NOT INCLUDED)                                     
 NODE = "Area "                                                                                               
 BLOCKING                                                                                                       
    1   0   0   0   0   0   0   0                                                                               
    0   1   0   0   0   0   0   0                                                                               
    0   0   1   0   0   0   0   0                                                                               
    0   0   0   1   0   0   0   0                                                                               
    0   0   0   0   1   0   0   0                                                                               
    0   0   0   0   0   1   0   0                                                                               
    0   0   0   0   0   0   1   0                                                                               
    0   0   0   0   0   0   0   1                                                                               
                                                                                                                
  -2 Log PseudoLikelihood =             2646.206                                                                
          Goodness of Fit =             9217.507                                                                
        Model Chi-squared =            12203.779     df = 6                                                     
                                                                                                                
 FIT AT P = 0.5                          RESIDUALS                                                              
                PRED           532                                                                              
             <P   ¦   >P                 Absolute =         670.305                                             
         ------------------              Squared  =         337.339                                             
       0 ¦    9843¦      55  10.3%                                                                              
 OBS     ¦--------¦--------  -----                                                                              
       1 ¦     337¦     477  89.7%                                                                              
         ¦        ¦                                                                                             
 814     ¦   41.4%¦   58.6%                                                                                     
                                                                                                                
   PARM BLOCK           b   "Std.Err"      PLWald   p(df=1)    exp(b)      Counts    Errors                     
      1     1      0.7861      0.2062     14.5306    < 0.01      2.19         388   0.00000                     
      3     1     -0.0186      0.0125      2.2055    > 0.10      0.98        5384   0.00000                     
 
 
     6     1     -0.0069      0.0184      0.1413    > 0.50      0.99        8880   0.00000                   
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LINK: PARTNERSHIP
NODE: Area
Permutation: ON
-2 * Log PL =     2646.2
P = 0.5       PREDICTED
  <P           >P
OBS  0
         1
          55
         337
        9843
         477
         814       41.4%        58.6%
         532
       10.3%
       89.7%
Area
 1      Air climate
 2      Ocean river
 3      Wildlife lan
 4      Historic pre
 5      Recycle ener
 6      Public trans
 7      Toxics nucle
 8      Animal right
 9      Public healt
10      general
  
 
 
7. “Region”. 
 
 LINK: "PARTNERSHIP"  LINKS =    814  NODES =  104  (DIAGONAL NOT INCLUDED)                                     
 NODE = "Region "                                                                                               
 BLOCKING                                                                                                       
    1   0   0   0                                                                                               
    0   1   0   0                                                                                               
    0   0   1   0                                                                                               
    0   0   0   1                                                                                               
                                                                                                                
  -2 Log PseudoLikelihood =             2639.636                                                                
          Goodness of Fit =             9435.053                                                                
        Model Chi-squared =            12210.349     df = 6                                                     
                                                                                                                
 FIT AT P = 0.5                          RESIDUALS                                                              
                PRED           539                                                                              
             <P   ¦   >P                 Absolute =         666.993                                             
         ------------------              Squared  =         336.703                                             
       0 ¦    9836¦      62  11.5%                                                                              
 OBS     ¦--------¦--------  -----                                                                              
       1 ¦     337¦     477  88.5%                                                                              
         ¦        ¦                                                                                             
 814     ¦   41.4%¦   58.6%                                                                                     
                                                                                                                
   PARM BLOCK           b   "Std.Err"      PLWald   p(df=1)    exp(b)      Counts    Errors                     
      1     1      0.8942      0.1981     20.3820    < 0.01      2.45         300   0.00000                     
      3     1     -0.0195      0.0113      2.9636    < 0.10      0.98        4157   0.00000                     
      6     1     -0.0108      0.0184      0.3428    > 0.50      0.99        5580   0.00000 
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LINK: PARTNERSHIP
NODE: Region
Permutation: ON
-2 * Log PL =     2639.6
P = 0.5       PREDICTED
  <P           >P
OBS  0
         1
          62
         337
        9836
         477
         814       41.4%        58.6%
         539
       11.5%
       88.5%
Region
1      Northeast
2      Midwest
3      South
4      West
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